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Abstract
This is a refugee-centred study of the decision making process of Iraqis displaced after the 
Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003. It investigates the pressures and influences that 
affected their decisions as well as who was involved and consulted. In doing so it sheds light 
on the under-theorised issue of what it means to be forced into a migration decision. The 
meaning of coercion is examined and applied to a forced migration context, considering the 
dynamics  of  cumulative  causation  in  the  process.  The  study  also  attempts  to  advance 
understandings of the relationship between state-formation and displacement. Narratives of 
Iraqis forced to migrate to Syria after 2003 were collected between June 2010 and April 2011 
and form the primary data  in  this  study.  Narrative methods were  used to  elicit  extended 
testimonies from Iraqis in Syria in order to explore conceptual issues.
The research demonstrates the complex nature of forced migration and how displacement can 
be experienced as a process. Transformations of state which occurred in Iraq after the 2003 
invasion led to purges which affected numerous groups perceived to belong to the old order. 
Iraqis who were perceived to be associated - rightly or wrongly - with the former regime 
experienced pressures and threats which resulted in some of them becoming migrants. The 
same transformations also manifested themselves as coercive alterations of spaces in Iraqis' 
daily  lives.  In  a  climate  of  generalised  violence  and  insecurity,  an  array  of  threats  and 
pressures, including those resulting from the dynamics of cumulative causation, combined to 
form  what  the  author  calls  a  coercive  landscape:  a  social  world  in  which  choices  are 
diminished and life is heavily constrained by a multiplicity of threats – and which is likely to 
induce mass displacement. Although grounded in a specifically Iraqi context, it may be useful 
for scholars to test this concept in other contexts of mass displacement. 
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Introduction
“Refugees are ordinary people in extraordinary circumstances” (Harrell-Bond, 1999: 58) and 
their “history has been actively forgotten” (Kushner, 2006: 47). In the coming pages I show 
that  refugees are  ordinary  people  responding  to  coercive  circumstances.  I  document  the 
experiences of Iraqis displaced by post-2003 political transformations which themselves have 
roots  in  historical  transformations.  Their  experiences  form case  studies  through  which  I 
address an under-developed conceptual issue in forced migration studies: what it means to be 
forced to migrate. In the field of Refugee Studies and Forced Migration Studies, this is a term 
which has received little conceptual examination but one used widely and taken for granted. 
Iraq's  modern  history  has  been  characterised  by  many  displacements  relating  to 
transformations of state (Chatelard, 2012). This project investigates experiences of those who 
lived through its most recent phase: mass displacement which took place in the aftermath of 
occupation in 2003 and the transformations of state initiated by it. The scale of displacement 
since 2003 has been huge. The International Organization for Migration estimates that 1.6 
million Iraqis have been displaced internally since February 2006 (IOM, 2011). The United 
Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) puts the figure close to 1.2 million (UNHCR, 2012:147). 
The official Syrian government figure for the number of Iraqis in Syria in January 2012 was 1 
million (UNHCR, 2012: 154). While doubts have been raised about the reliability of figures 
provided by the Syrian government, there are still 100,000 Iraqis registered with UNHCR in 
Syria (ibid.) and the agency reported that 260,000 had registered with it between 2003 and 
2010 (UNHCR, 2010). It was among refugees in Syria that I conducted this research.
This is an interdisciplinary project: I have mobilised insights from Refugee Studies, Narrative 
Studies,  Oral  History,  Ancient  and  Contemporary  Moral  Philosophy,  and  Development 
Economics.  I hope that the findings will be of interest to scholars in those fields, in Middle 
Eastern  studies,  in  the Sociology  of  Conflict,  and  to  policy-makers  responding  to 
displacement. The displaced are treated as social agents with lived experiences throughout 
this project. The research questions explore how Iraqis made momentous decisions to leave 
places of origin, who was involved in such choices, and how they addressed extremes of 
constraint associated with the violence and conflict which followed the invasion of Iraq in 
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2003.  I propose that displacement can be better understood by examining decision making. 
Displacement is a process (Marfleet, 2011b) which deserves closer analysis. I hope to shed 
light  on  how people  are  actually  forced  into  a  decision  to  move  by an  accumulation  of 
constraints. I connect these processes to wider political and historical developments. I address 
a number of key research questions. 
● What pressures and influences were most significant in convincing Iraqis to leave their 
homes?
● To what extent did key networks and communities of kinship, diaspora, sect, and 
profession play a role in decisions?
● To what extent were migratory decisions informed by the dynamics of cumulative 
causation? 
●What do migrants' experiences tell us about the relationship between state transformation 
and displacement?
I have developed a specific conceptual framework for addressing constraint in the context of 
migration drawing on experience at the individual level. I have not limited my understanding 
of coercion to the narrow “fear of persecution” remit of the 1951 UNHCR convention.  I 
explore coercion and threat in a broader context. I use insights from Moral Philosophy to 
address issues of agency and compulsion (Aristotle, 350BCE; Wertheimer, 1987), arguing that 
threats which can induce migration need to be understood in light of their context and the 
interpretation of those who perceive them. Their perceptions of threat are altered by evolving 
contexts and amplified by the aggregation of threatening experiences. At the same time I 
argue that migration, even under duress, is part of a calculated  threat-evasion strategy. My 
research also looks at the theory of cumulative causation (Massey, 1990) in relation to forced 
migration. I also assess the ways in which displacement alters contexts in which subsequent 
journeys are made, often coercing those who remain into taking flight. I  further assess the 
relationship  between  displacement  and  transformations  of  state  and  contextualise  these 
processes comparatively and historically. 
My project addresses developments in Iraq after 2003 and following 13 years of sanctions and 
the reconstitution of the Iraqi state in the years which followed. Iraqi society – particularly in 
Baghdad -  was re-shaped and communally “un-mixed” in the aftermath of sectarian civil 
conflict (Marfleet, 2007, 2009). These  changes  affected individuals and groups in different 
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ways. Social  class affects  the evasion strategies available  to agents  but is  not an  explicit 
feature of this study about decision making and coercion. I refer to the material resources 
available to my informants when the effects on choice are salient. 
My interest in displacement in Iraq derives in part from my heritage. I was born in Iraq but 
came to the UK, now my country of nationality, aged four. My family has been affected by 
displacement and I am aware of its multiple and undocumented effects. The study of forced 
migration is “affected by a partisanship … that cries out for moral positioning” because of the 
nature of the subject: suffering and dispossession call out to be recognised and their effects 
ameliorated (Chatty, 2010: 1). I make no claims to objectivity here nor do I aim to record and 
remedy suffering. Rather, in addition to making conceptual advances in the field, I wish to 
humanise the study of this period of Iraq's history by putting the people who have lived 
through it at its centre.  My study offers a contrasting representation of refugees - not as the 
passive victims found in dominant British media representations (Kushner, 2006: 44) but as 
people  with  agency  and  individuality.  I  have  also  situated  their  experiences  in  broader 
political and historical processes. Here I have benefited from being anchored dually in Britain 
and Iraq  - neither a complete insider nor an outsider. I was able to build relationships with 
many Iraqis in Syria, helped by my fluency in the distinctive Iraqi dialect of Arabic, but  I 
have also attempted to retain sufficient distance for critical analysis.
Organisation of the thesis 
In  Chapter  1  I  outline  my  research  questions  and  present  the  framework  that  I  use  to 
conceptualise forced migration decisions as coerced choices. I review different categories of 
forced migration and argue that they are all  threat-induced journeys and  that  therefore it is 
necessary to consider threat and coercion more closely. I have relied on insights from moral 
philosophy, notably from Alan Wertheimer (1987) but also from Aristotle, to address what 
constitutes  voluntary  and  involuntary  action,  or  more  precisely forced  action.  I  argue 
throughout the thesis that it is not only individuals who issue threats but also the broader 
circumstances  of  an  agent's  environment.  Changes  to  the  these,  such as  those  caused by 
transformations  of  state,  can  also  be  regarded  as  threatening.  These  are  coercive 
circumstances  in  which  reference groups,  as  well  as  individuals,  can  sense  a  threat  to  a 
baseline. The example I use in Chapter 1 is that of displacements relating to statecraft (Soguk, 
1999) and to transformations of state more generally. I compare the purging of members of 
the former Ba'athist regime in Iraq - and those perceived to be associated with it (rightly or 
wrongly) – with  similar historical processes.  Some faced threats to their survival and others 
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to their livelihoods. Here I use the concept of “instrumental freedoms” (Sen, 1999) to develop 
the  notion of  baselines.  I  also  consider  cumulative  causation (Massey,  1990) in  a  forced 
migration context and how departures affect those who stay, altering the context in which they 
remain and in which migration decisions were made. 
In  Chapter 2 I discuss methodological issues. I outline some conceptual issues in narrative 
and memory work, acknowledging the complex and fluid nature of memories from which 
people tell stories about their past and present. I also reflect on how contextual elements may 
have influenced the research.  My case studies are based on a selection from 30 interviews I 
conducted during 2010 and 2011 in Damascus, Syria. I asked Iraqis what their lives were like 
before and during the  occupation;  about  their  perceptions  of  threat  before  flight;  if/  how 
consultations affected decision-making; which individuals/groups were most influential; and 
how  decisions  to  leave  affected  those  who  remained.  I  used  narrative  methods  to  elicit 
detailed testimony and to reflect upon events which influenced decisions to leave. 
Chapter 3 provides a historical context to mass displacement in Iraq after the occupation of 
2003. It begins in 1979 with the Iranian Revolution and a background to the eight year long 
Iran-Iraq war. The war ended in 1988 at enormous human and material cost to both countries. 
An  international  coalition  inflicted  a  catastrophic  defeat  on  Iraq  in  1991,  decimating  its 
infrastructure.  Sanctions  then  impoverished  much of Iraqi  society.  The crushing defeat  of 
1991 also led to uprisings in the southern provinces and northern provinces of the country 
which were brutally suppressed. I discuss how the regime chose to interpret the uprisings 
from a communalist perspective  and how sectarian cleavages emerged in the 1990s.  I also 
show how exiled politicians and invading armies pursued sectarian agendas with disastrous 
consequences for Iraqi society. The result was a situation of generalised violence, sectarian 
killings and other criminal activities and the descent into a “state of violence” (Harling, 2011). 
It was in this context that further mass displacement took place. 
In  Chapter 4 I  present the first stories of displacement. I focus on state collapse and state 
transformation, examining their effects on Iraqis, particularly those who were directly targeted  
by the  nascent  Iraqi  state  which emerged after  2003.  I  look at  the displacements  caused 
directly by threats from the occupation forces, drawing on stories of those who were purged 
because they were seen to belong to the old order. The chapter also considers experiences of 
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the Palestinian refugees living in Iraq and of the Mandaeans – an ancient monotheistic sect. I 
also  present  the  narratives  of  Iraqis  who  made  temporary  pre-invasion  migrations  to 
provincial locations where relatives lived. This was because they anticipated threats to their 
lives from the intense bombing campaign in 2003.
Chapter 5 examines how  changed perceptions of space played a role  in the displacement 
process. I show how state transformations manifested themselves as threatening alterations of 
social relations in  key spaces in Iraqis' daily lives. I show how threats materialised in the 
school space, in the neighbourhood space, and in the work space in ways that disrupted social 
opportunities and  economic  freedoms,  and which  threatened lives.  Stories  in  this  chapter 
convey  the  cumulative  nature  of  the  displacement  process.  Agents  were  confronted  with 
coercive  proposals  in  a  multiplicity  of  spaces  in  their  daily  lives:  I  call  this  situation  a 
coercive landscape - one that is highly conducive to forced migration and mass displacement. 
This chapter also contains narratives of people who understood that leaving Iraq entailed 
economic insecurity which they were not willing to risk, and against which they did not have 
the financial means to cushion: they were “involuntarily immobilised” - they were unable to 
migrate - and displaced in place (Lubkemann, 2008). Their stories show how the dynamics of 
cumulative  causation  can  constrain  as  well  as  compel  migration.  The  phenomenon  of 
“socially fortuitous wartime migration” (ibid.) is also acknowledged in this chapter. 
Chapter  6  completes  the  stories  of  two Mandaean men and a  Palestinian  refugee  who I 
introduced in Chapter 4. The aim is to show how members of Iraq's minorities experienced 
the transformations taking place in particular ways. Although they endured many of the same 
threats as the majority of their compatriots, I show how they encountered other types of threat 
specific to their minority groups. I exhibit these stories in a longitudinal way to give a more 
vivid sense of the cumulative nature of the displacement process. The ways in which the 
pressures accumulated and the coercive landscape came into being are features of this chapter 
– so too are the ways that threats and constraints are understood collectively by a reference 
group.  The  general climate of insecurity restricted freedoms to generate income –  making 
Mandaean traders of precious metals into easy targets for criminal gangs. But it also restricted 
the freedom to practice their religious rituals which are key to maintaining their faith and 
group identity.
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Chapter 7 is a concluding discussion which re-examines conceptual  issues and summarises 
key findings  about  the  decision making process,  including observations about  cumulative 
causation and the  gendered nature of  displacement.  I  reflect  on the  benefits  of  analysing 
forced migration using the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1. I conclude that in the 
Refugee Studies and Migration Studies field we need to think in new ways about the nature of 
constraint. I have found it helpful to think about migrant decision making in the context of 
what I call coercive landscapes. It is in such situations that people are compelled to make hard 
choice decisions but continue to express their agency as social actors. I suggest that the notion 
of  coercive  landscapes  is  a  useful  conceptual  tool  with  which  to  interrogate  mass 
displacements  of  the  past,  present,  and  future  in  different  geographical  contexts  of 
displacement.  I  also  reassert  the  importance  of  the  historical  perspective  in  studying 
displacements and its relationship to state transformation. 
Whilst in Damascus I took many photographs and have included a selection in the thesis. I 
have also included photographs from a visit I made to Iraq in the summer of 2001. There are 
other images which an Iraqi friend took during a trip there this year and which she has kindly 
allowed me to use here. The images are not intended as data but serve to give the reader a 
sense of the world which the author and participants inhabited.
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Chapter 1 
Coercion: the missing concept 
… with respect to cases of throwing goods 
overboard in a storm: abstractedly no man throws
 away his property willingly, but with a view to his
 own and his shipmates' safety, anyone would who 
had any sense.
- Aristotle (350 BCE, NE iii: 54)
Coerced choices are not unwilled, but they are, it 
may be said, against one's will. 
- Alan Wertheimer (1987: 302)
In this chapter I outline my understanding of what forced migration is, addressing directly 
what it means to be forced into a decision to migrate, using insights from moral philosophy 
and development economics. This is an under-researched area. Although the concept of forced 
migration is widely used, it is taken for granted and few scholars have dealt with it directly. I  
argue that a forced migration is a decision taken to relocate under circumstances of duress, 
induced by the decision maker's perception of threat. These decisions typically occur after a 
process of displacement involving a series of episodes of increasing constraint on a person's 
ability to live in a way that he or she deems valuable, possibly culminating in a threat to 
personal safety. Threats may also be seen as challenging the capacity to live in a way that is  
worthwhile.
Displacement is often experienced as a process (Marfleet, 2011b: 281): a series of complex 
episodes  in  which  threats  and  pressures  accumulate  until  individuals,  families,  and  even 
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communities are compelled to take evasive measures that may lead to physical relocation in 
search of security (ibid.).  It  is  in  effect a  package of losses, including loss of social  and 
economic  resources  and legal  and political  rights  -  but  one which  should not  always be 
conflated with forced migration (Lubkemann, 2008: 454-455). Forced migration can often 
occur as part of this process of displacement but not all who wish to move after experiencing 
displacement are able to do so. They may not have the resources to do so, or they may be 
prevented from moving by actors and factors beyond their control. In effect, they are forcibly  
immobilized: rather than forced to migrate, they are forced to remain in a situation in which 
they have experienced losses - therefore they become displaced in place (ibid.). While many 
suffer losses as a result of forced migration, a few can benefit. A decision to leave, even if  
forced,  can  be  socially  empowering  and  result  in  socially  fortuitous  wartime  migration 
(ibid.).1 
The displaced are not objects but subjects with specific lived experiences. They are affected 
by forces that fundamentally alter their circumstances. Like all human beings they are social 
agents whose lives are constrained by structural factors. Within these constraints they seek to 
make choices  and act  upon them in order  to  change their  circumstances.  They may face 
constraints that are overwhelming and a range of choices which is minimal (Marfleet, 2006: 
193-4).  By  considering  refugees  as  human  agents,  the  constraints  upon  them  and  their 
available  options  can  be  better  examined.  Our  understanding  of  the  lived  experience  of 
displacement can be enhanced by treating Iraqis as social agents who have used migration as 
part of a calculated survival strategy. Many have been compelled to construct and act upon 
these strategies because of the political upheavals and crises confronting them since the 2003 
occupation  which  compounded  the  pressures  of  dealing  with  international  sanctions  and 
dictatorship. Further constraints have been imposed upon Iraqi society, limiting the choices 
that individuals and groups have in their everyday lives. 
Invasion and occupation of Iraq led to colossal changes in the country. Castles (2010) has 
written  about  “social  transformations”  that  can  drive  displacement.  He  speaks  of  “step 
changes”  which  are  “closely  linked  to  major  shifts  in  dominant  economic,  political,  and 
strategic relationships” (Castles, 2010: 12). They do not occur gradually as part of a process 
1
Those able to make socially fortuitous wartime migration were in the minority in this study and the fortuitous 
nature of their migration was limited but worthy of note. See chapter 5.
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in  manageable  increments.  They  are  “fundamental  shifts”  that  put  “all  existing  social 
patterns” into question with many being reconfigured (ibid.). Social transformations, however 
fundamental, typically retain elements of the reality that preceded them. Invasion of Iraq in 
2003 resulted in significant changes, though there were continuities with the recent past, as I  
explain in Chapter 3. The invasion exacerbated developments of the 1990s and formalised 
communal politics. Mass displacement ensued as a result of communal violence and radical 
post-occupation  policies.  I  say  more  about  these  issues  later  in  this  and  in  subsequent 
chapters.  
Research questions
In order to understand forced migration as a lived experience, I focus on the decision making 
process which preceded migration journeys. I explore how these decisions were made and the 
effects of change on the choices and constraints presented to individuals (and sometimes also 
to groups) before leaving Iraq. The key research questions that I address in this study are:
● What pressures and influences were most significant in convincing Iraqis to leave their 
homes?
● To what extent did key networks and communities of kinship, diaspora, sect, and 
profession play a role in decisions?
● To what extent were migratory decisions informed by the dynamics of cumulative 
causation? 
●What do their experiences tell us about the relationship between state transformation and 
displacement?
I begin this chapter with a critical assessment of Moore and Shellman's (2004) rational choice 
theory approach to understanding forced migration as it is the only published study which 
specifically addresses decision making in forced migration contexts. I discuss the limitations 
of the statistical political science approach they use and address matters of agency, calculation 
and threats.  Moore  and Shellman  also touch upon  notions  of  cultural  community and of 
cumulative causation in migration (Massey, 1990). These are concepts I address more fully 
later in the chapter. 
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What constitutes voluntary and forced actions - and what is meant by coercion? I consider 
these issues using Aristotle’s moral philosophy and Wertheimer’s (1987) framework for a 
theory of coercion. I explain why migration - even when undertaken after extensive planning 
and not after receiving a direct or personal physical threat - should be seen as a choice made 
under duress. Threats, as I show, manifest themselves in many different ways, and compel 
migration accordingly.  I  present  various categories of forced migrant and argue that their 
common characteristic is the experience of threat. 
Decisions and datasets: “Fear of persecution” 
Forced migration and decision making have been addressed in key articles by Moore and 
Shellman  (2004,  2007).  They  define  a  forced  migrant  as  “one  who,  owing  to  a  fear  of 
persecution, has abandoned his or her dwelling in favour of relocating elsewhere, whether 
within  or  beyond  the  borders  of  his  or  her  country  of  residence”  (Moore  &  Shellman, 
2004:724).  They  build  upon  Davenport,  Moore  and  Poe’s  approach,  seeing  migration 
decisions as choices and - importantly - address individual humans making decisions to leave 
(Moore & Shellman, 2004: 724-5). They see refugee flows as an observable aggregate of 
constrained individual choice, adding that “few (if any) refugees actually had no other option: 
they could have stayed and risked imprisonment or martyrdom” (Moore & Shellman 2007: 
814). 
The persecution they speak of refers to people's fear for their liberty, physical safety, or lives.  
Here, threats emanate from the behaviour of groups of people competing for political power. 
Moore and Shellman (2004: 725-6) themselves contend that people will monitor these threats 
– which can come from foreign, government, and dissident armed forces - before making 
migration  choices.  People  will  leave  home when the  probability  of  suffering  persecution 
becomes high enough to make the expected utility of leaving higher than that of staying. 
There is supporting evidence for these ideas. In a study by Al-Khalidi and others (2007: 1), 
Iraqis  gave  numerous  reasons  for  leaving,  often  as  a  direct  result  of  violence  -  mostly 
sectarian violence but also fighting between insurgents and the Multinational Forces allied 
with the Iraqi military. But the range of reasons given for leaving Iraq was broad. In a survery 
they conducted, 19 per cent of those questioned blamed the “bad situation in general” for their  
departure (Al-Khalidi et al, 2007: 46). This suggests that Moore and Shellman's approach is 
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useful but too narrow. 
Moore and Shellman (2004: 726-9) observe that people live in cultural communities based on 
familial ties, language, religious practices and traditions that are critically important to them. 
They refer to Douglas Massey’s (1990) ideas of cumulative causation noting that initially 
migrants  form networks  that  facilitate  new journeys  from origin  countries.  A cumulative 
increase in the flow of migration occurs,  inducing additional journeys until  the migration 
system has a dynamic of its own, affecting both countries of origin and destination. As more 
and more people leave their homes, a person’s cultural community begins to break down until  
eventually the cost of remaining increases. Moore & Shellman (2004: 742) touch on these 
ideas - about which I speak later in the chapter - but conclude that the primary determinants of 
forced migration are violent behaviour of governments and dissidents (and their interaction).
Conceptualising  refugees  as  social  agents  monitoring  threats  is  important.  Moore  and 
Shellman's studies are statistical and based upon “standard rationalist kinds of assumptions” 
(2004: 726).  They assume that people are “purposive”,  acting with conscious intention to 
protect  their  “liberty,  physical  person,  and  life”  (2007:  814).  These  are  reasonable 
assumptions:  when a  threshold  threat  value  is  reached rational  individuals  will  decide  to 
migrate. However, in a displacement crisis, what is meant by a rational individual? Moore and  
Shellman's studies are also focused at the level of the nation-state. Their interest is thus in 
publicly observable actions that large groups of people find threatening (Moore & Shellman, 
2004:  727).  What  of  less  visible  or  covert  actions  such  as  the  threatening  private 
communications received by so many? These can take the form of simple hand written notes, 
telephone calls, or cryptic verbal messages delivered in face to face encounters.
To measure threat levels in potential refugee producing countries Moore and Shellman make 
use of quantitative datasets. To measure the likelihood of violation of a person's physical 
integrity by the state they present a political terror scale, ordered from one to five, where five 
represents the highest  chance of violation (Gibney and Dalton, 1996, cited in Moore and 
Shellman, 2004: 730). Dissident threat is measured with Banks's cross-time archive data set 
which records the number of times dissidents used violence in each year in specific states 
(Banks, 2002, cited in Moore and Shellman, 2004: 730). These violent acts have an impact - 
but what of people's subjective perceptions of exemplary violent actions? In early April 2008 
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Youssef Adel, a Christian priest, was killed in a drive-by shooting in Baghdad by unknown 
gunmen (A.P., 2008). His murder cannot be understood properly as a statistic: there were 
significant  effects  on  his  congregation  and  for  Iraqi  Christians  generally  that  cannot  be 
verified through statistics. 
Here we need an approach that recognises a broader range of threats and their subjective 
impacts.  While  statistics  are  an  important  part  of  the  study of  displacement  in  terms  of 
measuring size and scope, data sets cannot teach us about deeper meanings behind threats, 
fears and decisions.  
Pushing and harming
Everett Lee (1966) cautioned against using a simple calculus to explain a process that was 
about inexact perceptions. Although Lee was writing nearly 50 years ago, his comment is as 
valid today as it was to the time in which he made it. He conceptualised migration decisions 
and processes as involving four interlinked sets of factors: those at the origin and destination, 
intervening obstacles between the two, and personal factors (Lee, 1966: 50).2 The decision 
maker may be indifferent to some factors in the places of destination and origin and view 
other factors as positives which would be attractive factors, or negatives which would be 
repellent factors. Obstacles would also affect people differently in their decisions (Lee, 1966: 
50-51).  But  the  most  crucial  element  was  the  perception  of  these  factors  which  were 
influenced by personal sensitivities and other individual character traits (Lee, 1966: 51). He 
also suggested that people would be reluctant to move from their familiar surroundings as 
their  knowledge of  origin  areas  was  more  accurate  and  reliable  than  of  a  new location. 
Moving was thus associated with uncertainty so the factors in favour of migration would have 
to substantially outweigh those against it (Lee, 1966: 50-51). Lee also acknowledged that not 
everyone who migrated took the decision themselves as “children are carried along by their 
parents”  and  “wives  accompany  their  husbands  even  though  it  tears  them  away  from 
environments they love” (ibid.). Parnwell (1993: 77-78) argues that although Lee's model was 
highly generalised it did point to the need to be mindful about prevailing circumstances in 
areas  of  origin  and  factors  that  help  and  hinder  their  movement.  In  other  words,  the 
circumstances and constraints of individuals need to be analysed to understand their decisions 
2 Lee used this framework to formulate a series of hypotheses about migration, such as its volume under 
varying conditions, which are not relevant to this study of decision making. See Lee (1966). 
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to migrate. These points are equally valid in the study of displacement. 
Parnwell  (1993: 78) set out to do this himself, though his work centred on push and pull 
factors relating to population movements in the developing world,  especially between the 
countryside and the city in relation to economic development processes. When he does briefly 
detour to look at forced migration, he acknowledges that certain forms of movement give the 
appearance of being a result of free choice. In reality though, the circumstances facing the 
migrant may well have been the choice “between survival and starvation”. To address this he 
uses  an  adaptation  of  Petersen's  1958 typology of  migration  and proposes  a  category  of 
impelled migration in which “the mover retains a modicum of power to decide whether or not 
to leave”. For Parnwell (1993: 24-5), people fleeing from political persecution may fall into 
this category: 
The  fact  that  people  have  different  levels  of  tolerance  of,  or  are  affected  to  different 
degrees by, political persecution determines that some people decide sooner than others 
that it would be in their best interests to leave. Similarly, different people give different 
weight to the advantages of moving to a new place set against the disadvantages of leaving 
their home areas.
Harm induced migration 
A different approach to migration and decision making looks at harm rather than danger. Penz 
(2002:  10-11)  argues  that  harm-induced  migration,  though  it  can  overlap  with  forced 
migration,  should be distinguished from it  as in some cases it  may not be deemed to be 
forced. The example he gives is where a development project or policy significantly disrupts 
someone's livelihood. Living standards are lowered, but still “viable” (ibid.). The person then 
decides to move elsewhere with his family. Penz argues it is more appropriate to say that the 
family moved because it was  harmed rather than  forced.  He includes this category in his 
analysis of displacement and recognises that where harm ends and force begins will be an 
issue of controversy (ibid.). One can ask what a “viable” living standard is, for whom it is  
viable, but only answer it with reference to context and circumstances. This is an issue which 
I discuss later with reference to Amartya Sen (1999). 
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Returning again to Parnwell we see another category of involuntary population movement in 
the case of resettlement, though the degree of involuntariness may vary. When occurring to 
make  way  for  major  infrastructural  projects  it  involves  “the  enforced  and  permanent 
movement  of people from one site  to  another,  to  which there is  no practical alternative” 
(Parnwell,  1993:  44).  Land  settlement  schemes  may  involve  resettlement  but  with  some 
degree of volition on the part of the mover.3 He also says that in most cases “resettlement is a 
form of  involuntary  population  movement  because,  given  the  choice,  the  movers  would 
generally have preferred to stay put” (ibid.). Parnwell touches on the absence of choice but 
does  not  develop  the  point.  His  focus  is  on  migration  related  to  economic  development 
projects. He mentions involuntary migration in relation to major infrastructural projects, but 
what of involuntary movements related to major  political  projects?  Parnwell does not deal 
with these interlinked factors in depth but they are developments that need to be understood in 
relation to displacement in Iraq. 
Displacement and Statecraft
It is the aim of some political projects to prompt human displacement. Political movements or 
state authorities that wish to seize strategic resources, or are committed to exclusivist claims 
on territory, have often assaulted local populations in order to make resources available for 
commercial exploitation or to achieve “cleansing”. Less obvious as a driver of displacement 
is “statecraft” – the “craft” of state building. For centuries those engaged in the exercise of 
authority within nation states, or those who wish to enjoy such authority, have developed 
strategies associated with mass displacement. This is especially clear in periods when nation 
states are under construction, or during periods of instability, reorganization or reconstruction 
of the state. Such developments have been common in the Middle East. Repeated episodes of 
displacement have taken place over the past 150 years, related to imperial policies, colonial 
encounters and, in the mid-twentieth century, to struggles for national independence (Chatty 
2010). In the case of Iraq they are evident from the first years of the British Mandate and have  
been a feature of modern Iraqi history (Chatelard 2011; Marfleet 2011). When a new order 
began taking shape after the invasion and occupation of 2003 a series of displacements began, 
which eventually became a mass exodus.
Changes  involved in  the  construction  or  the  reconfiguration  of  a  nation  state  may entail 
3 Presumably because in some cases people are compensated for being moved from the land. 
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abolition of an old regime. Zolberg (1983: 30–31) comments that during the course of these 
events  “entire  social  strata  may come to  be viewed as  obstacles”.  This  process  typically 
entails “successive refoundings… each of which may result in a refugee-generating crisis” 
(Zolberg 1983: 30–31). In European history human displacement has been instrumental in the 
transformations of the absolutist state to a centralising modern state, and from that form of 
state to the centralising national state (Soguk, 1999: 67). The displacement of some 200,000 
Huguenots from France after the Edict of Nantes was revoked in 1685 was an attempt by the 
French state to homogenise the religious affiliation of its population (Soguk, 1999: 70-71). 
The Huguenots were Protestants in a Catholic state. Shortly after seizing power its Catholic 
king Louis XXIV “set out to eliminate Calvinism from France. This undertaking makes sense 
only in regard to absolutist ideology, as an effort by the king to achieve what he conceived to 
be  a  perfectly  unified  polity”  (Zolberg  et  al,  1989:  5).  Jacobson  links  the  expulsion  of 
religious  minorities  by  monarchies  in  Europe  at  the  time  to  the  development  of  a 
protonationalism,  instilling an identification with embryonic nationalities (Jacobson, 1996: 
20, cited in Soguk, 1999: 71). The Huguenot displacement could be seen as intrinsic to a 
practice of statecraft in which the absolutist state evolved into a modern centralising one. The 
Huguenot episode was an early conceptualisation of territory as a bounded exclusionary space 
within which the “realities” of the state and its population were to become possible. The 
territorial state would mobilise resources of the territory in a more contained and controlled 
way. The territory would become identifiable and uncontested as a political  location.  The 
realignment of power, place, and population would be used to reaffirm it (Soguk, 1999: 71-
72). 
Later the French Revolution produced displacements that were symptomatic of statecraft. The 
revolution did not create something out of nothing. What it did do was reorganise political 
space for the expression of a range of existing and evolving sentiments of collectivity (Finer, 
1997, in Soguk, 1999: 74). Power was re-aligned under the new rubrics of the nation-state and 
nation-citizen. These were new forms of eligibility – in the sense of being eligible to be a 
nation-citizen and to any rights the citizen may be entitled to - which could not have been 
defined  without  the  simultaneous  creation  of  forms  of  ineligibility  (Soguk,  1999:74). 
Brubaker (1992: 46-7) argues that:
By inventing the national citizen and the legally homogeneous national citizenry, the 
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revolution simultaneously invented the foreigner. Henceforth citizen and foreigner would 
be correlative, mutually exclusive, exhaustive categories. One would be either a citizen or 
a foreigner, there would be no third way. 
To craft and empower the notions of national citizen, new forms of foreignness also had to be 
constructed. Thousands were displaced after the revolution but this was part and parcel of the 
process of inventing the nation-state.  The new France cast  out those falling victim to the 
readjustments  that  produced  the  new  category  of  “foreigner”.  There  were  several  great 
exoduses in the 26 years after the revolution. Earliest amongst them were Aristocrats and  the 
gentry,  as  well  as  the  squirearchy,  petite  noblesse,  and ordinary  people.  Later,  refractory 
priests and aristocratic remnants took flight and thousands more went into exile  after  the 
failure of the counter-revolution  (Soguk, 1999: 75-76). What they all had in common was 
their relationship to the old order. The new order saw them as problematic, a threat, real or 
otherwise, to the viability of the new national and republican political project.
There have been many similar episodes in history. Carr (2009) has written of King Philip III 
of Spain's expulsion of some 350,000 Moriscos between 1609 and 1614. They were Muslims 
who had forcibly been baptised as Catholics and were forcibly deported. Their removal was 
part of a process beginning with the forced conversion of the Jews from 1391-1412 during 
which time Spain's rulers “ruthlessly dismantled” the diverse Iberian society of the Middle 
Ages and “imposed a single homogeneous Catholic identity on all their subjects” (Carr, 2009: 
293). After the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in the aftermath of World War I, around 3 
million ethnic Hungarians suddenly found that they were minorities in the new nation states 
of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia (Brubaker, 1995: 195-196). The migration of 
ethnic Hungarians to Hungary was limited in scope in comparison to the flight of Balkan 
Turkish and Muslim populations after World War I as, observes Brubaker (1995: 196), it was 
primarily  an  upper  and  middle  class  migration:  “First  to  flee  were  those  most  closely 
identified with the repressive and exploitative aspects of Hungarian rule – and therefore those 
with the most to fear from a new regime”. This group included great landowners and state 
officials  connected to  the courts  and police.  Many of  them fled before the  new regimes 
consolidated  their  rule.  Next  to  leave  were  middle  class  Hungarians  who  suffered  from 
“economic displacement and loss of social status” as a result  of the “de-Magyarization of 
public administration, state employment and education” (Brubaker, 1995: 196). 
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Similar processes of adjustment and re-alignment were imposed upon state and society in Iraq 
after 2003. An example is the processes of de-Ba'athification. For decades before the invasion 
Iraq had been a one party state. The Ba'ath party was the ruling and only legal party in Iraq. 
Membership  was  crucial  to  an  individual's  career  chances  with  the  country's  biggest 
employer: the state. In 2003, vast numbers of Iraqis deemed to belong to the old order were 
instantly marginalised from the “new” Iraq. As part of de-Ba'athification measures, United 
States officials disbanded the armed forces and rendered some 350,000 people jobless without 
compensation (Marfleet, 2007: 405). Paul Bremer, the chairman of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, (Iraq's (in)effective ruler at the time), later reversed the decree. Attempts to pay 
thousands of former soldiers were ineffective. “In addition, the four top layers of the Ba’ath 
party  hierarchy,  comprising  some  30,000  people,  were  removed  from  state  institutions” 
(ibid.).  Not only were whole communities excluded from jobs in the new political order, but 
they were actively targeted by it. 
… the CPA approved a wholesale assault on academic and professional networks. In effect 
it  declared open season on professors, medical doctors, dentists, pharmacists, engineers, 
writers, artists – the “old” intelligentsia. They were guilty by association for having worked 
within the apparatus of state, for having remained in Iraq through the years of sanctions 
and hardship, and for not having become exiles. Most important, they were deemed to be 
people of influence who did not have a place within the new order and who could be  
targeted with impunity. As a result  the Iraqi diaspora, like many others before it,  soon 
contained  unprecedented  numbers  of  the  country’s  intellectuals,  “looted”  like  their 
libraries,  offices, classrooms, studios and laboratories.  Had they too become objects of 
contemporary statecraft – marginalised and excluded during reconstruction of the nation-
state? (Marfleet, 2009). 
Such a big question cannot be answered within the scope of this project. However, aspects of 
the interlinked processes of statecraft and displacement, integral to the re-formation of the 
Iraqi state along communal and ethno-sectarian lines are observable at the individual level 
and I hope to shed light upon them.
So far, I have surveyed different types of forced migration. I have looked briefly at journeys 
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in which individuals make calculations before they migrate from the threat of persecution 
from  different  armed  groups.  I  have  noted  that  the  breakdown  of  a  person's  cultural 
community can exert  pressure to  leave on those  who remain.  I  also  remarked that  some 
people have time to prepare and plan for their journeys while others must leave in a rushed 
way. Major infrastructural projects also result in enforced population resettlement, and land 
settlement schemes may have the same result but with a different level of volition (though not 
likely  control)  on  the  part  of  the  displaced.  I  also  discussed  the  relationship  between 
displacement  and nation-state  transformations.  I  also  noted that  there  is  a  worthwhile,  if  
blurred and controversial, distinction between forced migration and harm induced migration 
(Penz, 2002): a drop in living standards caused by a development project can be seen as a 
harm that  induces  migration  decisions.  There  is  an  array  of  circumstances  that  can  lead 
people to leave their homes and this is only a small selection. What they all share though is an 
element of coercion: their common characteristic is the experience of threat. What is meant by  
coercion and compulsion? What actions can we say are forced? 
Reactive migration
Richmond (1994) contends that “the distinction between movements of population that are 
voluntary and involuntary,  or  forced and free,  is  of  doubtful  validity” because  all  human 
actions are constrained (Richmond, 1994: 48). The distinction, he states, is “misleading”; he 
argues that migratory decisions made “under conditions of extreme stress, do not differ from 
other kinds of decision-governing social behaviour” (Richmond, 1994: 55). Instead he offers 
the  notion  that  all  migrations  can  be  placed  on  a  continuum  of  proactive  and  reactive 
migration according to the level of autonomy exhibited by the actors involved (1994: 58). 
Proactive migrants, he says, have relatively unconstrained choice and can choose if and where 
to go, when, and with whom. Reactive migrants, like victims of external wars and natural 
disasters  are  more  constrained in  their  actions  and are  “reacting  to  circumstances  almost 
entirely  beyond  their  control”  (Richmond,  1994:  58-59).  He  classifies  UN  Convention 
refugees, forced labourers, slaves and stateless persons as clear examples of reactive migrants 
(Richmond, 1994: 61) but emphasises that there is a continuum between the reactive and 
proactive extremes and that a large proportion of people who migrate, crossing state borders 
or not, combine characteristics of both ends of the continuum (ibid.). They may be responding 
to pressures beyond their control, reacting to circumstances by exercising a limited degree of 
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choice in their movements (ibid.). 
Richmond  (1994:  67-70)  also  produced  a  typology  of  25  reactive  migrations  that  had  a 
combination of political,  economic,  environmental, social,  and biopsychological factors as 
their main determinants and provided a brief explanation of each type. Despite his disinterest 
in the distinction between forced and unforced decisions and actions, he uses terms relating to 
force, coercion and threats throughout the descriptions of the migration types. For example 
there are “persons forced to migrate” he says because of economic collapse; migration may be  
induced  by  “a  threat  to  life-style”;  migration  may  be  “impelled”  by  laws  that  enforce 
discrimination; and maybe in “escape from general deprivation of human rights” (ibid.). But 
if these circumstances are not of the choosing of those who decide to leave, and as he says, 
are a  result  of pressures beyond their  control,  are they not therefore options  forced upon 
decision makers? He remarks that:
Although refugee movements are usually represented as “forced”, they are only an extreme 
case  of  the  constraints  that  are  placed  upon  the  choices  available  to  an  individual  in 
particular circumstances. … Choices facing an ethnic or political minority may be to join a 
dissident  army,  face  political  imprisonment,  torture  or  death.  ...  the  limited  options 
available involve excruciating choices. Flight is one of these. (Richmond, 1994: 53)
However, as I explain more fully in the following pages, when the only choices available to a 
person are excruciating ones resulting from pressures beyond her control, then decisions made 
under such conditions can correctly be understood as  forced decisions. While a person may 
willingly take an action from a limited set of excruciating choices, her being confined to those 
choices  is  not  willed  (Wertheimer,  1987:  301-302).  I  suggest  that  Richmond's  reactive 
migration typology also falls under the rubric of threat-induced migration. Richmond is right 
to say that refugees make decisions to move in circumstances of extreme constraint. But I also  
believe it is necessary to take the issue further and explain the process through which threats 
coerce refugees into making such decisions. An explanation of what constitutes a coerced 
decision is crucial to understanding experiences of displacement and now I consider this using 
ideas from moral philosophy. 
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Agency and compulsion
As  long  ago  as  350BCE  human  agency  was  a  matter  for  philosophical  consideration. 
Individuals were seen as agents whether on board a sinking ship or under the threat of a base 
despot. Aristotle was trying to understand the nature of human actions and the deliberations 
which precede complex decisions under threat. In book three of the  Nichomachean Ethics  
(NE iii) he referred to voluntary acts and involuntary acts, to acts taken under compulsion, to 
consultations, as well as to responsibility. His thoughts are relevant to understanding choices 
made by Iraqis under compulsion and the deliberations and consultations intrinsic to them. 
The point of departure is that for many Iraqis the aftermath of the invasion has been a time of 
crisis.  Migration was a  choice made after  deliberations  and possibly consultations,  under 
compulsion and within severe constraints. 
Whether  or  not  certain  choices  ought to  have  been made or  were  justifiable  even under 
compulsion is  not  a  concern of this  study. Migration can be  a complicated moral choice 
because individual or family safety may be at stake, as can be the fate of others left behind. I 
am interested in the causative events building up to displacement and migration and how 
these events influenced people's decisions. But these are events over which most displaced 
Iraqis had no control and for which they cannot be held responsible. 
Compulsion and “mixed” actions 
Aristotle's consideration of the involuntary nature of actions is useful here. His understanding 
of clear cut compulsory actions is that they are those where the origination is external to the 
agent. The agent contributes nothing, says Aristotle, as if being carried away by a wind or as 
though men had power over his person (NE iii 1:53). But actions can be “mixed” in nature 
(NE  iii  1:54).  Even  in  severely  constrained  circumstances  certain  actions  taken  under 
compulsion are more like voluntary acts for Aristotle because they are physically undertaken 
by the agent. Many journeys made by Iraqis after 2003 will have been actions of a “mixed 
kind”. These kinds of action are done:  
… from fear of greater evils, or from some honourable motive, as, for instance, if you were 
ordered to commit some base act by a despot who had your parents or children in his 
power,  and they were to  be  saved upon your  compliance or  die  upon your refusal  … 
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(Aristotle, NE iii 1:53)  
A man may throw goods overboard in a storm to prevent a ship from sinking. That would be a 
“mixed kind” of action and “choiceworthy” at the time of its doing (Aristotle, NE iii 1:54). 
The man was the originator of the motion of his limbs, and with himself being the origin of 
the action, “it rests with himself to do or not to do” (ibid.). The ends and objectives of these 
actions need to be understood with reference to the actual occasion. “Such actions then are 
voluntary, though in the abstract perhaps involuntary because no one would choose any of 
such things in and by itself” (ibid.). We know that many Iraqis have left their homes for fear 
of being killed. In some cases they have been directly and credibly threatened  with such 
things (Al Khalidi et al, 2007: 16-17). They have not been literally forced into taking each 
step of the journey, such as packing up their belongings, in chains or at gunpoint. We may 
assume however that they would not otherwise do such things in and by themselves. 
But  some ambivalence  remains  with  this  definition  of  voluntary-like  actions  taken under 
compulsion. Is it enough for our understanding of the experience of forced migration to say 
that it is voluntary in “real” terms but only abstractedly involuntary because it was performed 
under  compulsion?  Wertheimer  (1987:  301-302)  explains  the  ambivalence.  Aristotle 
understands actions as being more like voluntary ones in their nature when the agent is the 
source of the movement. The involuntary nature lies in the abstract because, writes Aristotle 
(NE iii:  53),  the  origination of  the  act  was not,  properly speaking,  external  to  the agent. 
Wertheimer (1987: 301-302) notes J. L. Mackie's similar observation that while an action 
taken within a coercive choice situation is voluntary, the agent's “being confined to just these 
alternatives was not voluntary”. Reformulating the common points of Aristotle and Mackie, 
he asserts that: 
one acts involuntarily when one must choose between alternatives that are contrary to the 
range of alternatives one's moral will would permit. One does not act involuntarily merely 
because one does not like the available alternatives. For, as we have seen, reluctance and 
voluntariness can well go hand in hand. One acts involuntarily because one has a deep 
aversion to having to choose in response to immoral proposals. Coerced choices are not 
unwilled, but they are, it may be said, against one's will (Wertheimer, 1987: 302).
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There is a relevant connection to forced migration in Iraq: Iraqis have had to act in response 
to immoral proposals which manifest themselves in many ways. They may be direct personal 
threats  from  militias  or  other  armed  groups.  They  may  be  conclusions  reached  after 
monitoring their surroundings to find themselves faced with an array of threats should they 
remain. Here there is a coercive proposal: abandon your home for an uncertain future to avoid 
these threats, or remain and accept the consequences for you and possibly your family.  
Baselines: the contextual nature of coercion claims
Let us explore the nature of coercion and the idea that it is contextual by considering cases in 
which a person is making offers and/or threats to another (Wertheimer, 1987: 233). In the 
following  examples,  person  A is  making  the  proposals  and/or  threats  and  person  B  is 
receiving  them.  When  person  A's  proposal  to  person  B  reduces  B's  options,  it  is 
uncontroversial  to  assume that  B's  freedom is  being  restricted.  But  options  can  only  be 
decreased (or increased) when compared to a standard or baseline. Here I am interested in 
evaluating the options available to B as the person being threatened or not - therefore it is B's 
baseline that must be assumed in order to understand what B's options are (Wertheimer, 1987: 
305-6). 
What is the difference between a threat and an offer?
A makes a threat when, if B does not accept A's proposal, B will be worse off than in the 
relevant baseline position. … A's proposal may, of course, include both a threat and an 
offer (what Michael Taylor calls a “throffer”): “If you do X, I'll give you a large reward; if 
you don't do X, I'll kill you.” (Wertheimer, 1987: 204)
Therefore a “throffer” is a threat as a person's refusal to accept it will leave her worse off than 
in the relevant baseline position. In simple cases, perhaps when A threatens to kill B if B does 
not do X (where X might be leaving the country), the baseline is clear: being alive. But the 
situation can be more complex. Robert Nozick's example of  The Drowning Case  illustrates 
this point.  
A comes upon B, who is drowning. A proposes to rescue B if B agrees to pay him $10,000. 
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A and B both know that there are no potential rescuers (Nozick, cited in Wertheimer, 1987: 
207).
Can person B expect to be rescued, and without reward, based on the norms or the morals of 
their society? If the answer to the questions is yes, then person A's proposal can be interpreted 
as a threat, normatively and morally. If the answer to the questions is no, but B expects (even 
mistakenly) that A is morally and normatively obliged to rescue him, then B may feel that the 
proposal  is  a  threat  and  not  an  offer  (ibid.).  These  examples  show  the  contextual  and 
subjective nature of threats and coercion. The interpersonal cases presented can be applicable 
in  cases  where  a  person  receives  a  personal  threat.  But  rather  than  thinking  purely  in 
interpersonal terms we should apply these ideas to the wider environment. A can be read as 
the  circumstances  that  face  B.  A can also  be  part  of  bigger  structures  and policies.  The  
coercive proposal presented to B may also be thought of as one facing a group of people, not 
just  an  individual.  The  coercive  proposals  may  be  understood  to  have  been  presented, 
intentionally or otherwise, to a specific sect, kinship group, or perhaps even to a professional 
class. In some cases they may have been interpreted as a threat to the whole female gender. 
That is not to say that members of a group will necessarily interpret or act upon threats in the 
same way, but certain actions and developments have been aimed at specific groups in Iraqi 
society and designed with exemplary effects in mind. 
Hard Choices
Some proposals are too unpalatable to accept. But if rejecting them means remaining in dire 
straits, then a person is faced with a hard choice situation and these situations are part of the  
coercion family, they are associated with “force”, “duress”, and “compulsion” (Wertheimer, 
1987:  233).  The  important  difference  between  hard  choices  and  other  choices  is  the 
“particularly severe constraining effect” they have. Joseph Raz has suggested that people do 
not act autonomously when they are struggling to maintain the “minimum conditions of a 
worthwhile life.”4 The relation between hard choices and autonomy is more complex than 
this: 
4 “The more one's choices are dictated by personal needs, the less autonomous one becomes.” “Liberalism, 
Autonomy, and the Politics of Neutral Concern,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. VII, ed. Peter French 
et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 112. Cited in Wertheimer (1987: 233).
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Although the  scope of our hard choice options is  limited by their unattractiveness,  the 
choice among those options may be of especial importance. In the latter sense, making a 
hard  choice  may  constitute  an  important  and  positive  assertion  of  our  autonomy. 
Nonetheless, just as the prospect of hanging is said to focus the mind, (very) hard choices 
produce too much focus and not enough scope. For that reason we can, I think, plausibly 
use the family of coercion terms to describe hard choice situations (Wertheimer, 1987: 233, 
emphasis in original). 
Too much focus and not enough scope make for a hard choice from the family of coercion 
terms.  In  addition  to  “coercion”  these  terms  are  “duress”;  “force”;  and  “compulsion”.5 
(Wertheimer, 1987: 5-6). It is this concept of a hard choice, with its coercion nomenclature 
that we can learn about in forced migration decisions in the Iraqi context. Certainly the choice 
is of special importance: leaving one’s home is perhaps the biggest decision of many people's 
lives and their survival may be contingent upon it. We can also see how migration can be a 
means to avoid a situation of dire straits. Whether the situation is one of a hard choice, a  
coercive proposal or “throffer”, an understanding of the threat must be accompanied by an 
understanding of the baseline. 
Instrumental Freedoms
The perspective of “freedoms” from development and welfare economist Amartya Sen (1999) 
can help us to craft an understanding of what these baselines might be. Sen speaks of the 
importance  of  substantive  human  freedoms  that  development  should  be  concerned  with 
expanding (1999: 36). They include “elementary capabilities” like:
…  being  able  to  avoid  such  deprivations  as  starvation,  under-nourishment,  escapable 
morbidity and premature mortality, as well as the freedoms that are associated with being 
literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and so on 
(ibid.).  
The expansion of these elementary capabilities, or freedoms, is intrinsically important as a 
primary end of human development. The expansion of different types of freedoms should also 
5  Wertheimer (1987: 5-6) uses these terms in a rough way without drawing important terminological 
distinctions between them, as I also do in this thesis.
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be  seen  as  instrumentally  important  to  human  development.  Sen  (1999:  37)  argues  that 
development itself should be seen as a process that enlarges human freedom, or capabilities,  
in general. In this context, different kinds of rights, opportunities, and entitlements contribute 
to development in two principal ways: their expansion contributes to the expansion of human 
freedom more generally, and to the expansion of other interconnected instrumental freedoms. 
There are five distinctive but not exhaustive groups of instrumental freedoms (Sen, 1999: 38-
9). They impact directly and indirectly upon the freedom that people have to live in the way 
they would like to live, but also complement one another.
1) Political freedoms: People's opportunities to select their government in terms 
from a selection of parties, and under certain principles; their ability to criticise and scrutinise 
authorities; the freedom of political expression and an uncensored press. They include the 
entitlements associated, broadly speaking, with democracies. Examples include opportunities 
for  political  dialogue  and  dissent,  as  well  as  voting  rights  and  participatory  selection  of 
legislators and executives.
2) Economic  facilities:  The  opportunities  given to  individuals  to  make use  of 
economic resources so as to consume, produce, or exchange, respectively. The conditions of 
exchange,  relating  to  markets  and  relative  prices,  and  the  amount  of  land  and  resources 
owned,  will  determine  economic  entitlements.  Increases  in  the  wealth  and  income  of  a 
country will manifest themselves in enhancement of economic entitlements of individuals or 
families.  However,  this  will  be  contingent  upon  how  generated  incomes  are  distributed. 
Economic entitlements of enterprises large and small will also depend upon availability and 
access to finance. 
3) Social opportunities: An individual's ability to live better is closely related to 
the arrangements that society makes for healthcare, education and so on. They will allow a 
person to live longer and more healthily but also let that person participate more effectively in 
economic and political activities. A higher level of literacy will grant a person freedom to 
partake in more advanced economic activities. In the political sphere, being able to read a 
newspaper  and  communicate  in  writing  with  other  political  activists  will  enhance  an 
individual's political freedom. 
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4) Transparency guarantees: They give people the freedom to operate on some 
sort of presumption of what they are being offered, and can expect to get, in their social  
interactions. Guarantees of operating under disclosure and lucidity create a sense of trust and 
openness key to preventing corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhand dealings. 
5) Protective  security:  The  presence  of  a  social  safety  net  to  prevent  the 
vulnerable  from  falling  into  abject  destitution  is  essential,  even  in  flourishing  economic 
systems. Measures include fixed institutional arrangements like unemployment benefits and 
income supplements,  and ad  hoc  arrangements  such as  the  creation  of  emergency public 
employment or famine relief.
This framework allows poverty to be understood not just in terms of low incomes but as the 
deprivation of basic capabilities needed to lead a life that people have reason to value. Sen 
(1999:  86-7)  acknowledges  that  lack  of  income  can  be  the  main  reason  for  a  person's 
capability deprivation, but it is seen as one of many different instrumental factors rather than 
as an intrinsic one.  Income is not the  only instrumental influence on capability generation. 
Finally, how income levels affect capabilities is contingent and conditional. The instrumental 
relationship between them varies between different communities, and even between different 
families and individuals (ibid.).  
Sen's point of departure is one of encouraging the expansion of instrumental capabilities as a 
means and end of development. In understanding the determinants of mass displacement it 
must be understood that the deprivation of elementary capabilities among large numbers of 
people  who once  had them can create  conditions  for  mass  exit.  In  other  words,  policies 
enacted in Iraq by the occupation rulers after 2003 and the ensuing violence and crises have 
created just such conditions. They have put many people in worse positions economically and 
otherwise than they were in before, in relation to a baseline. I use this idea of freedoms as a 
broad  framework  to  consider  what  a  person's  or  group's  baselines  might  be.  To  Sen's 
categories I add religious freedom - the freedom to practise one's faith without being harmed - 
as there is evidence to show that Iraq's religious minorities have experienced this type of 
constraint since 2003. 
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Cumulative causation and displacement 
Despite a collapse in employment and income following the 2003 invasion, relatively few 
Iraqis  left  their  homes  for  economic  reasons  and  there  was  no  immediate  mass  exodus. 
Marfleet (2007) observes that the patterns of flight from Iraq suggests cumulative causation.  
A study of Iraqi refugees in Syria (Al Khalidi et. al.,  2007) shows that only 4% of those  
interviewed  between  March-April  2007  had  arrived  before  2004.  A slow  increase  was 
followed  by  a  huge  rise  during  2005  and  2006.  By  2006  however,  security  had  been 
undermined in the broadest sense to the point at which millions felt they had no alternative 
but to leave (Marfleet, 2007: 398). The February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque, a 
holy Shia shrine in Samarra, had triggered “the beginning of reciprocal, retaliatory, sectarian 
violence which, in turn, has led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis” (Al-
Khalidi et al, 2007: 10). 
In Iraq it is not only the violence itself that has been a determinant but its cumulative effects  
on  the  population  at  large  which  has  seen  the  collapse  of  professional  and  other  social 
networks.  Kidnappings,  assassinations,  disappearances,  and  death  squad  killings  targeted 
civilian members of communities deemed to be enemies. Iraq’s Christian community has been 
drastically affected: following assaults on churches in Baghdad in 2004, large numbers of 
Christians fled to the north before heading to Syria. Cumulative causation took its effect: “as 
people departed, members of their families, communities and other networks were profoundly 
affected. In the case of Christians, by 2006, communities in areas of Baghdad such as Karada 
and Doura were said to be fast disappearing” (Marfleet, 2007: 411-12). Community leaders 
and  professionals  such  as  doctors,  lawyers,  and  lecturers  were  targeted  repeatedly, 
encouraging a sense of helplessness and (in theory) demobilizing the community as a whole 
(ibid.). With Iraq's Christians, their status as a minority faith makes this process appear more 
far-reaching. Marfleet (2008) speaks of a national dimension to post-invasion displacement 
that  has  disrupted  entire  socio-cultural,  professional,  and  political  networks:  Iraqis  of  all 
socio-economic status have been affected. 
The idea of cumulative causation first appeared in 1957 in Gunnar Myrdal's Rich Lands and 
Poor as “circular and cumulative causation theory”. Douglas Massey (1990: 4-5) introduced 
“the  idea  that  migration  induces  changes  in  social  and  economic  structures  that  make 
additional migration likely” in the context of rural Mexican economic migration to the United 
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States.6 With some modification and development, the concept can be useful in relation to 
displacement in and from Iraq. Massey and others have argued that international migration 
will sustain itself over time in ways that will make further movements progressively more 
likely (Massey et al, 1998: 45-46). They explain that “causation is cumulative in the sense 
that  each  act  of  migration  alters  the  social  context  within  which  subsequent  migration 
decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional migration more likely” (Massey et 
al., 1998: 45-46). The expansion of migrant networks can induce further migration as “each 
act of migration creates the social structure needed to sustain it” (Massey et al, 1998: 46). 
Every  new migrant  reduces  the  costs  and  risks  of  subsequent  migration  for  friends  and 
relatives. This is also evident in forced migration and is testable at the individual level. I 
explore the extent to which migrant networks influenced migration decisions. How important 
were connections to people who had already left in the decision to leave? 
The theory also posits that “as a household's sense of relative deprivation increases, so does 
the motivation to migrate” (ibid.). Sustained out-migration can lead to the depletion of human 
resources in sending regions and to accumulation in receiving areas. Over time, growth is 
reinforced in receiving areas and is simultaneously depleted in sending areas where stagnation  
is  exacerbated.  The  conditions  for  migration  are  thus  further  enhanced  (Massey  et  al, 
1998:48).  In Iraq, deprivation has not been purely relative. Most refugees are compelled to 
take decisions that mean abandoning crucial  material,  social,  and psychological assets.  In 
doing so, they devalue the assets of those who remain, compelling them to move. Eventually, 
“a threshold is reached at which community integrity breaks down, stimulating further rapid 
outward movements” (Marfleet, 2007: 407). I explore the extent to which the devaluation of 
these assets has compelled migration. I ask whether, as more people from a reference group 
migrated,  those remaining felt  an increasing sense of insecurity  which pressured them to 
leave. 
With  Elizabeth  Fussell,  Massey  (2004:  151-71)  later  suggested  that  there  were  limits  to 
cumulative causation in urban areas for several reasons. Again the study focuses on Mexican 
6 His writings on the subject have been extensive. Here I focus on the following selection of writings authored 
and co-authored by Massey:  “Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of 
Migration” (1990); “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal” (1993); “Contemporary 
Theories of Migration” a chapter from Worlds in Motion (1998: reprinted in paperback 2005); “The Limits to 
Cumulative Causation: International Migration from Mexican Urban Areas” (2004). The selection will allow 
for a critical discussion of the theory's development. 
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migration to and from the United States. First, “the social networks of urbanites are composed 
more of weak ties to acquaintances and workmates than of strong ties to kin and lifelong 
friends”. Face-to-face contacts are  more selective and less drawn from a community as a 
whole (Fussell and Massey, 2004: 153). The migration experience within an urban setting 
may be characterised more by gaining access to a network and information that facilitates 
migration than by the assumption of an existing relationship with a migrant (ibid.). In Iraqi 
neighbourhoods there may be less truth in the statement that social ties are weak in urban 
settings as suggested above for Mexican and American urban settings. There is still a strong 
chance that through close or extended kinship there will be a migration connection owing to 
generations  of  out-migration  from  Iraq.  The  anonymity  associated  with  high  population 
density in urban settings is cited as another reason for the effects of cumulative causation 
being weaker. Massey and Fussell write that in small rural settlements migrants there will be 
known in  a  face-to-face  context  through  overlapping  networks  of  kinship  and friendship 
(ibid.).  This  may  be  weaker  in  many  larger  cities  but  perhaps  less  so  in  Baghdad 
neighbourhoods where residents tend to have regular interactions with their neighbours  - this 
is  something  evident  in  chapters  4-6.7 In  Iraq,  the  decades-long  history  of  migration 
documented by Chatelard (2002a, 2002b, 2008a, 2008b), and the current national character of 
displacement (Marfleet, 2008) may have combined to counter the effects of such dilution in 
urban settings.  
In the context of economic remittances, Fussell and Massey (2004: 153-4) also suggest that 
feedbacks found in rural settings may not be significant enough in large urban populations to 
encourage further journeys. When large numbers of rural village residents leave, agricultural 
land is often neglected and left fallow. In the case of forced migration in urban areas of Iraq, 
feedback  mechanisms  manifest  themselves  differently.  The  flight  of  Iraq's  professionals, 
particularly in the health and education sector, has had detrimental effects on the country's 
critical public infrastructure. Furthermore, rather than land lying fallow there is the idea that 
the  neighbourhood is  transformed  and  lies  socially  fallow.  I  mean  this  in  the  sense  that 
important social networks are no longer there to provide support or even a sense of security.  
In  many Iraqi  neighbourhoods after 2003,  houses  once occupied by families which were 
neighbours for decades were emptied of their occupants and replaced with new ones. This is 
an important transformation of space. Here I use Doreen Massey's (1994) concept of space 
7 My participants fro Baghdad had regular interactions with their neighbours although their relations did not 
extend to consulting – or even informing - them about migration decisions. 
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Neighbourhood scenes from Baghdad. Figure 1 (above): two men passing through the neighbourhood in 2001. 
They were offering their services pruning and harvesting the date palms common to gardens in Iraq. 
Figure 2 (below): Boys play football in a Baghdad neighbourhood in 2012 (Sundus Al Bayati)
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understood as constituted out of social relations. These relations are inherently dynamic and 
are  "imbued  with  power  and  meaning  and  symbolism"  (Doreen  Massey,  1994:  2-3). 
Transformations  of  space  that  change  social  relations  into  relations  of  subjugation  and 
possible threat are likely to induce displacement among those who perceive threats in the new 
configurations. Feedback mechanisms from neighbourhood transformations may not result in 
cross-border movement - but perhaps movement to another neighbourhood. I learned about 
these phenomena from participants during fieldwork. Some migrated temporarily from Iraq 
but told of the complex depletion and confessional “un-mixing” of neighbourhoods.8 
Another problem with the theory of cumulative causation in urban areas is that the urban 
context,  with its  more favourable economic conditions  in relation  to small  cities or  rural 
towns, often reduces the necessity of international migration from larger cities (Massey et al, 
2005: 154). Sadly economic conditions in Iraq's big cities, notably the capital Baghdad, have 
been  dire.  Unemployment  sky-rocketed  after  the  occupation  and  the  ensuing  economic 
collapse and Baghdad experienced intense sectarian violence so that this suggested limitation 
of cumulative causation has its own limitations.
Finally, Massey and Fussell (2004) suggest that urbanites may not need social ties to make 
international journeys. This may certainly be true in the Iraqi context. There is no language 
barrier and with a protracted history of Iraqi migration to Syria, information about moving 
there  may  be  so  widely  available  (though  not  necessarily  reliable)  that  personal  ties  to 
migrants abroad are not needed to move there. I tested these questions at the individual level.
Cumulative causation is a dynamic theory, though it may seem implicitly deterministic given 
the belief in the compelling internal momentum of evolving migration structures. Will all of 
those  who  are  connected  to  evolving  migration  structures  migrate  as  a  result  of  this 
momentum?  Cumulative  causation  will  not  necessarily  lead  to  every  individual  with 
connections abroad migrating.  Indeed, the theory 
… accepts  the  view of  international  migration  as  an  individual  or  household  decision 
process,  but  argues  that  acts  of  migration at  one point  in  time systematically  alter  the 
context within which future migration decisions are made, greatly increasing the likelihood 
8 See Chapter 5.
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that later decision makers will choose to migrate (Massey et al, 1993: 449).
Cumulative causation alters the context: options to leave gradually become less difficult, and 
simultaneously constraints upon those that remain increase. At its peak it can leave groups 
and individuals in hard choice situations and can thus be seen as a coercive dynamic.  There is  
still  agency in decisions which take place under these circumstances,  but there is  intense 
constraint in the latter.
Cultural communities
The notion of “cultural communities” is a useful tool in understanding how dynamics of a 
large migration outflow affects those who stay behind.  They are based on important familial 
ties, language, religious practices, and traditions. As more and more people leave their homes, 
communities begin to break down and eventually the cost of remaining increases (Moore and 
Shellman, 2004: 726-9). Events in Iraq demonstrate that networks upon which so many Iraqis 
depend have been seriously, if  not  completely,  diminished by displacement.  In answering 
questions about the migration decision making process, I hoped to learn about how much the 
depletion of a person's social networks and cultural community influences these decisions.
Deliberations & Consultations 
I have noted the importance and complexity of these migration decisions. But how are they 
made? Aristotle spoke of deliberations intrinsic to making a moral choice which differ from 
the idea of a “wish”. Wish has for its object an end, but moral choice implies the means to the 
end (Aristotle,  NE iii  1:  56-60).  Deliberations  are  made about  practical  matters which in 
general can be affected through agents' own instrumentality (Aristotle, NE iii 3: 61-62). The 
assumption here is that in leaving their homes, the “wish” for Iraqis was survival and security, 
and migration - an act achievable through their own instrumentality - was the means.  Once 
individuals have set before them this certain end: 
… they look how and through what means it may be accomplished: if there is a choice of 
means, they examine further which are easiest and most creditable; or, if there is but one 
means of accomplishing the object, then how it may be through this, this again through 
what, till they come to the first cause; and this will be the last found; for a man engaged in 
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a process of deliberation seems to seek and analyse, as a man, to solve a problem, analyses 
the figure given him (Aristotle, NE iii 3: 63). 
The greater the matter, the less we trust in ourselves to settle it alone, associating with co-
adjustors in counsel. Possibilities are what may be done through our own instrumentality, but 
this includes what may also be done through our friends because the origination rests with us 
(NE iii 3: 62-3). The decision to leave one's home, one of gravity, will not have been taken 
lightly. So in whom did Iraqis trust to seek guidance? Cohen & Sirkeci (2011: 2) assert that 
“…  migrants  do  not  act  alone.  They  come  to  their  decisions  in  discussions  with  other 
members  of  their  households  and  with  friends  and  relatives  at  points  of  origin  and 
destination.” Sometimes the household is ignored, at others times it is overwhelming, but it is 
always present in the decisions (ibid.). The household itself is not a reference to the people 
living in the physical structure but a dynamic and fluid unit which transcends geographical 
place and includes individuals who live in a variety of places (Cohen & Sirkeci, 2011: 28).  
How true is this for Iraqi migration decisions? We shall see in the following chapters. 
Conclusion
I have presented a selection of different categories of forced migration in scholarly works. I 
have  shown  how  the  processes  of  displacement  and  forced  migration  are  related  to 
transformations of the state. All are threat-induced, involving decisions to move taken under 
duress.  These  decisions  are  taken  after  deliberations,  consultations  and  calculations.  In 
themselves they were voluntary decisions: however, the circumstances under which they were 
taken were not of the decision makers' choosing. These circumstances, which limit a person to  
a selection of unpalatable proposals, are  beyond the control of the people at the centre of this 
research. They were forced upon them and therefore can be seen as coerced decisions - the 
migration correctly defined as forced migration. Decisions of people to leave can coerce those 
who remain into moving. Even if they had not considered it initially, the effects of departures 
of people in their social world can exert coercive pressures to leave on those who remain. 
Decisions to move house, move city, and possibly move country, are of magnitude and are 
unlikely to be taken alone. In the following chapters I show how transformations that took 
place after 2003 created coercive circumstances and how these coercive pressures impacted 
on peoples lives, eventually forcing many of them to leave. 
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Chapter 2
Methodology of the thesis
Here I explain why I chose a narrative framework for my research. While acknowledging the 
problematic nature of memory as a source of data, I argue that personal accounts are still an 
important  source for researchers in  the human sciences.  I  then discuss the context  within 
which participants told their stories. In the second part of this chapter I outline how I collected  
data in Syria. I explain how I met the people interviewed and make observations about how 
relationships established with my participants may have shaped the data. 
Why narrative methods?
I have chosen a narrative framework because of the universal nature of the narrative form as a 
means of human sense-making. Riessman (2008b: 154) comments that “Individuals interpret 
events  and  experiences  in  the  stories  they  construct  collaboratively  with  listeners.  As 
investigators we, in turn, interpret their interpretations, constructing analytic stories from (and 
ideally with) those we study”.  Bruner (2004: 708) tells us that “a life as led is inseparable 
from a life as told – or more bluntly, a life is not 'how it was' but how it is interpreted and 
reinterpreted, told and retold ...”.1  The way that a person recounts past experiences changes 
with different social,  temporal  and geographical  contexts.  I am in agreement with certain 
elements  of  the  experience-centred  approach  to  narrative  (Squire,  2008:  42-43)  in  its 
assumptions that narratives are sequential and meaningful. They re-present experience and 
reconstitute it as well as express it. They display transformation and change (ibid.). This does 
not necessarily mean that displacement narratives and interpretations of them are detached 
from material realities.  The historian E. H. Carr said  (2001: 21): “It does not follow that, 
because a mountain appears to take on different shapes from different angles of vision, it has 
objectively  either  no  shape  at  all  or  an  infinity  of  shapes”.  To  extend  Carr's  metaphor 
accordingly for narrative research, we can add that a person's recollection of the mountain 
changes over time, as do memories of the journey up or down it. Perhaps the pain and triumph 
in  the  climb are  suppressed or  emphasised  in  narrations  of  the  journey according to  the 
1
 For a discussion of narrative form and its influence on shaping life experience, see Bruner (2004). 
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context  of  its  telling.  The  narratives  I  collected  are  grounded  in  lived  experiences  of 
displacement and forced migration but I am aware of the fluid and complex nature of memory  
and  narrative  as  representations  of  experience.  Across  time  and  place,  there  is  some 
reconstruction  of  stories.  These  are  never  repeated  exactly  and  words  acquire  different 
meanings across time (Squire, 2008: 42). This is just as true of the researcher as it is of the 
participants. Andrews (2008: 93) observes that: 
The historical context in which we produce our work not only frames its meaning, but is 
not  replicable  in  other  places  and  times.  Even  the  very  same  words  carry  different 
meanings when they are authored – or read – in different places and times. 
I say more about this issue later in this chapter in relation to the research context of Syria. 
A narrative framework is useful because it encourages participants to speak in their own way 
and facilitates personal reflection (Riessman 2008a). Mishler (1986: 7) argues that the goal of 
the research interview should be to understand respondents' worlds of meaning in a way that 
is "adequate to the tasks of systematic analysis and theoretical interpretation." He advocates 
for the unstructured narrative interview:
We  are  more  likely  to  find  stories  reported  in  studies  using  relatively  unstructured 
interviews where respondents are invited to speak in their own voices, allowed to control 
the introduction and flow of topics, and encouraged to extend their responses. Nonetheless 
respondents may also tell stories in response to direct, specific questions if they are not 
interrupted by interviewers trying to keep them to the "point." (Mishler, 1986: 69)
The interview is  a collaboration in which the interviewer and the participant  engage in  a 
conversation  (Riessman  2008a:  23,  Mishler,  1986).  Interviewees  can  develop  narrative 
accounts  of  their  experiences:  “The goal  in  narrative interviewing is  to  generate  detailed 
accounts rather than brief answers or general statements” (Riessman, 2008a: 23). This was the 
approach I used in order to gather accounts of my participants' experiences of displacement. 
Interviews were  not  completely open-ended.  I  guided the  course of  the  exchange but,  as 
Mishler advises, endeavoured to avoid  interrupting participants if it seemed like they were 
straying from the point. I did not entirely “give up control” or always “follow participants 
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down  their  trails”  as  Riessman (2008a:  24)  recommends in  order  to  obtain full  extended 
narration. This was because I had a conceptual focus to the study and was not seeking data 
that stretched across a participant's lifespan. However, the paths I pursued during interviews 
were still broad enough in themselves to elicit detailed narratives. For example, I wanted to 
understand what a person's daily life was like both before and after the invasion in 2003  so as 
to identify changes that may have exerted coercive pressures. These open questions about 
daily  life  prompted an  exchange that  produced rich  and detailed  narrative.  During  some 
interviews with participants who were not forthcoming, I relied on a set of open-ended key 
questions each with its own sub-questions. They were comparatively closed in nature. I did 
not need to go mechanically through the latter in any interviews but on some occasions I did 
use the open-ended questions to prompt conversation. This was effective in eliciting stories 
and details. During most interviews I barely needed to refer to my questions as participants 
were open and forthcoming.
My approach to knowledge generation was case-study based. From detailed cases I sought to 
make  theoretical  inferences.  I  am in  agreement  with  Mishler  (1996:  80)  that  case-based 
methods grant individuals coherence and unity through time, “respecting them as subjects 
with both histories and intentions”. Conceptual inferences can be made about social processes 
from  close  analysis  of  in-depth  case  material  (Riessman,  2008a:  13).  These  sequential, 
temporally ordered social processes are “fundamental features of personal and social life” and 
there  is  a  “structuring  impact  of  earlier  on  later  events”  (Mishler,  1996:  89).  This  is  an 
important  recognition  in  the  analysis  of  the  process  of  displacement.  I  was  aware  that 
pressures and threats may accumulate to the point at which a threshold is reached. An event 
which  may  not  have  felt  threatening  in  the  past  may  take  on  extra  meaning  as  threats 
accumulate and pressures increase. A note at the door from a militia telling a family to leave 
home will have a greater coercive impact if that family has already experienced violence at 
the hands of that militia.
On the problems of memory
Data gathered from these detailed narrative case studies, created by an interaction between the 
researcher  and participant,  are  not  precise  representations  of  a  past  reality.  Memory  is  a 
complex matter and people recall events and details in an incomplete and unspecific way. 
Cameron  (2010)  shows  this  in  an  assessment  of  the  limits  of  memory  in  refugee  status 
determination decisions. Decades of research has established that “human memory is nothing 
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like a video recording, that it is neither as complete nor as stable” (Cameron, 2010: 470). 
Whole  categories  of  information  are  difficult  to  recall  accurately,  if  at  all:  temporal 
information, such as dates, frequency, duration and sequence; the appearance of common 
objects; discrete instances of repeated events; peripheral information; proper names; and 
the verbatim wording of verbal  exchanges.  In addition,  our autobiographical memories 
change over time, and may change significantly. (Cameron, 2010: 469)  
We can remember events in considerable detail but still have only a vague idea of their date,  
frequency and duration (Cameron, 2010: 470). Even with repeated distressing events, research 
has shown the limits of human memory in recalling events and dates precisely.  Cameron 
(2010: 482-483) cites a study by Bidrose & Goodman (2000) of four young people (ages eight 
to 15 years old) who were exploited by a prostitution and pornography ring. Police arrested 
the abusers and seized hundreds of audio tapes and photographs. When the young people were 
interviewed about specific incidents, they had no memory at all for 39% of the acts of abuse 
inflicted  on  them,  despite  there  being  conclusive  evidence  of  their  occurrence.  “The 
researchers concluded that the children's memories of these repeated events had simply fused” 
(ibid.). The point Cameron is making is that an inability to recall distressing events in detail 
does not mean the events never occurred. 
This  is  what  memory  researchers  in  psychology  have  referred  to  as  a  “generic  script 
memory”: repeated events are merged and blended together (Cameron, 2010: 481). Themes 
and the gist of events are remembered, precluding the need to retain precise details which are 
typically not useful to us. This occurs with memories of mundane as well as distressing events 
(ibid.). Repeated distressing events  - such as personal death threats, witnessing car bombs, 
and assassinations - were all part of the coercive landscapes in which many of the Iraqis I 
interviewed lived their daily lives. I have not been concerned primarily with precise dates and 
statistics but  with subjective perceptions of threat  that were crucial  in  Iraqis'  decisions to 
leave. At times precise and approximate dates do appear and give an idea of the timeframe 
within  which  decisions  were  taken.  This  is  often  because  some  Iraqis  learn  to  bring 
documents with them to verify facts for UNHCR resettlement officers. Dates are recorded 
during the UNHCR registration process which help to cement them into memory. It is the 
general script of events and their details rather than their precise dates that I am concerned 
with. The verbatim wording of a threat letter is not significant but its meaning in the view of 
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the recipient is.
The conceptualisation of memory that Cameron criticises is similar to that which Plummer 
(2001: 234) calls the memory as “storehouse” and in which memories are “more or less piled 
up and become more or less accessible”. Cameron's critique is valuable, particularly for the 
legal community to comprehend for more accurate determinations of refugee status, but it is 
itself limited to being a thorough critique of a limited concept of memory. My concern is not  
with proving or disproving factual or temporal truths. I agree with Plummer that memory 
works on different levels and the storehouse version, where the focus is upon what a person 
can recall and how well in relation to certain factors – such as tiredness – is only one of them 
(Plummer,  2001:  234).  Memory  is  “a  socially  shared  experience”  and  not  just  an  inner 
psychological one (ibid.) It is the source of the selective narratives which people tell about 
their past. The storied ordering of memories is what Plummer refers to when he says “Our 
narratives  are  our  memories”  (ibid.).  Bruner  has  explained  the  inherent  ways  in  which 
memory and narrative are connected: 
… the  ways of  telling and the  ways of  conceptualizing that  go with them become so 
habitual that they finally become recipes for structuring experience itself, for laying down 
routes into memory, for not only guiding the life narrative up to the present but directing it  
into the future. (Bruner, 1996: 708) 
Memories originate in the realities of past events but are affected by current circumstances. 
Kohli states that “the reference to past events occurs in the context of the present situation, 
and  under  the  criterion  of  their  significance”  (1981:  67,  in  Andrews  1991:  65).  This  is 
important to keep in mind in the Iraqi context and an important justification for interviewing 
Iraqis in Syria - the first port of call for many. Syria is a neighbour of Iraq and from 2006 was 
the only country allowing them relatively easy entry. The past events that are the focus of my 
research are the  same events  that  brought  them to Syria.  It  may be that  the resettlement 
process and problems of survival in their liminal situation in Syria are refugees' most salient 
concerns. But they are in that situation because of the circumstances which are the focus of 
my research. These also feature in the resettlement process, where displacement stories help 
or hinder claims for refugee status in third countries - depending on how these stories are 
understood by UNHCR resettlement officers. In exploring those moments in their lives which 
led to displacement, there is an advantage to interviewing participants while they are living in 
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a present still immediately and intimately connected to those moments. 
Narratives are co-constructed and this is especially true in the context of research interviews 
where  there  is  a  conceptual  focus.  Holstein  and  Gubrium  (2003:  4)  note  the  increased 
awareness in the human sciences that “knowledge is created from the actions undertaken to 
obtain it”, such as “the social encounter of the interview in which knowledge is constructed”. 
This co-construction is  affected by an audience that goes beyond the listening ear of the 
researcher. The ways in which memories are expressed as meaningful narratives varies in 
relation to the audience that the teller believes he or she is speaking to (Andrews, 2007:16-
17).  Most people tell their stories to others as well as themselves – who those others are, as 
well as who they are in the moment of the telling, influences the stories which are told.  As 
researchers we should try to identify who the interviewees believe they are speaking to - how 
they perceive us (ibid.). 
Equally, if not more important, are the “ghostly audiences” (Langellier 2001: 174) – those 
persons central in the lives of our respondents, for whom or to whom the story may be 
being told. We as researchers often have little or no knowledge of this imagined audience, 
yet their presence in our work is significant (Andrews, 2007: 17). 
Although it is difficult – or impossible - to know fully how my participants really viewed me, 
or to identify the “ghost audience” I can say that I was seen by them in many ways: as a  
friend, a teacher, an employee of the UNHCR, as a person who could expedite their hopes for 
resettlement to North America, as an academic, an educated Iraqi, from Baghdad, a Brit living  
in London, a man, as a means to address an international audience about the plight of the Iraqi 
Mandaeans, and as a Muslim. 
For Kuhn (2000:189) memory is “always already textual” and memory texts have “their own 
Formal Conventions”. My focus here is on the thematic analysis of narrative, I am interested 
more  in  the  told  rather  than  the  telling  (Riessman,  2008a).  However,  I  do  not  view 
displacement  narratives  solely  as  textual  constructions:  “a  narratological  analysis  can 
disarticulate these stories from the politics of displacement” and displacement narratives are 
clearly  marked  by  material  conditions  and  human  experience  (Nassari,  2007:  56-57). 
Memories are mediated in complex ways related to the moment of their telling – between 
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researcher and subject, between speaker and listener - but memory work is not about reducing 
them to  fiction  -  “it  is  their  relation  to  lived  historical  experience  that  constitutes  their 
specificity” (Radstone, 2000: 11).
Memory is modified over time and in changing contexts the meanings that are ascribed to past  
events change. Kuhn (2000: 189) speaks of the active production of meaning in  memory 
which  is  “shaped by secondary  revision.  … For  while  it  might  refer  to  past  events  and 
experiences, memory is neither pure experience nor pure event.” Memory undergoes revisions 
across  time  and  the  memories  articulated  in  a  research  interview  differ  from  those 
remembered among family members looking through old photographs (ibid.). These revisions 
and different articulations make memory a fluid and complex source of data. Nevertheless, it 
is a crucial one for social researchers as:
… it is a sensitive indicator of an individual's internal construction of an external event. … 
When an individual looks back at  her life, she makes connections between events and 
situations which she would not have had the perspective to make at the time she lived 
through them. … However … these recollections are not stored in pure form, and instead 
what the listener hears is how the speaker, in her present life, makes sense of her past. 
(Andrews, 1991:65) 
Internal constructions of an event can vary even between close relatives in the same nuclear 
family. Nguyen's (2009) study of women in the Vietnamese Diaspora includes a comparison 
of two sisters' accounts of the same events of displacement and loss. They converge on some 
matters but differ on others, showing that “their memories convey individual recreations and 
interpretations of shared events, as well as their family dynamics” (Nguyen, 2009:36). Both 
sisters  were  able  to  construct  coherent  if  sometimes divergent  narratives  about  the  same 
crucial  and traumatic events in  their  lives (Nguyen, 2009:55).  “Their  perceptions of their 
shared  past  indicate  the  way  in  which  each  found  it  most  expedient  to  process  events, 
experiences, and losses” (Nguyen, 2009: 56).  I did not seek to acquire different accounts of 
displacement experiences from different members of the same family in this study but make 
the point that the data we can acquire and present as researchers is partial in nature. This does 
not invalidate their individual accounts. Clifford has remarked on the inherently partial nature 
of  ethnographic  truths  which  are  “committed  and  incomplete”  pieces  belonging  to 
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“economies of truth” (Clifford, 1986: 7) Portelli (2006: 38) makes a similar observation when 
he says of oral sources that “they are artificial, variable, and partial.” This is also where their 
strengths lie. “Oral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what 
they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did” (Portelli, 2006: 36). 
I now consider some of the ways in which the contextual realities may have influenced the 
data. 
Stories are not told in a vacuum
I had collected all of the narratives used in this research before the anti-government protest 
movement emerged in Syria. The Syrian regime was in a stable position and had survived 
attempts to destabilise it by the American administration of George W Bush which viewed 
Syria as an extension of Iranian influence in the region and labelled it as part of the “Axis of 
Evil”, which also included the regime of Saddam Hussein toppled by force in 2003. In 2005, 
when millionaire Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in Beirut, the United 
States  and France  led  calls  for  the  withdrawal  of  Syrian  soldiers  from Lebanon and for 
members of the Syrian regime to be investigated for alleged involvement in Hariri's murder. 
There were growing accusations levelled at Syria by the United States of its involvement in 
armed resistance and terrorism in Iraq – in October 2008 a number of Syrian civilians were 
killed  in  a  United  States  military  raid  in  the  border  town  of  Abu  Kamal  (BBC,  2008). 
However, in 2010 there appeared to be no domestic challenges to the authority of the Assad 
regime. Iraqis in Syria were waiting in a place that was relatively secure. There was none of  
the lawlessness that still plagued Iraq - Iraqis and others in Syria could feel safe from crime in  
most of the country. For those whose residency rights had expired the feeling was different - 
though it should be said that corruption was prevalent throughout the Syrian bureaucracy so 
there were often ways around residency restrictions for people able to pay bribes. Until March 
2011 Syria was a country of safety for nearly all the people I interviewed.   
The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions and the military intervention in Libya were televised 
and  watched  closely  by  people  in  Syria.  Most  of  my  Iraqi  friends,  acquaintances,  and 
participants, feared what would happen if a movement began in Syria to depose the Assad 
regime, particularly those who had made some progress with their resettlement cases. The 
American embassy in Syria announced the closure of all its visa services on July 11 th 2011 
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after sustaining damage during violent anti-American protests.2 It was a huge blow for the 
Iraqis I knew who had been referred for resettlement to the United States by UNHCR. Some 
had been waiting for an interview with an American government official from the Department 
for Homeland Security (DHS) for many months. They also feared that the popular slogan of 
the Arab Spring - “the people want the fall of the regime” - would come to fruition in Syria.  
They feared they would find themselves in the middle of another violent state collapse and 
some worried they would be targeted because officially they were “guests” of the government 
of Syria. It is hard to say how differently they would have told their stories about Iraq had I 
been interviewing them after the Arab Spring. I might have acquired a less detailed set of 
stories about  the past  when the possibilities of radical political  change on their  doorsteps 
dominated their present. This would have been exacerbated by the fact that after March 2011, 
Syrians began openly speaking about politics with acquaintances and even strangers.3   
It  was  fortunate  that  I  did  manage  to  collect  my  interviews  before  the  anti-government 
protests began. I  left  Syria early in August 2011. Army checkpoints appeared around the 
perimeter of the city around June that year, creating a fortified line between the two provinces 
of Damascus (i.e. the city) and Rural Damascus4, the latter being the site of a growing number 
of  anti-regime  demonstrations  that  were  dealt  with  violently.  It  was  in  parts  of  Rural 
Damascus that most Iraqis lived, in neighbourhoods like Jaramana and Sayidda Zaineb. A 
checkpoint established in June, consisting of a number of soldiers and heavy machine guns 
where  Jaramana met  Damascus  proper,  had  become a  small  camp with  at  least  a  dozen 
soldiers by early August. Soldiers and security officials had beefed up their presence and were 
carrying out more ID checks and searches throughout the city. Although I had a research 
permit it may not have quelled their suspicions to find a digital recorder in the hands of a 
British passport holder. It may also have caused problems for Iraqis whom I befriended and 
whose homes I frequented whilst doing my research. 
Only on two occasions did I sense that Iraqis I interviewed feared speaking about what had 
happened to them in Iraq. One participant strongly criticised Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri Al 
Maliki at the end of the interview and later asked me not to mention any of it in my research. 
He  feared  what  would  happen  if  he  had  to  return.  This  was  the  same  reason  another 
2 All embassy operations were formally suspended on February 6 th 2012.
3 I had regular conversations with taxi drivers – pro and anti-regime – after the protest movement began 
(around March 2011) about domestic politics, subjects which were taboo with strangers before then. 
4 Rural Damascus - Reef Dimashq - is the administrative name for the suburbs of the city. 
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participant would not mention the names of groups of “outsiders” who he was certain were to 
blame for displacing local residents and merchants in Iraq. 
Most of the Iraqis I knew in Syria did not comment on the political situation there before the 
protest movement began. They were nearly all grateful for the fact that they were allowed to 
be in the secure country of Syria, acknowledging that it was not a wealthy country yet was 
hosting a huge population of displaced Iraqis. They did not complain about the government's 
position  of  only  granting  them temporary  stay  and  not  formally  allowing them to  work. 
Nearly all of them had uncomplimentary things to say about the UNHCR. Others would speak 
about  bad  treatment  at  the  hands  of  Syrian  immigration  officers  when  renewing  their 
residency permits - but never while my recorder was on. One participant, Maher, hushed his 
wife Rania when she began to speak of prejudice she had experienced from Syrians. 
Why was there a disparity in speaking freely of the present and the past? As Andrews says: 
“Stories are never told in a vacuum … ” (2007: 3). Iraqis had moved from one police state to 
another. There are red lines to be aware of and criticising any element of the Syrian regime 
was one of them. Iraqis' residency situation has been tenuous, especially since visa restrictions 
were introduced in 2007 - they generally feel vulnerable and know that they can easily be 
deported from Syria, though this has rarely happened. Their situation in Syria was not a focus 
of my research but it was clearly a more problematic story to record – on my Dictaphone as 
well as the historical record - than stories of their displacement in Iraq. I built friendships and 
relationships of exchange with the individuals I interviewed and they often spoke at length 
about distressing subjects. But as Andrews writes: 
… the  “tell-ability”  of  stories  is  highly  influenced  not  only  by  the  level  of  intimacy 
between speaker and listener, but critically by the larger context in which the narrative is 
recounted (Andrews, 2007: 33). 
     
Speaking about the catastrophe which was the 2003 invasion of Iraq was never a problem in 
Syria. The government of Syria had always been an opponent of the invasion, worried in part 
that its success would lead to an attempt at a American led regime change in Syria. The Syrian  
regime derived some legitimacy from “Resistance”, referring specifically to its foreign policy 
of resistance against American and Israeli regional ambitions. The presence of displaced
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Figure 3 (above): Damascus at sunset taken from mount Qasioun in 2011.
Figure 4 (above): A Syrian Army helicopter hovers low over central Damascus in July 2011. A camera crew 
inside films a pro-regime rally which is shown on Syrian state television and the regime-friendly Adunnya TV.
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Figure 5 (above): A procession of Shia pilgrims in Damascus commemorate Arba'een in 2009. Behind them 
hangs a large poster of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad opposite the Iraqi restaurant in Sayidda Zaineb that  
paid for it.
Figure 6 (above): A once typically bustling street by a popular Iraqi restaurant in Sayidda Zaineb, Damascus 
2011. The owners have since moved to Iraq because, after the anti-government uprising began, business declined  
and the security situation became precarious.
45
Iraqis proved the regime's point that 2003 was the start of an occupation and not a liberation. 
This  is  not  to  suggest  that  Iraqis'  resentment  at  the  United  States  stemmed  from  an 
internalisation  of  Syrian  state  discourse  of  resistance,  or  that  Iraqis  had  internalised  this 
discourse  –  most  of  the  Iraqis  I  knew were  sceptical  of  state  discourse.5 But  stories  of 
displacement in post-invasion Iraq were “tell-able” in Syria in the sense that they were in 
harmony with state discourse on regional politics.6 
I want to offer some reflections on the different possibilities of how these displacement stories 
may have been told in a different context. When we collect narratives and record them in 
printed form we risk freezing the story at the expense of others. 
If it is written down, placed in a museum, turned into a book (as many memories are), then 
it can “freeze” the story - making a process and experience become a fixed event. It may 
serve ironically to lose other ways of telling the story or the life. (Plummer, 2001: 234)
The  narratives  in  this  thesis  are  based  on  participants'  recollections  of  past  events  at  a 
particular moment in time, shaped by the researcher and the research context. We should be 
aware that these narratives are snapshots – rooted in the past but also formed by the interview 
context. How would Iraqis' recollection of events, of the decision to leave Iraq, be affected by 
the situation in Syria today? BBC Arabic news showed footage of Iraqis returning to Baghdad 
from Damascus  after being  kicked out  of  their  homes in  Sayidda Zaineb by armed men 
claiming to be members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).7 How might an experience like that 
have influenced reflections on past decisions to leave when those decisions, even forced ones, 
have led them into another situation of danger? How would they have told their stories if I 
had interviewed them after a second major forced migration? We cannot know of course but 
these are important factors to acknowledge. 
I want to consider how reflections on the decision to leave Iraq in 2006 might have been 
5 Whether the language and tropes used in Iraqis' narratives of displacement were affected by the official state 
discourse of Resistance is not a subject I can pursue here, but one worthy of research.  
6 According to a researcher I met in Syria in February 2009, the Iraqi refugee issue was salient in Syrian state 
media until the election of Obama in the United States. There followed a temporary warming of relations 
between the two countries and the Iraqi refugee issue almost disappeared from the press. 
7 The report can be seen here [https://www.youtube.com/watch?
feature=player_embedded&v=gP_KTThdY9M]. Al Jazeera English reported in May 2011 that 2000 Iraqi 
refugees registered with UNHRC Syria had returned to Iraq because of violence in Syria (AJE, 2011). Early 
in August 2012, UN officials in Baghdad reported 22,300 Iraqis had returned from Syria (Schreck, 2012).
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influenced by having to return there owing to threats from Syria's ongoing armed conflict. 
How would  my  participants  have  told  their  stories  about  threat  perception  in  their  Iraqi 
neighbourhoods in 2006? Perhaps they would need to suppress memories of events which 
prompted their earlier decisions to flee so that they could cope with the reality of having to 
return to Iraq. Perhaps upon returning to Iraq in 2012 - from a Syrian town shelled by regime 
forces – the sporadic violence in Baghdad would seem bearable in comparison to that and to 
the memories of intense violence in Baghdad in 2006. Conversely, how might my participants 
reflect on their stories after reaching the safety of asylum in North America? The sisters in 
Nguyen's (2009) study constructed narratives in  ways which  helped them to process  past 
losses and deal with their present circumstances. These are things I cannot know now, but 
would make for an interesting investigation.
The setting in Damascus allowed and even encouraged Iraqis to express feelings of fear and 
insecurity that prompted decisions to leave for Syria. Iraqis seeking resettlement to a third 
country via  the UNHCR realised the  necessity of  emphasising threats  and recalling them 
methodically in certain contexts. This is also another good reason for conducting research 
interviews in the Syrian context rather than waiting until they reach a third country. Upon 
arrival in the United States or Canada, Iraqis can begin to forget these difficult memories and 
maybe bury a severely distressing past. In Syria, those seeking resettlement are not allowed to 
forget them. They must keep them in mind for the resettlement officers at the UNHCR, for the 
interview with the IOM and immigration officers of the desired country of refuge. In the case 
of one of my participants, Anwar, this process lasted four years. Others,  he told me, had 
waited  for  six  years.  Hadi  encapsulated  this  when  I  was  acting  as  an  interpreter  for  an 
American lawyer preparing him for his resettlement interview at the UNCHR. The lawyer 
prompted Hadi to recall memories of his harsh experiences of detention and military service 
in Iraq during the 1980s and the early 1990s. Hadi could expect to be asked about his past in 
order to ascertain that he had not been a high ranking Ba'athist or been involved in human 
rights abuses. Afterwards Hadi said: “Really, I tried to forget about all of these things. When I 
thought about them I would dream about tanks floating in the sky”. Until he reaches a secure 
country of resettlement, Hadi will not be allowed to forget these things. 
As Hodgkin and Radstone (2003: 1) observe: “Contests over the meaning of the past are also 
contests over the meaning of the present and over ways of taking the past forward.”  The 
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UNHCR resettlement  process  means  that  these  displacement  stories  become  instruments 
through which Iraqi families can acquire refuge in third countries and begin to take their lives 
forward. These narratives also serve to justify their  continued presence in Syria,  however 
difficult the circumstances. An Iraqi family can justify remaining in a tough situation in Syria 
by not forgetting what led them there in the first place, a story which many also hope will take 
them forward into a secure country of refuge. This is also an example of meaning making and 
the need to make sense of the present. It is what Colin Davis8 informs us is “the need to make 
habitable meanings from uninhabitable truths.” Reflections and memories of their experiences  
help them make sense of their present as well as of what happened to them in the past. 
How did I collect these stories? In the next section I provide details of my field-work and 
speak  about  the  individuals  I  interviewed  and  the  organisations  and  individuals  who 
introduced them to me. I make observations about how I believed they saw me and about the 
dynamics of relationships which may have affected the data. 
Collecting the interviews in Damascus
Across a  13 month period in  Damascus I  completed 29 interviews.  Iraqi  Arabic was the 
language of all but eight that were undertaken in English. I transcribed Arabic interviews 
directly into English: I did the transcription and translation for all but one, which I paid an 
Iraqi student to do. There were eight women in the sample. Four were aged 20-21, two were 
in their mid 20s, and two in their late 40s. Of the men, eight were in their 20s, three were aged 
30-40. Five were in their 40s, four in their 50s, and one in his 60s.  Muslims, Christians, 
Mandaeans, and atheists are in the sample. The majority came from Baghdad but there were 
some from other provinces. 
The paths I chose in Syria led me to organisations and people who were working to assist  
displaced Iraqis and that  was how I  met  most  of  the  people I  interviewed.  Many of  the 
relationships  involved  some form of  exchange  as  well  as  friendship.  I  met  the  people  I 
interviewed through four networks I engaged with in Damascus. The first I found through 
teaching at the Education for Iraq Project9 (EIP), a non-profit agency based in Damascus and 
the United States that helps Iraqis to acquire university scholarships in the United States. I 
8 Colin Davis (1991: 302), quoted in Skultans (1998: 43).
9 The name has been changed to protect the anonymity of the students I interviewed. 
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volunteered as a teacher and interviewed some of the students who also became my friends. 
The second network came through conducting research for the UNHCR separately from this 
thesis. I wrote a study Under the radar but not invisible: Iraqi economic activity in Damascus  
for the UNHCR about the employment situation of Iraqis in the Syrian capital. With some 
guidance  from Kamel  Dorai  of  Institut  français  du  Proche  Orient  (IfPO)  in  Damascus,  I 
interviewed Iraqis about generating income in the city. I was able to interview three men from 
the UNHCR study for my doctoral research. I also befriended an Iraqi woman who acted as a 
research assistant and introduced me to Iraqis who I interviewed in the suburb of Sayidda 
Zaineb - where she had lived for 10 years. The third network was encountered through the 
Iraqi Legal Aid Society10 (ILAS) an organisation that provides Iraqis with legal assistance in 
their resettlement cases. I volunteered as as an interpreter for a law graduate who was also an 
intern at the UNHCR. Some of the Iraqis I helped through ILAS allowed me to interview 
them for my research. The fourth was the network of friends I made whilst in Syria. I was not 
able to interview all the Iraqis I befriended as not all were willing, and there were times of 
research fatigue when I was unwilling to pursue a lead. I was also lucky enough to be in the  
field with another researcher, Tahir Zaman, with whom I could discuss and exchange ideas. It 
was Tahir who informed me about the research opportunity at the UNHCR and introduced me 
to the only Palestinian of Iraq11 in my sample. I introduced Tahir to my research assistant in 
Sayidda Zaineb (SZ) and to a prominent Iraqi Mandaean man in Damascus. I now provide 
details of how I met my participants through these networks. 
The Education for Iraqis Project (EIP)
Upon arrival in Damascus I contacted the Education for Iraqis Project (EIP) which helps Iraqi 
students to apply for university scholarships in the United States. They have helped around 50 
students acquire  scholarships.  The aim is  for the  student to  eventually return to Iraq and 
contribute  to  the  rebuilding  of  the  country.  The project  is  run  from the  apartment  of  an 
American couple, J & C, who were involved in the anti-sanctions movement in the 1990s. 
They  turned  their  interests  to  education  after  the  occupation  of  2003,  motivated  by  a 
humanitarian  desire  to  remedy  some  of  the  damage  done  to  Iraqi  society  by  wars  and 
sanctions. I taught academic English to students with highly advanced English aptitude, using 
10 The name has been changed to protect the anonymity of my participants.
11 This is how the creators of the community website Filistiniyu al Iraq – Palestinians of Iraq 
[http://www.paliraq.com/ ] – refer to themselves, and how Palestinian scholar Mohammed (2010) refers to 
the Palestinian refugees living in Iraq. Mohammed also refers to them simply as “The Refugees”. I refer to 
them in this thesis as the Palestinians of Iraq.
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texts from Refugee Studies so that they could all relate to the subject.12 It also led to some 
interesting discussions based on their experiences in Iraq and Syria. I taught academic English 
from April to July 2010. After that I was co-teaching a drama workshop in July with another 
researcher, Tahir Zaman. He had also been teaching English to a different group of students.  
We asked students to read and discuss short theatre scripts and then to write and perform their 
own short plays about any life experiences in Iraq and Syria. We taught another round of 
drama classes in late 2010. I taught a weekly note taking class at EIP in July 2011.
I interviewed 10 students from EIP as well as a parent. The students were aged 19-21, though 
one was a little older at 23. I also spent time socialising with EIP students. First I interviewed 
students from my own class. They agreed after I answered many questions for them about my 
research  in  a  class  one  day.  Two  of  them  had  earlier  told  me  that  they  disliked  being 
“studied”. They were referring to times when J & C would invite film makers, activists, and 
others they knew to come and meet  students  and sometimes speaking briefly  about  their 
activities. They told me that sometimes it felt that those people were coming along to look at 
strange beings. I was therefore apprehensive initially about asking for interviews. One student 
later explained that I had not, at least in her eyes, fallen into this category because I had 
explicitly asked the students for their permission before including them in my research. I hope 
that the others felt the same way. I believe that the friendships I built with the students as 
individuals moved me far away from the visitors who would come to observe the students. 
After I had befriended my students, I found it awkward to ask for interviews because at that  
moment, and potentially during the interview, the relationship went from being a friendship to 
one of researcher and participant. There was something uncomfortable about it at first but I 
realised that a person would not grant an interview if they did not want to. 13 I think some 
students were helping me out of duty – to their friend and to a committed volunteer teacher. 
With other students the duty was different - it was about helping an Iraqi-born researcher to 
tell the story of what happened to Iraqis after 2003 from their own perspectives. None of the 
students were the key decision makers in the family as they were too young. Some had been 
13 years old in 2003 but still had vivid memories of their surroundings when war broke out.  
Even though they weren't the decision makers they were witnesses to decisions in the family. 
12 One student later complained about having to read too many depressing articles about refugees so I also used 
different, less tragedy-centred, material at the end of the course.
13 Some of my participants told me after being interviewed that they had enjoyed having somebody listen to 
their reflections about their displacement experiences with such interest.
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I did not use three of the student interviews because I felt that participants had been shielded 
from the full horrors of their surroundings by their parents and therefore not privy to all of the 
factors involved in the decision to leave. In one case this was clearly true. I interviewed the 
reserved Sideeq in his home. He explained that his family left Iraq because it had become 
dangerous to have a noticeably Sunni name where they lived. Their clan name also made 
them into targets. Their parents decided to leave Iraq because they were afraid that one of 
them would be killed at a militia checkpoint because of sectarian affiliation - but this was not 
the whole story.  One of his  older brothers was in  the room at the time of the interview. 
Shuhayb was quietly watching television - his attention split between us and the broadcast. I 
asked Sideeq about threats that he or family members received but he wasn't aware of any. 
After the interview was over, Shuhayb corrected Sideeq, explaining that two attempts had 
been made on his life and that their father had been threatened. He explained that it  was 
because they shared their family name with an unpopular Iraqi politician. Shuhayb did not 
want to be interviewed. Sideeq's testimony revealed an interesting family dynamic, one which 
I was not privy to with my other participants. But I could not gain a thorough understanding 
of how their family reached the decision to leave through his story alone and therefore did not 
include it.
Being  of  Iraqi  origin  and  able  to  converse  in  Iraqi  Arabic  meant  there  was  hardly  any 
language barrier – and this applied to the participants I met through other networks. In social 
situations with some of my advanced students, I found myself speaking English. Some had 
assumed that I couldn't speak Arabic and enjoyed hearing the British accent that I spoke with. 
It helped to break down the student-teacher boundary. I interviewed some of the student group 
in Arabic and some in English, letting them choose. If their English was more advanced than 
my Arabic it seemed better to use English. I made it clear that I wanted them to use Arabic 
whenever  they  couldn't  find  the best  way of  expression in  English,  which  they did.  The 
students with less advanced English were interviewed in Arabic. 
The students had a maturity above the level I expected from students of their age in the UK: 
perhaps experiencing displacement and war made them mature quickly. But this could also be 
related to the selection process controlled by J & C. They were effectively the gatekeepers to 
the group. It was based partly on the student's English aptitude but more on their own ideas 
about  who  would  be  successful  in  an  American  academic  environment.  They  not  only 
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controlled  admissions  but  also  who  could  remain  on  the  programme,  giving  them  an 
enormous amount of power over the students. According to a former teacher who fell out with 
them after they dismissed a student, they were not aware of their power. The students told me 
of their anxieties too.  The programme was an intensive one because of the workload and 
because the students' personalities and behaviour were also under scrutiny. Most had been told 
to “correct” certain of those aspects by J & C whose intentions were always decent, but who 
often created anxiety in the students. I was careful not to come across in the same way. 
A feature of how these young people told their stories was a generally positive tone – with the 
exception of Mohsin. They were bound to the United States for an education, or could see a 
realistic hope of it - all of those I interviewed are now there. Was their positive tone a result of 
their youth, or because they had good prospects (certainly for the next four years)? It was 
probably  a  combination  of  the  two  and  also  because  of  their  migration  trajectory.  The 
displacement process had not been entirely negative for them individually and they did not 
feel the same level of loss as their parents.  They had lived through the sanctions era but not 
during the 1980s and the “golden era” of the 1970s before the Iran-Iraq war. At that time the 
country  was  prosperous  and  state  social  provisions  were  generous.  Most  of  Iraq  was 
peaceful.14 Mohsin told his story with a wearier tone. He seemed to have had more exposure 
to violence than the other students I interviewed – he was a few years older than the other 
students and had gone out to work after 2003 unlike the other students in the sample. Some of 
them were young women who were shielded more from the events than younger men, partly 
because they were not allowed to leave their homes unaccompanied. This was also true of 
Jasim who was a doctor's son and therefore a prized kidnap target.
UNHCR study
In the summer of 2010 I conducted a study for UNHCR about how Iraqis generated income in 
Damascus.  I  explored themes relating to  their  informal  economic activity,  including their 
residency permits or  iqaama. I investigated their awareness of the need for a work permit, 
how they found their work, who they work(ed) for and with. I conducted the study with some 
guidance from Kamel Dorai, a researcher at IfPO Damascus. The interviews I did myself with  
one  exception.  At  the  insistence  of  UNHCR they  took place  on  their  premises  in  Kafar 
14 The glaring exception being the brutal suppression of the Kurdish population in the north of the country 
which did not affect Baghdad and the south of the country so much. 
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Soussa, Damascus. I was able later to interview some of the Iraqis involved in the UNHCR 
study for my doctoral research. I interviewed three men who had taken part in the UNHCR 
employment study and I met a woman who I hired as a research assistant. I have included 
information about them in the biographical appendix. 
The Iraqi Legal Aid Society (ILAS)
ILAS provides legal  assistance to  Iraqis  trying to  navigate  the  complicated third country 
resettlement  process.  It  was  established  by  law  students  from  Yale  University  and  then 
expanded to include a growing number of qualified lawyers in the United States working pro 
bono. Initially I did not like the idea of toiling to get Iraqis out of Syria and to the United 
States where they would most likely spend the rest of their lives struggling to make ends meet 
in low skilled jobs, unable to pay for health care and possibly other basic needs. I felt it was 
better for them to remain in Syria if they could not get to a country that catered to their basic  
needs and where they could have a more dignified existence. It was by chance that I began 
working for them as an interpreter, as a favour to a friend. I was interpreting for an American 
law graduate,  Jake,  who was volunteering at  ILAS and also working as  an intern at  the 
UNHCR. Jake knew very little Arabic. We became friends as we worked on several other 
resettlement  cases  together.  Through  my  work  with  ILAS  I  could  see  that  some  Iraqis' 
situations could be improved by their emigration to the United States such as in cases of  
medical emergency. One man's son had a brain condition that doctors in Syria were unable to 
diagnose,  but  perhaps  could be treated effectively in  the United States.  The Iraqis I  met 
through ILAS were aware that life would not be easy in the United States, but they were 
prepared to take their chances rather than live in uncertain circumstances as “guests” in Syria. 
Jake knew that I was researching Iraqi displacement so he put me to use on some interesting 
cases. 
It was through my ILAS work that I met Adnaan, a former army parachute instructor who 
later founded a “Sons of Iraq” unit  in his neighbourhood to combat Al Qaieda and other 
militias. I also met and interviewed his brother, Abu Bakr, an ILAS client and former army 
officer. I met Hadi through ILAS, a distinguished figure in the Sabean Mandaean community. 
He was a gatekeeper to the Mandaeans and still active in Mandaean community affairs even 
after being displaced to Syria. As well as helping Hadi with his family's own case, Jake took 
on the cases of other Mandaeans that Hadi had led him to. It was through Hadi that I was able  
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to interview two Mandaean men, one of them a priest, as well as Hadi himself. It was also 
through ILAS that I was able to interview Najma.
The ILAS group related detailed accounts of their experiences in Iraq. The quality of the 
relationship and the context of its telling both account for this. The role of the resettlement 
process, as discussed earlier, encourages memories of threat and displacement and does not 
permit Iraqis to forget them. The ILAS group's narratives were highly detailed. This may also 
have been because all of the group knew me as part of the network through which they were 
hoping  to  acquire  refuge  in  North  America.  I  believe  that  a  factor  to  consider  is  their 
impression that the more vividly they could recount their stories of threat to me, the more 
likely they would remain a priority case for ILAS' legal team and so the better their chances 
of resettlement. This was not a correct assessment of ILAS' methods – they were constrained 
in their activities by many different factors - but I think it is a correct assessment of how 
participants saw me: I relayed messages to Jake and the legal team in the United States about 
their cases which I came to know well. Understandably they saw me primarily as a member of  
ILAS. This and the effort I made to help them as an unpaid volunteer elevated the quality of 
the relationship. They were grateful for this and their desire to help me in return facilitated the 
interview process.  The  tone  of  their  interviews  were  wearier  than  those  of  the  students 
mentioned above. I think the positive tone of some of the EIP students was likely an exception  
rather  than the  norm. Refugees  are  typically  the  losers  in  war  and other  radical  political 
reconfigurations. The Mandaeans and former army officers I met through ILAS all fall into 
this  category.  Their  interviews  were  mixed  in  tone.  There  was  a  sadness  in  them and a 
pessimism  about  the  future  of  the  country  from  which  they  had  been  excluded.  The 
pessimistic assessments of Adnaan may have be correct. They may also have been a result of 
his exclusion as a Sunni Arab and army officer and the need to emphasise the bleak prospects 
of his return to someone he views as a potential facilitator of asylum. 
Friends
Three of my participants were friends, including a married couple - both Baghdadi artists 
active in the Damascus art scene.  They had already been accepted for resettlement in the 
United States before meeting me. I had come to know Maher and Rania at social occasions. I  
interviewed Maher in Rania's presence but couldn't interview Rania separately. Anwar I also 
met during social occasions. He later agreed to be my research assistant but was told he would  
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be resettled  to  the  United States  within weeks so understandably could not  do so in  the 
circumstances. I interviewed him in my apartment a few days before his departure. I had also 
agreed to help him by translating and subtitling a short documentary film he had made about 
an Iraqi family in Damascus. It was an implicit exchange between friends as well as between 
researcher and participant. 
It was through my friend and fellow researcher Tahir Zaman that I was able to interview a 
Palestinian man displaced from Iraq. Tahir introduced me to him. He was actively involved in 
community affairs, dedicated to documenting the deaths and attacks on Palestinians in Iraq, 
and also a regular contributor to a community website documenting their plight. Initially he 
was reluctant to talk about his personal experiences to a researcher but later agreed. He felt  
obliged to speak on behalf of the Palestinian community throughout the interview. Early on in 
the interview, conducted in his apartment in a Palestinian neighbourhood in Damascus, he was 
speaking more generally about the situation of the Palestinians. As I tried to steer it towards 
his personal experiences he asked me to allow him to speak about certain broader issues first, 
and then he would speak about his own experience. I believe he wanted to get a message out 
to the world about what was happening to the Palestinians and he saw me as a scholar who 
may be able to reach an international audience. This was also a feature of my interactions with  
Hadi. He had been a vociferous advocate of minority rights in Iraq and I believe was speaking  
to  a  wider  audience when I  interviewed him. He wanted the interviews he gave  to  raise 
awareness of what was happening to the Mandaeans in Iraq. 
The interview questions
IfPO and Oxford University began a study on forced migration decision making in post-2003 
Iraq before I had started my PhD. It was wider in scope than my PhD, including Iraqis in 
Syria,  Jordan,  Egypt  and Lebanon,  and making use  of  many researchers.  My supervisor, 
Philip Marfleet, introduced me to its researchers and I was allowed to see the questions they 
were asking.15 It did influence the list of questions I created for my PhD but the IfPO study 
was not based on a narrative framework or designed to gather extended narration, probably 
because of practical constraints as it included around 150 participants. I created a list of open-
ended questions about daily life before and after the invasion. I wanted to know if daily life 
had changed in ways that exerted coercive pressure on the decision to leave. These open-
15 See Appendix 3 for a list of the questions.
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ended questions led, in most cases, to long and detailed accounts of life under occupation and 
how people amended their daily routines to adapt to it. However I also had a list of sub-
questions as a  back up, but most  of the time these were answered through conversations 
triggered by the open questions. I wasn't always able to ask every question in every interview, 
and not all questions would get an answer. The sub-questions were useful when participants 
were reticent. 
I had met Geraldine Chatelard in Amman and Kamel Dorai in Damascus during a visit to the 
field in February 2009. Geraldine was overseeing the IfPO research project in Amman, and 
Kamel in Damascus - I benefited from discussions with them. I met the other researchers in 
Amman and Damascus and translated an interview with an Iraqi boy, aged around eight years, 
into English.  I  was also allowed to see  translations from other interviews.  Having yet  to 
interview anyone at that stage, the experience was valuable.   
Confidentiality and anonymity 
Before each interview I explained that the purpose of the study was to understand why Iraqis 
had left their homes and how they came to take migration decisions. I explained that I would 
be asking about what their daily lives were like before 2003 and whether or how they had 
changed afterwards. I assured participants of their anonymity and asked them if they would 
like to pick their own pseudonym or let me choose one for them. I obtained consent from my 
participants and explained that they could withdraw it at any time.
Where I recorded interviews, I provided a copy to those who desired it. I did not make the 
same offer with the interview transcripts. They were all in English and not completed until 
months after the interviews. I also explained that the recordings would be kept by me and not 
made available to the public, but that I would be translating them into English and sections of 
the anonymous transcriptions would appear in my thesis and any publications evolving from 
it. They were informed that copies of my thesis would be publicly available at the libraries of 
the University of East London, the British Library, and the British Institute for the Study of 
Iraq (as a condition for receiving a travel bursary from them). I made it very clear that they 
were free to withdraw at any time and if there was anything they said in the interview that 
they wanted to amend, add or delete then I would oblige. I stored recordings and transcripts 
electronically. There were copies on my laptop, which required a password for access, backed 
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up and encrypted on a USB drive and encrypted cloud storage. 
It was also reassuring for some of my participants that I had acquired a research permit. This 
was thanks to IfPO in Damascus. It was not strictly necessary at the time - other researchers  
had managed without one - but it gave me peace of mind. One researcher from a British 
university, also looking at  Iraqi refugee issues but without a permit, was deported by the 
Syrian government and not told why. We will never know if lack of a permit was the reason. 
The  welfare  of  the  Iraqis  I  knew was  a  paramount  concern.  I  wanted to  avoid drawing 
unnecessary attention to myself but still behave openly so as not to arouse suspicion that my 
activities were seditious. Deportation would have been disruptive for me but deportation to 
Iraq for the Iraqis I knew could have been lethal. Fortunately I had finished collecting the 
narratives before the anti-government protest movement began.16 Syria is a police state and its 
society was permeated by networks of informers and undercover security officers.
Looking back, I may have been too careful and maybe could have collected more interviews 
in my sample. Several months into the protest movement there was a demonstration outside 
the UNHCR. Afghan refugees were protesting against their treatment by UNHCR - perhaps 
its resources had been earmarked for Iraqis - and had established a small camp. Some had 
stitched their lips together in protest. Syrian police officers were close by but while I was 
there the Afghan camp wasn't shot at, suggesting that the government tolerated protests that 
did not conflict with its interests. Nevertheless, the potential risk to myself and participants 
was always on my mind, even if it may not have always been one in reality. 
I did not interview participants twice. On two occasions participants had a lot to say and we 
needed two sessions to complete the interview. There is evidence which shows the benefits of 
secondary  interviews  for  memory  recall  (Cameron,  2010:  495-496):  individuals  can 
remember more about an event when asked about it  a second time. The memory seeking 
process  continues,  even subconsciously,  after  the  initial  attempts  at  recall.  Recall  is  also 
affected by the participant trying to please the interviewer by remembering more about events 
which the interviewer wants to  know about  (ibid.).  However,  the relative mobility of the 
Iraqis I knew made this impractical. Many left Syria before I did, to locations as far away as 
the  United  States  and  Canada.  Some  returned  to  Iraq.  I  would  not  have  been  able  to 
16 See ICG (2011a, 2011b) for more details about the origins of the protest movement and the government's 
brutal response to it.
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consistently interview my participants twice. 
Here  there  were  also  ethical  considerations.  I  was  asking Iraqis  to  speak in  depth  about 
distressing events:  some of  the people  I  spoke to  had had relatives  kidnapped and close 
friends killed. I was reluctant to insist on asking them to speak in depth about these incidents 
twice. Many Iraqis in Syria also suffer from interview fatigue. They have already had to relate  
their stories to bureaucrats at the UNHCR who are often indifferent to their circumstances and 
in some cases the Iraqis I spoke to had been interviewed by other researchers. However, I was 
still able to gather very rich testimonies with single interviews because of the quality of the 
relationships I established with most of my participants, and other issues outlined above.
From oral to textual: transcription
I recorded all but three of the interviews. Two of those were at the participants' request. I took 
notes in English and Arabic as they spoke. Another interview took place unexpectedly, hence I  
was not carrying my Dictaphone with me and could not record it. Most of the interviews were 
in Iraqi Arabic. When translating Iraqi Arabic into English, I tried to find the words in English  
that  best  conveyed the  meaning as  I  understood it,  remembering as  much as  I  could the 
interaction of the interview, and listening to the audio again to replenish my sense of the 
interaction. The translation was not just from Arabic into English, but from human interaction 
into text. I also wanted to translate the fluency of their stories from oral to textual form. I 
deliberately avoided noting the non-verbal forms of communication in the transcripts, as well 
as verbal fillers, because they can create an impression that the participant is inarticulate. In 
the transcripts,  and the extracts  included in the  thesis,  I  have included my questions and 
interjections in acknowledgement that these narratives are co-constructed.17 I did not include 
non-lexical elements or non verbal communications. My focus is on the told and not on the 
form of the telling so this would not have represented a good use of time. I avoided organising 
the transcripts into “thematic stanzas, or meaning units” as this would also erase part of the 
process  of  co-construction  in  the  narrative  (Riessman,  2008a:  35).18 Nevertheless,  the 
transcripts reflected my inclination towards a thematic analysis with a conceptually guided 
focus on the content – itself a co-construction based on my open-ended interview questions.   
17 My contributions appear in italics. 
18 See Riessman (2008a: 21-50) for an evaluation of different ways of constructing narrative texts for inquiry.
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Conclusion 
I have discussed how I view the narratives of displacement that I gathered. They are partial 
recollections influenced by the moment of telling and by the immediate and broader context 
but  grounded  in  important  material  realities.  They  are  influenced  by  temporal  factors. 
Narratives change over time as well as with different social settings. But the intimate and 
causative nature of the connection between Iraqis'  presence in Syria and their reasons for 
leaving Iraq made Syria an apt place to conduct the research – or so it was before the anti-
government protests and uprising began. Syria was also a place where Iraqis were encouraged 
to remember their displacement experiences and where some were not allowed to forget them. 
I was able to collect the rich stories that appear in this thesis through different relationships of 
exchange facilitated by the different networks in Syria that were seeking to assist displaced 
Iraqis. That was how I collected the stories that form the coming chapters of this thesis. In the 
next chapter I provide a historical context to the circumstances that led to mass displacement 
in Iraq.  
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Chapter 3
Historical background to mass displacement in Iraq
The invasion and occupation  of  Iraq  did not  immediately produce  a  mass  exodus across 
national  borders.  Mass  movements  would  take  place  later  as  a  result  of  communal  and 
generalised violence following the collapse of the Iraqi state and its re-formation along ethno-
sectarian lines thanks to the policies of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and exiled 
politicians. These dynamics were unleashed on a population which had already endured the 
pressures  of  living  under  a  dictatorship  that  had  dragged  them  into  years  of  war  and 
international isolation. Those years had produced their own set of refugees. The years after 
2003 would produce many more and on a national scale. How did this situation come to be? 
Here I shall present a compressed history of the events which led to the international embargo 
of Iraq, the occupation in 2003, to state collapse and the generalised and communal violence 
of 2006-2007 – the situation in which my participants undertook their decisions to migrate. 
The chapter examines international and regional circumstances which led to the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait, sanctions and the 1991 uprisings. It begins with the background to the Iranian 
Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. The eight year war ended in 1988, putting the Iraqi regime 
in a vulnerable domestic and international situation. It wrongly believed that an invasion of 
Kuwait would be a solution to its woes: in fact the consequences were disastrous. I look at the  
sectarian discourse employed by the regime during the Iran-Iraq war and how it was affected 
by the uprisings of 1991. The regime had used discourse with anti-Shia sectarian undertones 
in the 1980s in response to the challenges against its legitimacy presented by revolutionary 
Iran. But after the uprisings of 1991 it began to use anti-Shia discourse more overtly. Here I 
show how a religious revival during the sanctions era affected sectarian cleavages in society. 
I also look at  the situation in Iraq after 2003 and how it  was connected to domestic and 
external  dynamics  of  the  1990s.  Sectarian  politicians  and  the  invading  armies  pursued 
communal agendas, purging members perceived to belong to the old order. Their task had 
been made easier by developments in the 1990s. After 2003, communal violence became 
commonplace as armed groups including Al Qaida and the Mehdi Army vied for control of 
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territory and assets. The combination of these armed groups, occupation forces, and a weak 
state with no political solution to the political and security crisis that engulfed Iraq after 2003 
resulted in a “State of Violence” during 2006-2007. These dynamics created a situation of 
intense insecurity, one which resulted in mass displacement. 
There  is  a  dearth  of  academic  research  on  domestic  socio-political  developments  in  Iraq 
during the 1980s, 1990s, and the 2000s, though there are many studies centred on Saddam 
Hussein and Iraqi foreign policy. Conducting research is difficult in countries under dictatorial  
rule  -  as I  learned from conducting this study in Syria -  and Iraq under  Saddam was no 
exception.  This  state  of  affairs  continued after  2003 because  of the  deteriorating security 
situation. Like all histories, this chapter is only a partial narrative. Here, a few well-informed 
sources  feature  strongly  in  my account  of  social  trends  in  Iraq  in  the  1990s and  2000s: 
research  conducted  by  Haddad  (2011),  Harling  (2010,  2011)  and  the  International  Crisis 
Group (ICG). Harling spent a considerable amount of time in Iraq from 1998 to 2004 and as 
the director of the Iraq-Syria-Lebanon Project for the ICG, can also draw upon extensive 
field-work in Iraq. Haddad has attempted to put sectarian conflict in Iraq into a historical 
context and draws upon extensive interviews with Iraqis in the process. I have deliberately 
avoided explanations of sectarian conflict which rely on the idea of centuries-old animosity 
between “the Sunnis” and “the Shias” as I believe a nuanced approach is needed which takes 
into account the policies of the Iraqi state as well as regional and international developments. 
Broadly speaking, the sources I have used in this chapter adopt this approach in their research.
How Iraq became a pariah state: war with Iran and the invasion of Kuwait
Mohammed Rezah Shah, an oppressive monarch who ruled Iran and owed his power to a 
clandestine Anglo-American coup in 19531, was deposed by the 1979 Revolution. He had 
positioned  himself  as  the  regional  gendarme  guarding  against  communism  –  and  thus 
guarding American interests - in the oil rich Gulf. He recycled Iran's petrodollars into arms 
purchases from the United States and maintained a close alliance with Israel (Hinnebusch, 
2003: 190-192). There was popular domestic resentment against his subservience to western 
interests and to the oppressive practices of the Shah's security forces. A broad coalition of 
1
 Christopher de Bellaigue's (2012) Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Very British Coup  
is the biography of Muhammad Mossadegh and the most recent treatment of the coup which deposed him. 
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Iranians  overthrew  the  Shah,  radically  altering  Iranian  foreign  policy  orientation  in  the 
process (ibid.). 
Ayatollah Khomeini became the leader of the Revolution and came to power after living in 
exile.  The ideology of  the revolution had been anti-imperialism fused with  populist  Shia 
Islam. Revolutionary fervour at home influenced Iranian policy abroad (Hinnebusch, 2003: 
190-196). Iran cancelled $9 billion worth of Western arms contracts in 1980 and declared it 
would instead use its petrodollars for internal development (ibid.). Revolutionary ideology 
heavily influenced Iran's foreign policy elites in the early stages of the revolution. They began 
calling for Muslims across the region to revolt against client regimes of the West - such as 
Saudi Arabia – a challenge to the regional status quo (ibid.). 
  
Hinnebusch explains that the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran, after the Shah was 
given refuge in the United States, led to Iran's international isolation and enabled Iraq to 
attack  Iran  without  international  condemnation  (ibid.).  Iran  had  also  rejected  an  offer  of 
protection from the USSR and warned it  not to attempt to play Cold War politics in Iran 
(Menashri, 1990 in Hinnebusch, 2003). Exporting the revolution became a tactic for domestic 
legitimation and to counter Iran's growing isolation but it was unsuccessful. Arab states in the 
Gulf  had  sizeable  disenfranchised  Shia  populations  which  Iran  attempted  to  prompt  into 
rebellion. This, however, only served to unite those states against Iran (Hinnebusch, 2003: 
190-196). Exporting the revolution, it was feared, could also have destabilising effects on Iraq 
with its large Shia population.2 The United States looked to Saddam Hussein to challenge the 
Islamic  Republic.  Saddam  foolishly  indulged  in  a  cycle  of  provocation  and  counter 
provocation with Iran (Hinnebusch, 2003: 195) which led to an eight year war at immense 
human and material cost to both countries. 
Iraqi soldiers invaded Iran in September 1980. Bill and Springborg (1994: 385-395) comment 
that  the  Iranian  revolutionary  regime  was  faltering  under  domestic  and  international 
challenges when Iraq invaded. The war served to consolidate the revolution and Iraq was on 
the defensive by 1983 as Iran attempted to push into Iraq believing it could win the war and 
destroy Saddam's regime. That was why Khomeini rejected the chance to negotiate a peace 
that year (Bill and Springborg, 1994: 386). The conflict continued for five more years and 
2 This fear proved to be unfounded as Iraq's Shias fought alongside their compatriots during the Iran-Iraq war. 
62
became one of attrition that was increasingly internationalised, with the superpowers siding 
with Saddam. Billions of dollars of military assistance poured into Iraq,  mostly from the 
USSR and the United States, but also from Britain and France. Iran grudgingly accepted a 
ceasefire after Iraq acquired chemical weapons which it was able to fit to long-range missiles 
capable of reaching Tehran by 1988 (Bill and Springborg, 1994: 386-387).
The war crippled the Iraqi economy. Iraq's financial position had been $35 billion in the black 
in 1980 but was $75 billion in the red in 1988 - most owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Bill 
and Springborg, 1994: 386). In the wake of the war, Saddam Hussein faced huge domestic 
economic challenges which soon led him to the desperate measure of invading Kuwait. His 
regime suffered from a shortage of funds to keep the wheels of patronage turning in Iraq's 
subsidised  consumption-oriented  economy.  There  was  potential  for  resentment  against  a 
leader who appeared incompetent rather than heroic (Tripp, 2002: 250-251). The “economic 
liberalisation process” remarks Tripp (2002:251) “that had begun before the war was extended 
and reinforced, at least on the statute book”. But this process only benefited a tight circle of 
cronies close to the ruling circle and could not make any serious dent in the country's overall 
economic predicament. The debt burden was over 50 per cent of Iraq's oil income in 1990, 
reconstruction costs were massive, and Iraq's import bill far exceeded its projected oil income3 
– itself  in  decline  because  of  weak oil  prices  (ibid.).  Riots  directed  at  Egyptian  migrant 
workers  took place  in  1989 after  200,000 soldiers  were  demobilised (Davis,  2005:  229). 
Desperate times would shortly result in a desperate gamble. 
The Iraqi state was of a type too weak to overcome the fiscal crisis it brought upon itself after  
1988. It is worth considering the Iraqi state in the context of Ayubi's analysis of Arab states 
(1994: 447-458)4. It was a mixture of what Ayubi (1994) calls the “hard” and “fierce” types of 
state rather than a “strong” state able to penetrate society and organise social relations through 
hegemonic persuasion. It was “hard” in the sense that it was strongly centralising and relied 
on administrative instruments – a huge and complex bureaucracy5 - to try to penetrate civil 
3 Iraq's oil income in 1988 was $11billion, half of what it was in 1980 (Tripp, 2002: 248).
4 His central thesis is that the strength of Arab states vis a vis their societies is overstated in the sense that they 
rely on a blend of resource allocation (obtained from external rents) and raw coercion – ruling through 
intermediaries and corporatism. They suffer from hegemony deficits which make them incapable of 
implementing many of the laws they pass and of extracting taxes. They are also overstated in the sense that 
they are overstaffed. See Ayubi (1994).
5 The Iraqi state under Saddam had developed an elaborate network of surveillance, terror, and patronage. A 
web of complex bureaucracy made it difficult for members to operate beyond their assigned roles, the 
fulfilment of which was enforced by disciplinary procedures (Tripp, 2002: 248).
63
society and control the economy. But it was also a “fierce” state because of its capacity and 
will to use raw coercion to discipline civil society when its members did not conform to its 
will. Therefore it proved not to be a “strong” state: it was shaken by a fiscal crisis from 1988 
but was unable to extract taxes directly from the population. Taxation can lead to increased 
political awareness and demands for participation, something the regime wanted to avoid. 
This was a sign of its incapacity to implement laws and real social change. Its capacity to 
mobilise people – such as for war against  Iran -  depended on a combination of resource 
allocation through patronage networks and a use of raw coercion. Without the oil wealth to 
continue its ambitious programmes of infrastructural development, to lubricate the wheels of 
patronage  that  had  bought  the  acquiescence  of  the  population,  and  which  funded  the 
enormous bureaucracy and security apparatus, Saddam gambled. 
Iraq's leader sought to persuade OPEC to raise the price of oil with new restrictive quotas and 
looked to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular for help in lifting Iraq out of its economic 
plight  (Tripp,  2002:  251-252).  They  were  expected  to  cooperate  in  raising  oil  prices  by 
restraining their own production and pressuring others to do the same. Saddam repeatedly 
asked them to declare that $40 billion in financial assistance they had provided during the war  
to be a loan and not a debt. He also asked that they should make substantial contributions to 
Iraq's economic reconstruction. They refused and Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 after 
making threatening hints earlier that year. Saddam had calculated that Kuwait could be used 
as a  bargaining chip to dominate  the Gulf  states more generally and the conquest  would 
enhance Saddam's authority at home. He had calculated wrongly that the United States and 
Western countries would take their  lead from the Gulf states and would acquiesce in the 
negotiated outcome of the Iraqi engineered crisis (Tripp, 2002: 252). It seems that the Iraqi 
leader had also taken the words of American Ambassador to Iraq6, April  Glaspie, that the 
United States had no interest in the border dispute with Kuwait (Bill and Springborg, 1994: 
389), to be a green light for the invasion. 
Defeat and the 1991 uprisings
Unlike in the war with Iran, there was no support forthcoming from regional or international 
powers. It turned Iraq into a pariah state: its people had to endure a protracted international  
embargo.  The  Unites States  led an  international  military  coalition which  overwhelmingly 
6 Spoken in a controversial meeting between Saddam Hussein and his Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on July 25th 
1990 (Bill and Springborg, 1994: 389). 
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defeated Iraqi military forces, expelling them from Kuwait within a few weeks (Davis, 2005: 
227). Bombing destroyed much of Iraq's power and transport infrastructure and its industrial 
capacity  was  reduced  to  1960s  levels.  Diseases  spread  as  sewage  and  water  treatment 
facilities were damaged (ibid.). Iraqi Army units mutinied in Basra on February 28 th 1991. The 
uprising spread across the south of the country and soon 16 of Iraq's 18 provinces were out of 
the  regime's  control.  However,  it  managed to crush  the  uprising by April  and only three 
northern provinces, comprising the Kurdish areas of Iraq, remained out of its control (ibid.). 
The regime then turned its attention to crushing the Kurdish uprisings, sending mechanised 
units of the Republican Guard to do the job with the support of air power. The rebels were not 
capable of confronting this technology which was used against civilians as well  as armed 
rebels. A mass exodus of Kurds into Turkey and Iran ensued (McDowall, 2000: 372-373). No-
fly  zones  were  subsequently  established  and  enforced  in  northern  and  southern  Iraq  by 
American, British and French fighter jets.7 This created a “safe haven” and many Kurds were 
able to return. The Baghdad government blockaded the Kurdish areas which soon fell under 
the control of the rival Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK),  with  international  assistance.  This  region  saw  further  conflict  between  the  rival 
factions, parts of northern Iraq becoming an autonomous Kurdish area from which attempts to  
topple Saddam were launched (McDowall, 2000). 
Sanctions 
Sanctions were imposed under the authority of the United Nations after the Iraqi invasion and 
remained in place until 2003. They caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, destroyed the 
nation’s economy and its education and health care systems, and reduced a “sophisticated 
country” to the level of “the poorest of the poor” (Gordon 2010: 87). Policies of the United 
States were “extreme and harsh… going well beyond the mandate of the Security Council’s 
resolutions” (Gordon 2010: 235). The Iraqi people would bear the cost of American efforts to 
weaken and depose the regime in Baghdad. The American government showed overt hostility 
towards it and was committed to a policy of isolation and replacement – preferably by coup 
and not popular uprising (Allawi, 2007: 50). The Iraqi government was able to mitigate the 
effects of the embargo but was unable to avoid a human catastrophe (Gordon 2010: 127–30). 
7 France withdrew from enforcing the no-fly zones in 1996.
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Figure 7: Sanctions made it difficult to acquire spare parts for cars in Iraq. By 2001 a flow of relatively new cars  
had begun to appear in Baghdad, imported from Dubai but most Iraqis had to improvise with pre-1990 models.
Measures to increase food production, together with a national system of rationing, prevented 
famine and the regime encouraged expansion of private health care to compensate in part for 
the collapse of state provision. There was an emergency reconstruction programme to restore 
electricity, water and telecommunications services damaged in the 1991 bombing campaign 
(Gordon  2010:  130).  However,  these  were  not  enough.  The  state  was  unable  to  deal 
effectively with the changed circumstances (Gordon 2010: 132–33).  
The Iran-Iraq war and anti-Shia state discourse
A propaganda war accompanied the Iranian revolution and the military conflict between Iran 
and Iraq. Bengio (1998) has analysed Ba'athist discourse and shows how it evolved to take on 
more Islamic tones after the war began. One reason for this was that “Iran made religion its 
main weapon for maligning Ba'thist Iraq, proclaiming it a heretical regime” (Bengio, 1998: 
180). The Iranian revolution polarised opinions beyond Iraq. In the Islamic world it resulted 
in the mobilisation of sectarian identity as regimes which felt threatened by it, Gulf Arab 
monarchies in particular, sought to  discredit  the revolution in any way possible  (Haddad, 
2011: 12-13). Targeting Shi’ism, the creed of the revolution, was one way of doing so. There 
was a concerted anti-Shia discourse in the post-1979 Gulf Arab media landscape. Anti-Iranian 
polemics became anti-Shia polemics (Al-Mu'min, 2007 in Haddad, 2011:13) thus politicising 
Shia identity in a way that emphasised its otherness, with damaging consequences for Sunni-
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Shia  relations.  There  was  a  cyclical  dynamic  involved  –  the  increased  salience  of  one 
particular  identity  led  to  a  heightened  awareness  of  sectarian  identity  across  the  sects 
(Haddad, 2011:13). 
Saddam produced a specific historical narrative to cast suspicion on the Shia population of 
Iraq during the war with Iran. The Ba'ath argued implicitly that the Arabised Shia of Persian 
origin – the Shu'ubiyuun - who had formed the core of the Abbasid empire's bureaucracy – in 
the 8th century CE - had conspired to bring its downfall (Davis, 2005:4). The implicit message 
to contemporary Iraqi Sunni Arabs was that Shias were untrustworthy.  To Iraqi  Shias the 
message was that they would only receive the benefits distributed by the state if they would 
embrace Pan-Arabism (ibid.). This polemic originally appeared in a pamphlet in 1962 but was  
reprinted  in  1980  and  continued  to  appear  in  regime  propaganda  throughout  the  1980s. 
Saddam alleged that Iraq's Shia community harboured disloyalty and ill intent towards the 
Iraqi nation throughout history (Davis, 2005: 131-133, 184-188). 
After the 1991 uprisings
The regime chose to  interpret  the 1991 uprisings  through a communal  prism,  calling the 
violence a “Shia” act of treason. It made official and entrenched a sectarian narrative which 
reflected only one aspect of the revolt (Harling, 2011: 46). Davis (2005) highlights a series of 
seven articles issued in the name of the Ba'ath Party in its newspaper Athawra8 in 1991. They 
formed the  regime's  first  attempt  at  dealing  with  the  outcomes  of  the  Gulf  War  and the  
intifada.  They were anonymously written but,  according to Davis (2005:  242, 343),  most 
analysts believed they had been penned by Saddam Hussein himself. They addressed issues 
including the nature of Iraqi collective identity, using the word Shia in a political sense and 
publicly  so  for  the  first  time  –  a  major  change  in  Iraqi  political  discourse.  Iraq's  other 
minorities, the Kurds and Turkmens, were also targeted in the series (Davis, 2005: 242).
Saddam's articles were aimed primarily at  the Shias and paralleled Western analysts who 
viewed Iraq through an ethnic lens. In one article titled Criticism of the Iraqi People – The  
Impact of Iranian Sectarianism, the chaos and destruction of the uprisings were the fault of 
the Iraqi people who were not united or disciplined enough to counter this sectarianism and 
the Shias were viewed as its cornerstone (Davis, 2005: 243). Continuing his approach from 
the 1980s, the Iraqi leader was trying, says Davis, to  “divide and conquer” (ibid.).  Then, 
8 Meaning The Revolution.
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Saddam had tried to sow divisions between secular Shias and the clerical Marja'iya class who 
he connected to the Iranian revolution. In the 1990s Saddam attempted to separate respectable 
religious Shias on the one hand from lower-class elements whom he asserted originated from 
the marshlands in southern Iraq bordering Iran on the other hand  - implying it was through 
the marshlands that Iranian culture infiltrated Iraqi society9 (ibid.). He labelled them as sexual 
deviants,  misogynists,  and  dishonest  in  their  business  dealings,  with  a  moral  culture  not 
conforming to the high standards of Islam. “Saddam argued that these people are much in 
evidence in Baghdad, as itinerant pedallers, street vendors, and petty merchants … ” (Davis, 
2005: 243). The broad denigration of Shias was present in state media which pushed the idea 
in the 1990s of the “mob provinces” - those where rebellions took place - and the “white 
provinces”  where  they  did  not.  People  with  origins  in  these  provinces  were  labelled  as 
Shurugi - a term meaning a person from the east, i.e. the south eastern part of Iraq bordering 
Iran  but  which  after  1991  acquired  a  pejorative  meaning:  an  uncultured  person. 
Discrimination towards  many people from the southern provinces  ensued (Haddad,  2011: 
102). 
Haddad (2011:65-85) explains how political,  geographical and other circumstances led the 
1991 uprising to be seen as a Shia rebellion. The rebellion itself spread quickly in the nine 
southern provinces that had Shia majorities where the state had been weakened the most, 
being closest  to  the  Saudi  and  Kuwaiti  border  areas where  Iraqi  military  units  had  been 
routed. It was also through the southern provinces that dishevelled Iraqi soldiers retreated and 
thus where people could see first hand the humiliating extent of the defeat. Some had walked 
from Kuwait after being abandoned by the central command of Baghdad, and after American 
bombers targeted columns of retreating Iraqi army units. Retreating armoured units began 
attacking Ba'ath headquarters and other regime structures and symbols.  In these provinces 
some assertion of exclusive Shia identity were purportedly made. These included displays of 
posters of Iraqi Shia clerics like Ayatollah Abu Qasim Al Khoei (the highest authority in Shia 
Islam at the time) but also posters of Iran's then dead ruler Ayatollah Khomeini (though this 
was more likely for their value as anti-regime symbols) and also the use of Shia slogans. All 
of these circumstances made it  easy for the regime to persuade Iraqis in the provinces of 
western  Iraq  (most  of  whom  were  Sunni  Arabs  and  from  where  many  of  the  regime's 
members  came) that  an Iranian backed Shia Islamic rebellion was taking place (Haddad, 
9 He would later order the draining of the entire Iraqi marshlands, approximately 20,000km2. 
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2011: 65-85). 
The manner in which the regime crushed the rebellion gave the appearance of a deliberate 
attack on Iraq's Shias. Holy shrines in Najaf and Kerbala were targeted - seen as an intentional 
violation of Shia symbols – and the notion that as they suppressed the rebellion, the Iraqi 
Republican Guard carried the slogan “No more Shias after today” gained wide currency10. The 
result was to alienate them from the state and to galvanise Shia identity (Haddad, 2011:73). 
The way in which the 1991 uprising was suppressed, says Haddad (2011), served to nourish a 
deep sense of victimhood among the Shias during the 1990s whereas Sunni Iraqis, broadly 
speaking viewed the rebellion with scepticism believing that Iran played a pivotal role. The 
result  was an irreconcilable  memory of  the  events  on sectarian lines  that  would create  a 
division between Sunnis and Shias (ibid.).
… the memory of the uprisings was not in and of itself the cause of embittered sectarian 
relations in the 1990s; rather, the dismal economic situation soured social relations on a 
number of levels, one of which was the sectarian cleavage … (Haddad, 2011: 107).
In the deprivation of the sanctions era there was a religious revival in Iraq at the societal and 
state level. The revival was not dissimilar to developments in Arab states more generally. 
Islamist  movements were gaining ground in  a  climate in  which  ruling pan-Arabists  were 
discredited and oppositional ones marginalised (Karawan, 1992: 448). Karawan (1992: 448) 
remarks that  in  the 1990s,  certain pan-Arabists  adopted “the language and the banner  of 
Islam”.  There  had  been  a  legacy  of  Islamic  activism in  Iraq  but  the  greater  factor  was 
arguably the need for assurance and support in a time of social and economic crisis – people 
mobilised religion as the state could no longer provide the jobs and social services that were 
available  before  the  embargo  (Haddad,  2011:  106-108).  The  regime  had  used  religious 
language in its discourse in the past (Bengio, 1998) - what differed about this religious revival 
was its very visible and public nature (Haddad, 2011: 103-112). The state here was a “cultural 
compass” in that it was following society – which began to mobilise religious resources - as  
much as it was leading it by mobilising religion in order to regain a semblance of legitimacy. 
It embarked upon the National Faith Campaign (NFC) in 1994, increasing Islamic classes in 
10 The damage done to the shrines was visible though the Republican Guard's slogans were impossible to verify. 
Haddad states that many Iraqi Shia nonetheless believed that the slogans had been widely used (Haddad, 
2011: 73). 
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school, building mosques, banning the sale of alcohol in public places, and adding the phrase 
Allahu Akbar to the national flag.11 The campaign and the funding for it was under the control 
of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. This was, however, a Sunni institution and so the 
NFC took on a character of Sunni Islam, further distancing Shias from the state (Haddad, 
2011: 112)12. 
Although the religious revival was not inherently sectarian, it resulted in a heightened sense 
of religious group belonging. Haddad (2011:105-112) argues that the more devout a person 
becomes, the more s/he needs to refer to religious rulings and therefore the greater awareness 
becomes of differences between different religious schools of interpretation.  A heightened 
sense  of  the  validity  of  one's  own religious  affiliation  is  concomitant  with  awareness  of 
divisions between sects more broadly. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence from visitors to 
Iraq in the 1990s of overt displays of piety in Iraqi society - a marked increase in the number 
of  women wearing  head scarves  for  example.  These  displays  were  clear  markers  of  self 
definition and group identity (ibid.). The 1990s saw a strong sense of social identity appear 
among the Shia which took on quasi-ethnic qualities for an increasing number of them. It was 
the result of “the increased disconnect from the state, rising piety and the shift to religious 
modes of self identification” (Haddad, 2011: 111). 
The Sadrists
It was in this environment of deprivation and religious revival that the social base of the 
Sadrists grew. After 2003, Sadr City in east Baghdad became a stronghold of the movement 
and its  militia,  which was responsible  for  much of  the violence and displacement  in  the 
capital.13 Sadr  City  (formerly  “Saddam  City”  and  “Revolution  City”)  had  its  origins  in 
migrations to the capital of landless peasants from southern Iraq (Batatu, 2004: 134): by 1986 
it accounted for more than a quarter of the city’s population, many still living in Baghdad’s 
worst slums (Batatu, 1986: 182–84). The public transport system did not extend to Saddam 
City, water was scarce and residents had very low standards of education. People of the area 
suffered particularly badly under the international embargo. Further migration from southern 
provinces ensued in the 1990s thanks to the regime’s policy of draining the marshes, and new 
11 This phrase means “God is the greatest” and was penned in Saddam Husseins's handwriting. 
12 Haddad quotes this fact from an interview with Nasir al-Samarrai in Amman, November 2008. 
13 The Sadrists were also a force in Basra and the south of Iraq but this study is concerned with their activities 
in Baghdad. 
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Figure 8 (above): A poster of Muqtada As-Sadr in Sayidda Zaineb, 2009. 
Muhammad Sadiq As Sadr is pictured to his left.
Campaign posters of Nuri Al Maliki (Figure 9: left) and Ayaad Allawi (Figure 10: right) on display in Damascus. 
Iraqi parliamentary elections took place in March 2010 and Iraqis could vote at polling booths in Syria.  
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waves of rural migrants merged with previous ones (Harling, 2010: 14–15).14 After 2003 it 
was renamed Sadr City, in honour of Muhammad Baqir As-Sadr and Muhammad Sadiq As-
Sadr, both politically active Shia clerics murdered by Saddam’s regime in 1980 and 1999, 
respectively. The Ba’thists thought that Sadiq could become an accommodating Shia leader 
and from 1993 he was given regime support. He adopted  a defiant stand, however, attacking 
the regime and the quietist clerical elite, and advocating a more vocal and militant approach 
against  the  injustices  faced  by  Iraq’s  impoverished  Shias.  With  an  ascetic  lifestyle,  and 
genuine eagerness to listen to the latter's concerns, he stood out from the traditional clerical 
elite. He soon led an authentic social movement, bringing to the fore a deep split within Iraqi 
Shia  politics  (ICG,  2006c:  3–6).  The  Sadrists  led  by  Muqtada  As-Sadr  after  2003,  says 
Harling (2010, 2011), were the only post-2003 political group with any real social base.15 The 
rest were returning exiles who had spent the 1990s abroad lobbying the governments of the 
United States and UK to remove Saddam Hussein by military means. 
Developments abroad: the role of Iraqi exiles in the 1990s. 
During the 1990s, exile politicians attempted to organise themselves and discuss what a post-
Saddam  Iraq  might  look  like.  In  1992,  with  American  support,  opposition  figures  held 
conferences in Vienna and in Salahuddin in northern Iraq. The Iraqi National Congress (INC) 
was formed and would spend the next decade hammering out a structure for a future Iraq. 
Controversially it was committed to allocating leadership positions on a communal basis – a 
Sunni, a Kurd, and a Shia were on its tripartite executive council. Ahmad Chalabi was the 
chair of this council. He was a wealthy Iraqi exile banker whose family had been prominent in 
commercial and political life during the Iraqi monarchy (Allawi, 2007:40-53). The other exile 
opposition group was the Iraqi National Accord (INA) headed by Ayad Allawi and formed in 
1990 with the help of western  intelligence agencies.  He was a former Ba'athist  who had 
commanded a unit in the notorious National Guard and later cultivated relations with the CIA 
and MI6 (ibid.). Both these movements had their credibility weakened when their struggles 
against  the  regime failed in  the  mid-1990s (Vanderbusch,  2009:  293).  The INC failed  to 
topple the regime with a military insurrection in 1995, with the assistance of the CIA and the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Stansfield, 2007: 144-145). In 1996 the INA, again with support 
14 The Baghdad quarters of Shu’la, Fadhila and Washash are similarly places where Sadrists have strong 
support.
15 This is with exception to the Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, who were allocated positions in the post-
Saddam government. 
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of the CIA, failed in its coup attempt – all the army officers plotting against the Iraqi regime 
were rounded up by Iraqi security forces and few survived (Stansfield, 2007: 146). 
One  of  the  most  powerful  exile  groups  was  the  Supreme  Council  (SC),  a  Shia  Islamist 
group.16 It  suffered from a legitimacy deficit  inside Iraq,  stemming in part  from its close 
relationship  with  Iran.  It  was  formed  there  during  the  Iran–Iraq  war  with  the  aim  of 
overthrowing the Ba'thist regime and establishing an Islamic theocracy in Iraq. After the 2003 
invasion it  succeeded in  convincing credulous American officials  of  its  influence  in  Shia 
communities:  Visser  (2008:  32)  comments  on  a  startling  success  in  “exploiting  the 
predilections of western governments for an ethno-sectarian reading of Iraqi society”. The SC 
may have been aware of a more assertive Shia identity forming in 1990s Iraq but before 2002 
it had opposed this reading because of the potential harm that identity politics could cause 
there. The leader of the SC rejected an invitation to be the Shia representative for the exile 
conferences in 1992 because the communal allocations they had proposed would enshrine 
“sectarian divisions and national division” (Ra'uf, 2000, in Visser, 2008: 38). In 2002, the SC 
broke  away  from  this  view  and  was  rewarded  with  “sectarian  spoils  at  the  opposition 
conferences during the run-up to the 2003 invasion and in government in Iraq after the fall of 
the Ba'athist regime” (Visser, 2008: 38-39). 
The Iraqi opposition in exile, particularly the INC and Ahmad Chalabi, lobbied for western 
intervention to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The relationship of the INC and the INA 
with Bill Clinton's administration was strained. With George W. Bush becoming president in 
2001, and the events of September 11th that same year, the prospects for the success of their 
lobbying improved dramatically. The American Neo-Conservatives had themselves advocated 
a more aggressive American policy to deal with Saddam Hussein. The exile lobbyists saw an 
opportunity to convince the American government and public of the need to invade Iraq and 
remove Saddam from power (Vanderbusch, 2009: 294). Some representatives of the INC: 
worked almost from inside the government with like-minded officials to promote a specific 
policy.  That  relationship  was  of  considerable  mutual  benefit—the  exiles  got  funding, 
legitimacy,  and  the  likelihood  of  influence  over  post-Saddam Iraq;  and  the  presumed 
16  The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was also known as the Supreme Assembly for 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq. It changed its name in 2007 to the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq and is 
therefore referred to in this article as The Supreme Council (SC). See ICG (2007) and Faleh Jabar (2003) for 
comprehensive details of the SC.
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expertise of the exiles lent support or even authenticity to the claims made by that group of 
government policy makers (ibid.).
They argued that invasion was necessary to remove Saddam Hussein because he was a threat 
to the United States, and that the Iraqi people would welcome the freedom and democracy 
that would come with his removal. Opponents of the war were labelled naïve and lacking 
compassion for, and confidence in, the Iraqi people (ibid.). During the two years following 
September 11th 2001, Bush and three key senior officials made 935 false statements in the 
campaign  to  sell  the  war  (Lewis  and  Reading-Smith,  2008,  and  McClellan,  2008  in 
Vanderbusch, 2009: 304). They were successful in their deception and on March 19th 2003, on 
the pretext of disarming Saddam Hussein's alleged chemical and nuclear weapons arsenal, the 
American led invasion and occupation of Iraq began. 
Invasion and occupation
In 2003 the richest and militarily most powerful state worldwide invaded another state it had 
spent years enfeebling.  During the long build-up to  the  invasion of Iraq in 2003 there were 
many predictions that military conflict would immediately produce a refugee crisis.17 In fact, 
few Iraqis  would  decide  to  leave  Iraq  as  a  result  of  war  in  2003.  Many chose  to  make 
temporary migrations away from Baghdad to escape the bombing, and we shall hear from 
them in Chapter 4. 
The first large scale episode of displacement took place in 2004 with the American assaults on 
Fallujah. Ahmed Mansour (2009),  one of the few unembedded journalists in the city, has 
written of the immense destruction brought upon it by American forces. Heavy weaponry and 
air power were used on a densely populated urban area. The city was encircled and put under 
siege. Mansour (2009: 316-325) notes that between 4,000 and 6,000 civilians were estimated 
to have been killed in the assault and some 36,000 homes (from 50,000), 60 schools, and 65 
mosques  and  shrines  were  destroyed  by  American  forces.  Sewer,  electrical,  and 
communication systems were also destroyed. Some 900 shops and factories were seriously 
damaged or  obliterated (ibid.).  Eye witness  accounts,  from civilians  as  well  as  American 
Marines, told of the use of White Phosphorous (ibid.). Many Iraqis from Fallujah and the 
province of Anbar fled to Baghdad to escape the American offensives across the province. 
Many  established  make-shift  camps  in  squalid  conditions  in  the  capital  –  some  of  my 
17 For an account of both warnings and preparations for mass displacement see Marfleet (2007).
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participants told me that Baghdadis assisted them with modest supplies of food, water and 
clothes.
The  heavy  handedness  of  the  American  military  has  been  linked  by  Niva  (2008)  to 
cooperation with the Israeli military. Tactics modelled on the Israeli assault on Jenin in 2002 
were seen in Fallujah in 2004 and across Iraq.
… American forces frequently adopted a new set of tactics that appeared to have come 
straight out of the Israeli  playbook from the occupied Palestinians territories, including 
physically  enclosing  villages  within  razor-wire  fences,  bulldozing  homes  of  suspected 
insurgents, destroying irrigation systems and agricultural  fields, taking civilian hostages 
and using torture to extract intelligence. Underlying the new strategy was the conviction 
that only a tougher approach would quell the insurgency and that the new strategy must not 
only punish the insurgents but also make clear to ordinary Iraqis the cost of not cooperating 
(Niva, 2009: 72).
The strategy of course failed and only in 2007, when a change of tactics accompanied an 
augmentation of troop numbers in the “Surge” did the United States achieve some success in 
counterinsurgency (ICG, 2008). From 2003-2007, American forces would continue to use the 
brutal  Israeli  approach.  But  it  was  not  the  ferociousness  of  American  forces  that  would 
directly lead to mass displacement. Displacement and forced migration on a mass scale would 
occur as an outcome of processes initiated after the invasion by the United States and its 
appointees in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Within weeks of the invasion they 
had introduced radical reforms. For decades Iraq had been a one-party state; the Ba’ath was 
the only legal party and membership was crucial to career chances with the country’s biggest 
employers:  the  state  bureaucracy;  state  agencies  and  welfare  services,  and  state-owned 
corporations, commercial and industrial enterprises. CPA Order Number l, De-Ba'athification 
of Iraqi Society, “disestablished” the Ba’th Party, removing its senior members from all state 
bodies. CPA Order Number 2,  Dissolution of Entities, dissolved the armed forces and many 
state bodies including the ministries of defence, military affairs and information,  rendering 
some 350,000 people jobless without compensation (Marfleet 2007: 405). 
Vast numbers of Iraqis deemed to belong to the old order were instantly marginalized and 
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entire communities reliant on income from the state were thrown into crisis. At the same time, 
a  campaign  of  retribution received  semi-formal  backing from CPA officials,  who gave  a 
“green light” to looting of state resources and to attacks on the intelligentsia of the Ba’thist 
era – members of professional, academic and technical networks including educators, doctors, 
engineers, journalists, writers and artists.
State properties including schools, colleges, technical institutes, university campuses, depots, 
ministries and military bases were looted openly, sometimes with American troops standing 
by (Chandrasekaran 2007). Thousands of people were attacked at their homes or workplaces; 
there were countless abductions, kidnappings and disappearances, many perpetrated by plain-
clothes  gangs  whose activities  recalled the  reign of  terror  favoured  by Central  American 
regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. Meanwhile the CPA pursued policies of abrupt economic 
change that made millions of people much more insecure (Klein 2004, 2007; Marfleet 2007). 
In 2004 widespread displacement began as both fear and insecurity spread rapidly. In 2005, as 
restructuring  of  the  state  gathered  pace  on  the  basis  of  ethno-religious  agendas,  which 
prompted  the  intensification  of  communalist  hostilities,  the  crisis  became  systemic. 
Reconstruction of Iraq soon detached millions of people from their homes.
Targeting the old order
Among the first to take flight were those with senior positions in the former state. Belonging 
to the old order, they were seen as obstacles by those whom Chatelard (2012) refers to as 
“would-be state actors”. These aspired to control the emerging state and wished to shape its 
formation to their benefit. The Supreme Council, mentioned earlier, benefited hugely from the 
occupation.  The  SC  took  over  a  reformed  Interior  Ministry,  its  military  arm  the  Badr 
Organization (formerly the Badr Corps, Faylaq Badr) assuming control of police commando 
units. There was soon a steep increase in killings of Sunni Iraqis that could not be explained 
as counter-insurgency. Men dressed in police or military uniforms carried out night raids in 
Sunni areas, seizing men later found in secret detention centres or in mortuaries, their bodies 
bearing evidence of torture. The Badr Brigades were widely suspected of carrying out these 
attacks.  Meanwhile special  police units  believed by many Iraqis to be composed of Badr 
members became death squads implicated in attacks on people associated with the old regime 
(ICG 2006b: 3, 17–18). The International Crisis Group notes that “Assassinations multiplied 
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of former regime elements, as well as of senior officers in the old army and pilots who had 
flown in the Iran-Iraq war” (ICG 2007: 13). Shias were not immune if they were deemed to 
belong to the old order.
The post-invasion landscape was desolate: state institutions had been thoroughly looted and 
there  were  no  viable  “internal”  political  parties.  When  exiled  politicians  returned  they 
discovered that they had no significant social base. Having failed to articulate an ideological 
vision in the diaspora during the 1990s they now faced a crisis of credibility (Harling, 2010: 
2).  Jabar  noted  that  Shia  exile  movements  were  already  focused on what  they  saw as  a  
window of opportunity offered by the invasion to “reshape the political order and ultimately 
Islamize power and/or redress communal grievances” (2003: 18). In this situation, he warned, 
“a communal-based politics,  or an Iranian type of fundamentalist-authoritarian rule would 
trigger Sunni fundamentalist responses, risk a communal cleavage and threaten secularism” 
(2003: 21). Sectarian politics, endorsed by the occupation authorities, allowed former exiles 
to compensate for their status as outsiders (Harling 2010: 3). Eventually they were rewarded 
by control over key government resources, so that after the April 2005 national election (the 
first  since  the  invasion)  “sectarian  logic  began  to  dictate  the  staffing  and  work  of  new 
ministries. Most became party fiefdoms, first and foremost” (ICG 2006b: 19).
Towards mass displacement
Between 2003 and the election of April 2005 there were numerous suicide attacks in Shia 
areas,  almost  certainly  the  work  of  Sunni  cells,  notably  Tandhim  al-Qa’ida  fi  Bilad  al-
Rafidayn/al-Qa’ida’s Organization in Mesopotamia and Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna/Partisans of the 
Sunna Army (ICG 2006b: 2). Shia leaders argued publicly for restraint, urging support for 
electoral activity which they believed would shortly secure them a large majority. When the 
April  2005 poll  brought  victory for  the Shia–Kurdish alliance,  together  with much wider 
access to institutions of the state,  the picture changed dramatically, with a steep increase in 
killings of Sunnis involving death squads often believed to involve police or men in military 
uniform. There was promptly “an alarming descent  into sectarian discourse and violence” 
(ICG 2006b: 3). All sides used increasingly inflammatory rhetoric, attacking mosques, seizing 
individuals and groups based on real or imagined ethno-religious affiliation, and compelling 
mass exit from towns and neighbourhoods. 
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The Mehdi Army, the militia of the Sadrists, played a huge role in coercing people to leave 
their homes in Baghdad. This was particularly true after the bombing of the Al Askari shrine 
in Samarra in February 2006 which it  used as a cue to  run amok in the city on an ugly 
rampage  seizing  material  resources  and  strategic  assets  (Harling,  2011:  48,  50).  Today's 
Sadrists are lead by Muqtada As-Sadr, the heir to Muhammad Sadiq Sadr (or Sadr II) who 
was murdered by Saddam's regime in 1999. Muqtada was at  first dismissed and excluded 
from the political process by American officials, who soon had to acknowledge the reality of 
the Sadrists’ strength after deadly clashes with his followers. The Sadr movement had deep 
roots but its  material  assets  were scant. Unlike the SC, it  had not  aligned with a  foreign 
sponsor, receiving only limited support from Iran. Its followers, traditionally disenfranchised, 
saw  Muqtada  as  a  spokesman  who  contested  their  marginalization  within  the  emerging 
political order (ICG 2006c: i). Some also benefited directly from their engagement with the 
Mehdi Army. Sadiq had centralized assets, redistributing them in clientelist fashion; Muqtada, 
with  limited  resources,  operated  a  system  that  “allow[ed]  his  followers  to  take  direct 
possession of whatever resources they can acquire – a far more fluid leadership style in which 
he directs less than he referees and adjudicates” (ICG 2006c: 18–19). The Mehdi Army was 
undisciplined and difficult  to  manage,  with Muqtada “unable to prevent  a steady flow of 
dissent and disorder at all levels” (IGC 2006c: 20). 
During  the  worst  days  of  conflict  in  2006  and  2007,  their  militiamen  damaged  the 
movement’s popular base with brutal acts of sectarian plunder and killing, seriously affecting 
its claims to be part of a nationalist movement. Its heavy involvement in the violence became 
a valuable source of revenue: it profited from selling protection to merchants and from the 
assassination of Sunnis (ICG 2008a: 6). After February 2006, the Mehdi Army launched a 
systematic  sectarian-cleansing  assault  on  confessionally  mixed  and  middle  class 
neighbourhoods in Baghdad (Harling, 2011: 49). Although the different factions enjoyed a 
large amount of autonomy, their activities followed a cohesive pattern: they would set up local  
offices to assure residents that they would defend the area, and encourage them to set up 
vigilante groups. They also provided displaced Shias from other quarters with accommodation 
and tapped into  their  knowledge of  the  neighbourhoods they  had left  in  order  to  mount 
retaliatory raids (Harling, 2011: 50). Many people were kidnapped or killed (or both) and the 
militia  occupied  and  retained  properties  for  its  own  purposes.  Its  activities  contributed 
substantially to the generalization of fear and to mass displacement.  
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Throughout the cleansing process, these factions enjoyed the aloofness of U.S. forces, the 
passivity of the national army, the complicity of the local police, and the blessing of the 
Shi‘i ruling elite, who reportedly contributed to the effort by pointedly depriving Sunni 
neighbourhoods of much needed public services (Harling, 2011: 50).
The  new  sectarian-oriented  setting  left  Iraq’s  Sunnis  devoid  of  credible  political 
representation. The United States supported the SC and Kurdish political groups directly.18 
The  occupation  took  more  antagonizing  forms  in  predominantly  Sunni  areas,  further 
marginalizing them. Sunni Arab political identity could only organize itself underground in 
radical opposition to the emerging political order.  Many of Iraq’s despairing Sunni youth then 
joined these clandestine movements including Al Qa’ida, the Islamic Army of Iraq and other 
small groups (Harling 2010: 11–12; ICG 2006a: 2–3).19 ICG comments on the implications 
for displacement:
Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s methods were excessively brutal, its goal being to fuel ever-intensifying 
sectarian strife, fear and instability. It systematically targeted Shiite civilians, killed police 
officers and other civil servants and even coerced Sunni civilians to the point where most 
were forced to flee. (ICG 2008b: 17) 
Al Qa’ida’s methods isolated them from the other Sunni groups. It desired continuous conflict 
and disorder,  seeking to take the battle to apocalyptic levels. Armed groups across ethno-
religious communities had a different but also brutal rationale, seeking to acquire and hold 
key positions in the urban landscape. They combined a will to commit horrific acts against 
civilians  with  a  sometimes “sophisticated understanding of  the  socio-economic  factors  at 
play” to engage in systematic sectarian ‘cleansing’ (Harling 2010: 17–18). Meanwhile, they 
catered deftly to the needs of those displaced from other neighbourhoods.
18 American Special Forces were also implicated in numerous sectarian attacks carried out by militias operating 
as part of state security agencies (Ismael and Fuller 2008). Both of the SC and Kurdish political groups 
espoused “victim narratives”: blame for their past suffering was apportioned to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs for their 
alleged collective support for Saddam’s regime (Harling 2010). 
19  By 2006 the initially disparate groups became coherent and confident, united against the occupiers and Shia 
militias. Later, the bulk of the Sunni Arab insurgency eventually turned against al Qaida Iraq and personal 
and ideological rivalries put an end to the unity (ICG 2008b: 16).
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A State of Violence
Violence peaked in 2006 and 2007 after the attack on a sacred Shia symbol, the Al Askari 
shrine in Samarra in February 2006. These conflicts have commonly been referred to as a 
civil war but this description, suggests Harling (2011), is an inadequate term for the events of 
2006-2007.  The  interplay  of  military  occupation,  state  collapse,  sectarian  politics  and 
lawlessness  combined  to  create  a  “state  of  violence”   in  distinction  to  a  “state  of  law” 
(Harling, 2011).  The Iraqi state after 2003 was unable to “provide peaceful mechanisms for 
addressing  political  conflicts,  to  form a  common  frame  of  reference,  and  to  enforce  its 
monopoly over the use and legitimization of violence” (Harling, 2011: 45). Three interrelated 
processes conspired to create this situation of generalized insecurity: an exclusionary post-
2003  political  process;  sectarian  differentiation;  and  the  privatisation  of  violence:  gangs, 
militias, mercenaries and insurgent groups filled the security vacuum caused by state collapse 
(Harling, 2011: 45-48). 
It  is  worth stating what  the privatisation of violence entailed as I  have already discussed 
sectarian differentiation and the political process which excluded Iraq's Sunnis. The vacuum 
left  in  place  of  the  collapsed  state  in  2003  allowed  gangs,  criminal  networks,  private 
contractors and insurgent groups to flourish. The American response to this security crisis was 
to  produce  ever-larger  contingents  of  armed  men,  all  of  them with  loyalties  to  different 
political factions of a highly polarised political elite  (Harling, 2011: 47). The aim was to 
increase the coercive capacities of the nascent central government and therefore, it was hoped, 
stability would return. But the vetting and training was hurried and the oversight mechanisms 
were  deficient.  Accordingly,  the  emerging  security  apparatus  was  itself  privatised:  its 
members  showed loyalty  to  special  interests  far  more  than to  an elusive common cause. 
“Typically, at least up to 2007, civilians perceived their behaviour much in the same light as 
that of the other armed elements within society – arbitrary and opaque” (Harling, 2011: 48). 
“Symptomatically, civilians often expressed their confusion at the identity and purpose of the 
perpetrators,  although  these  forms  of  violence  more  often  than  not  cut  right  through 
neighborhood, professional, and kinship relations, and rested on an intimate proximity with 
the victims” (Harling, 2011: 44). Baghdad was engulfed by a battle for control and conquest 
by different armed groups hailing from a limited number of strongholds (Harling, 2011: 55). 
Many of these strongholds were deprived areas containing many underprivileged young men 
from the city's underclass (Harling, 2011: 49). The neighbourhoods where the Mehdi Army 
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was strongest were typical examples of this. In a state of violence, these men were able to  
seek fulfilment and empowerment by joining an armed group like the Mehdi Army (ibid.). 
Moreover, violence was not just a response to marginalisation, but also a means of social 
ascension as, Harling (2011: 58) comments:
Unable  to  legitimate  their  rule,  returning  exiles  strove  to  enforce  it.  Former  regime 
officials, despondent and denied a future, mobilized to challenge them. Militias and armed 
groups recruited within the capital’s underclass and among its desolate youth. Interestingly, 
in many cases self-made commanders were themselves ousted by even more wretched 
outcasts, such as teenagers and petty criminals, as ruthlessness increasingly became the 
primary factor of success. 
In this environment it was not only sectarian “cleansing” that took place, but “class cleansing” 
too (Harling, 2011: 58). Indeed, much of the sectarian cleansing could be understood better as 
an attack on the middle classes: 
Local “notables” (e.g. doctors) were not only kidnapped for ransom, but also assassinated 
for  no  other  discernible  reason  than  their  mere  status.  Teachers  and  intellectuals 
particularly  came  under  attack.  Shop  owners  and  entrepreneurs  were  racketeered  and 
pressured to the point of hampering business (Harling, 2011: 58). 
The capital's middle class was targeted systematically. Most of them were members of the 
state-employed professional ranks who lived in open residential areas that were difficult to 
defend and lacked social cohesion – they were prey for armed groups who easily depopulated 
these  areas  (Harling,  2011:  55-56).  The  loss  of  this  qualified  and  relatively  progressive 
population, “both the product and the basis of a modern state”, may not have been the most 
visible phenomenon of the descent into a state of violence, but it may be the one with the 
most lasting consequences for the future of Iraq ...” (Harling, 2011: 59).
From mid 2007 some of the militias were “partly routed or collapsed under their own weight 
as a result of self-consuming dynamics”: Baghdad's new confessionally unmixed social make 
up has since been frozen into place by a network of blast walls (Harling, 2011: 59). The 
network  of  walls  has  formalised  sectarian  divisions  and  means  that  Iraqis  who  fled  the 
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violence will have only a network of walled homogeneous enclaves to return to, if they ever 
do (Niva,  2008: 76).  The “Surge”,  an American plan to return security to the country by 
increasing  troops  and  applying  a  shift  in  counterinsurgency  strategy,  was  relatively  and 
surprisingly successful considering the odds (ICG, 2008c). These were, however, a series of 
tactical victories – calming very violent areas such as Anbar province and several Baghdad 
neighbourhoods – rather than the success of an overarching strategy for Iraq. As the ICG 
(2008c: i) warns: “...what remains is an enduring source of violence and instability that could 
be revived should political progress lag ...” . 
Conclusion
Iraqi society has been undergoing a profound transformation, one which began decades ago. 
Iraqi  politics  has  shifted  towards  communalism and  is  mobilising  according  to  sect  and 
ethnicity, a change from the ideological politics of the past. New patterns and new rules have 
been emerging (Stansfield, 2007: 196, 204): “These new rules are those of communalization, 
identity based politics, chauvinism, religious exclusivism and ethnically based nationalism” 
(ibid.). Whether these new patterns are permanent or not is still unclear. What is clear is that  
the process of putting them in place has been central to understanding mass displacement in 
Iraq today (Marfleet, 2011a: 177). Mass displacement and forced migration took place in a 
climate of generalised and palpable threat. For many of my participants, their social life was 
permeated  by  threats.  They  appeared  in  a  number  of  spaces  in  their  lives,  aggregating 
pressures as armed groups fought for control of physical spaces, turning them into sites of 
intense conflict. When so many threats are present in daily life people are compelled to take 
drastic action such as moving house or leaving the country. These decisions are made after a 
threshold  point  is  reached  whereby  certain  baselines,  as  I  explained  in  Chapter  1,  are 
challenged.  The  baseline  is  socially  constructed  and based  on perception.  It  can  also  be 
socially adjusted - threatened by armed actors vying for control of assets and territory, and 
authority over the population living in that territory. In a state of violence, threats appear in 
multiple spaces in people's lives and are related to the processes described above of armed 
conflict and state transformation. Such violence also produces a communal-wide and society-
wide apprehension of threat. Many people were able to endure these violent circumstances for  
some time – indeed many people did not - perhaps could not - leave. But aggregate pressures 
of living in a state of violence can push people to a threshold point which is understood as a 
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threat to survival. Here the norms of protection have gone and the environment is  one of 
imminent threat. We shall now hear from Iraqis who experienced these changes first hand. 
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Chapter 4
State Collapse, State Transformation and Displacement
This chapter addresses the experiences of those specifically targeted by the emerging new 
order in the wake of the collapse of the Iraqi state in 2003. These groups were targeted by 
occupation forces and by the emerging new regime which began to purge the old one and its 
symbols.  The  experiences  of  people  who  had  been  high  ranking  administrators  in  state 
institutions  and  former  military  officers  are  discussed  here.  They  appear  to  have  been 
perceived as the embodiment of the collapsed state and the former Ba'athi regime. Gardner 
(2012:  28)  observes  that  the  state  is  not  only  conceived  of  as  apparatuses,  laws  and 
bureaucracies, but also as “a configuration of powers  inseparable1 from the embodiment in 
individual citizens.” They were directly targeted after the state collapsed and a new order 
began to emerge from it. They were victims of statecraft, discussed earlier as the craft of state-
building  (Soguk,  1999).  State  transformation  was  not  only  a  professed  intention  of  the 
occupiers but also a strong driver of displacement.  Changes involved in  the  construction or 
the reconfiguration of a nation state may entail abolition of an old regime. Zolberg notes that 
“entire social strata may come to be viewed as obstacles” during the course of these events 
(1983: 30–31). Typically there are “successive refoundings… each of which may result in a 
refugee-generating crisis” (Zolberg 1983: 30–31). The people most affected by this process in 
the early phase of the occupation were those who had been, or were perceived to have been, 
part of the “old order”. As I explained in Chapter 1, the United States and its appointees in the 
Coalition  Provisional  Authority  (CPA)  initiated  radical  reforms  that  left  hundreds  of 
thousands of people in economic insecurity. 
Other groups were also displaced by statecraft. Palestinian refugees who had been in Iraq 
since 1948 became easy targets for a weak nascent  state that wished to make a show of 
strength to hide its weakness. As I show, their displacement bore the markings of statecraft. 
They were another group which were perceived to be embodiments of the former state and 
were thus directly targeted by the new order emerging from the collapse of the old one. The 
Mandaeans also suffered and I discuss their experiences here too. The post-2003 state was 
being formed along ethno-sectarian lines in a way which they felt deliberately excluded them 
1 Emphasis in original.
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from the “new Iraq”. Processes of exclusion began which for them, like many other Iraqis, 
compounded pressures they had endured in the Saddam era resulting in their displacement 
and eventually in their forced migration.   
I also present the experiences of others whose displacements began in the early stages of the 
transformation of the Iraqi state – or regime change as it was referred to more commonly. 
They include  the  migration  to  Syria  of  one  man under  pressure from his  family,  and in 
anticipation  of  the  imminent  bombing  campaign.  I  also  discovered  that  families  made 
temporary journeys away from Baghdad to places in Iraq where extended family members 
lived. This was also in anticipation of a fierce bombing campaign which they rightly expected 
would concentrate on Baghdad and other major cities. There was a calculation of risk in all of 
the decisions taken, preceded by an acute monitoring of their surroundings. There was also 
evidence  of  cumulative  causation:  the  decisions  of  others  to  leave  affected  those  who 
remained and who had not yet decided to leave, changing their surroundings in a way that 
added to the growing pressures on them to do so. Two families in this chapter left Baghdad 
because they could see that everyone else was leaving. In one case the neighbourhood was 
virtually empty,  only a  few families  remained on the street  as people fled Baghdad.  The 
unsettling feeling of being amongst the last  families left on the street acted as a coercive  
pressure  and  those  in  the  household  who  could  leave  did  so  until  the  occupation  was 
complete. They returned to their neighbourhoods to find them in a very different condition to 
when they had left. 
Leaving Iraq because of the invasion? 
Expectations of mass migration from Iraq were high in 2003. When the Anglo-American led 
coalition  invaded,  they subjected  the  country  to  aerial  bombing on a  colossal  scale.  The 
“shock and awe” doctrine was the guiding principle of the bombing and Baghdad was given 
special  attention.  In  2003  the  whole  country  awaited  the  dangers  of  an  intense  aerial 
bombardment.  Death  and fire  could rain  from the  skies  at  any moment.  Buildings  could 
collapse and send shock waves and shards of glass indiscriminately into the flesh of those 
unfortunate enough to be nearby. These dangers would be further intensified with potential 
house-to-house  fighting  in  urban  areas.  It  seemed clear  that  the  population  was  facing  a 
choice between leaving the country to avoid the dangers of war, or remaining to risk being 
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killed. There were expectations of threat-induced mass migration. Emergency camps were set 
up  to  deal  with  an  anticipated  million  refugees  (Chatty,  2011:  7).  UNHCR believed that 
refugees would be filling up the border camps they had set up in neighbouring countries but  
was mistaken. “No substantial movements” were reported across Iraq's international borders 
in March 2003, and only “small numbers” were “trickling into Jordan and Syria” in April 
(UNHCR, 2003a, 2003b). UNHCR even began preparing to supervise refugee returns and 
reintegration before changing their policy statements in 2004 owing to general insecurity in 
the country (Marfleet, 2007: 406). 
Of all the Iraqis I interviewed, only one left before the invasion. Majeed was under pressure 
from his parents and brother to leave Iraq with his pregnant wife before the war started. He 
had already lost a brother in the Iran-Iraq war and his parents believed that his life would be 
in danger in Iraq. He had worked in a Baghdad printing press near his home for years but left 
Iraq on March 11th 2003.
Do you remember the day that you left Iraq?
Yes, I remember, how can I not remember? Things were tense, they were making 
preparations, putting black oil on the bridges.2 They were expecting an attack, it was 
imminent. … Nine days before Baghdad was hit, I left.
What was on your mind before you left? Did you leave in fear of the bombing?
Yes, of course, from fear of the war. My mother urged me to go, to leave. My brother, the 
martyr, she didn't just love him she worshipped him. He also had a really high esteem for 
her, it was unusual. So we used to listen to the news and see what was going on around us. 
So my mother was afraid for me and used to say “go, don't stay here”, even my brothers 
were urging me to go. This is a photo of my brother, the one who was martyred in the war 
with Iran [shows me his photo]. He was 28 years old when he died, he was young. 
The preparations for war in Baghdad, when did they start? When did you sense that there 
2 This is a reference to the oil fires lit by the Iraqi army in an attempt to disrupt the advanced guidance systems 
of the American Air Force. They were thought to have been oil pools created from pipelines. See Reed (2003)  
http://www.geotimes.org/may03/geophen.html. Images by Bruno Stevens can be seen here: 
http://bruno.photoshelter.com/gallery-image/Iraq-2003-During-the-
War/G0000cVnrF4iOWSk/I0000Myey3e0Idrs ; http://bruno.photoshelter.com/gallery-image/Iraq-2003-
During-the-War/G0000cVnrF4iOWSk/I0000hBCKWf_vOpw . 
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was definitely going to be a war?
It was in the news, you know, someone was coming every day to meet our “friend” who 
was there before.
Our friend?
Yes.
You mean Saddam? 
Yes, Saddam [we both laugh].  Yes, they were coming to meet him at the time. We would 
see the news on TV, a person could know everything. You could know too from what was 
happening around us, you could see the general situation too. You know, like I told you the 
preparations for war. It was these things. They were getting ready, preparing for a strike, an 
attack. So during that period, I left. 
Did you see more soldiers on the streets?
No, no. It was the Popular Army, not soldiers. 
Majeed and his family monitored their surroundings and official news broadcasts and became 
certain that there would be a war. Majeed spoke of pestering more than persuasion on the part 
of his family. He resisted until one brother, resident in Australia, confirmed he would begin a 
visa application for Majeed and his wife as soon as he got hold of a valid passport and arrived 
in Syria. Majeed was reluctant to leave Iraq because he had twice used the smuggler route in  
the 1990s but failed to go beyond Turkey.
I had tired of it. The exhaustion and anxiety, not knowing where you're going, the 
uncertainty. I didn't like the smuggling method. I tried it twice, not just once. Once I went, 
and after a month, I was sent back, I stayed in our village in the north of Iraq. Then I went 
again a second time. I didn't like the smugglers' route, it is scary. Then I went back to 
Baghdad. 
Majeed told me that had his brother not offered to begin the Australian visa application, he 
would not have left Iraq in 2003. He did not know that he would still be in Syria seven years 
and 11 rejected visa applications later. Yet return to Iraq is an unpalatable option. His parents 
still discourage him because of the poor security situation and unreliable public services, and 
he does not want to return until “it goes back to how it was before”. He is still waiting for a 
chance  to  resettle  to  a  third  country.  Majeed  is  a  working  class  Iraqi  with  no  assets  in 
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Baghdad, such as an apartment to return to, and his lack of assets limits his mobility. He 
cannot afford to return to Iraq because of steep rises in living costs and high unemployment 
rates - his wife has since given birth to two children which means that living in his parents 
house in Baghdad is  not an option because his  sister's  family lives there too.  Even if  he 
changed his mind about the smuggler route he would not be able to afford the thousands of 
dollars that smugglers charge. He has been stranded in Syria since 2003.
Temporary migrations from Baghdad
So was there any kind of exodus before the invasion? Yes, but not as UNHCR had expected. 
There was an exodus from Baghdad. Mohsin, Najma, and Farah left Baghdad temporarily, to 
rural locations where they had family connections. Anwar's mother and sisters left too, but he 
and his father remained to guard their home and because of his father's military commitments.  
These temporary migration experiences, lasting two months at the most, were examples of 
people escaping the threat of bombing and invasion.  Their experiences all reveal something 
interesting about how the decisions were made. 
Mohsin  was  still  a  teenager  in  2003,  but  remembered  how  his  family  monitored  their 
surroundings:
We sensed that things were changing in Iraq, the streets were changing, security were 
everywhere, the police were everywhere. People who had retired were being called up by 
the state, people like my father. They called him up and told him that he had to be ready to 
return in any emergency situation. Things were changing, we realised there was going to 
be a war, 100%, even though we were cut off from the media. There was nothing you could 
call[reliable] media in Iraq. Even on television they would show you things that were far 
removed from the world. 
An uncle living in Germany played a key role in their temporary flight away from the threat 
of war. He telephoned insisting that they “go on a trip” and take some other families with 
them.  His  uncle  owned agricultural  land near  Ramadi,  west  of  Baghdad.  Once they  had 
received the  money he  had sent,  they  set  off  with  those  other  families,  taking food and 
provisions with them. They spent around 20 days there while his father remained in Baghdad, 
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returning only after the invasion was complete. 
At the time, people in Baghdad were leaving for the provinces. The streets were empty. 
People were going to Mosul, Anbar, to the south, to Basra, any place but Baghdad.   
… On the bus we rode, the passengers were all women and children, and some young men. 
There were no older men because they had all remained in Baghdad. Some stayed to guard 
their homes, others because they had been called up by the army. 
Anwar made similar observations and his family's decision to leave Baghdad was affected 
greatly by cumulative causation.
We started seeing trucks on a lot of roads and they were carrying belongings, furniture, 
clothes, and they were leaving. The highways that led out of Baghdad were full of cars 
carrying their belongings. We started seeing people leave, our neighbours too. … I had to 
stay in Baghdad because I wanted to keep watch over the house, our belongings, furniture, 
our money. We couldn't just leave it because the neighbourhood was nearly empty. There 
were maybe three or four families left in the street from a total of 50 or so houses. ... Those 
were people who didn't have anyone outside Baghdad, they didn't know where to go. The 
rest of the houses were either empty, or there was maybe one person in the house, a young 
man. … When my parents saw that all of the neighbours had gone, they started saying that 
they couldn't stay there alone, they had to leave too.
At first they had not wanted to leave but the decisions of others played a coercive role. The 
empty neighbourhood had an unsettling effect on his mother and sisters. They stayed with 
relatives in Salah Ad Din province north of Baghdad for two months, arriving unannounced. 
They remained in frequent contact  by telephone with Anwar and returned after Saddam's 
regime fell and Anwar could see that their neighbourhood had become “calm and peaceful”. 
His father, like many others, had been ordered to remain in the city to perform military duties, 
despite being in his mid-50s and only ever attaining a low rank. 
Farah and her family similarly made a trip to her family's village of origin in the north of Iraq.  
She remembers  a  crowded bus  station,  it  was packed and it  seemed as  though everyone 
wanted to get on a bus out of Baghdad. The decision was made very quickly by the adults in 
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the family, she was a teenager at the time. Farah explained that close relatives came to her 
home where they met and argued about what to do. Her father and two uncles insisted on 
staying in Baghdad to guard their homes. Her mother thought it was a bad idea for the men to 
stay but they did so anyway. A day before the war began, she left for northern Iraq where she 
would spend 40 days with her family. The day the war began, her father and uncles changed 
their minds and set off with a neighbour to rejoin them in the north.
Farah's  trip also included an element  of  cumulative causation.  She remembered a  hastily 
planned trip affected by the departure of others.  
It was just happening very fast.  We didn't know, the day before we didn't know we were 
travelling. And then suddenly everyone decided to travel because everyone was doing it, 
and it's safer there. We knew the reason, it was pretty dangerous [staying in Baghdad 
during the bombing], and we have to go, but we didn't know how dangerous it was.
Najma too left with her parents for Al Qadisiya province in southern Iraq where her maternal  
grandmother  owned  farmland.  They  left  two  days  before  the  war  began.  Her  uncle  was 
influential in the decision - he followed the news more than her father did and expected it to 
be a very rough war. He advised them to leave and they spent a month in Al Qadisiya but  
returned in April after the initial phase of the war was over. 
The threat of bombing and invasion was enough to trigger temporary migrations away from 
Baghdad, whose residents correctly expected it to be intensely targeted by coalition bombs 
and missiles.  In the case of Anwar and Farah,  the flight of others affected their  families' 
course of action, suggesting that cumulative causation played a coercive role in these early 
migrations. The decisions were all made amongst close family members and they were all 
monitoring their surroundings before making the calculation to leave. Although the women 
were consulted in the decisions, they did not hold the greater sway in these cases. None of 
them expressed an intention to remain in the provincial areas of refuge. All of them expressed 
a desire to return to Baghdad once it was deemed safe to do so by relatives who had remained 
in the city. Majeed was the exception - he left Iraq altogether under pressure from his parents 
and brother. But he did so reluctantly and only after expectations were raised of a permanent 
migration to Australia to  join his  brother.  Had this option not been available to him it  is 
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unlikely he would have left for Syria in 2003. He had in fact spent several weeks with his 
sister in Ba'quba, north east of Baghdad, to escape the heavy bombing in 1991 and may have 
done the same again in 2003 had it not been for the Australia option. 
Military occupation and displacement 
Abu Waleed  was  born  in  Baghdad  in  the  1950s.  He  is  a  Palestinian  whose  family  fled 
Palestine in 1948 and became refugees in Baghdad. He was living in the Karraada district of 
the capital. He took his wife and three children to stay with his sister when the American army 
reached nearby Jadiriya. There they occupied a compound belonging to the University of 
Baghdad and the Republican Palace on April 7th. His sister lived in the Baladiyat residential 
compound alongside many other Palestinian families. Abu Waleed recalled the small arms fire 
resistance that  the  American army encountered when they reached the main street  of  the 
Baladiyat compound. They responded with tank and artillery fire, and then with air strikes.
The people were in a state of hysteria. Around the compound there were maybe 8,000 
Palestinians living there. There was a kind of hysteria I had never seen before, it was 
something new. The people living in the compound all the families, the children, the 
elderly, got out of the compound on foot. They wandered around the streets and the 
alleyways, and the houses. Their Iraqi brothers opened their doors to their neighbours and 
people they knew. Iraqis lived in the houses around the compound. They knew the 
Palestinians well and took them in. 
With  his  sister's  family,  some  more  relatives  and  other  families  they  knew  from  the 
compound, they left for his maternal cousin's house. There were five families huddled in the 
house that evening, dangerously close to Baladiyat but they survived.  The next morning they 
returned to the compound where around a dozen apartments had been destroyed. Abu Waleed 
did not leave Iraq until 2006. He and his family returned to his Karraada apartment four days 
later to find that “life was almost normal but the situation had totally changed”. We shall 
return to his story later to see how.
In addition to the deaths, injuries and destruction of military operations, the occupation of Iraq  
disrupted  people's  lives  in  other  ways.  The  collapse  of  the  state  and  the  looting  of  the 
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country's  public  institutions  also  came  with  a  collapse  in  public  services,  a  climate  of 
insecurity,  and  economic  upheaval.  The  security  situation  immediately  after  the  fall  of 
Saddam's regime varied between different areas of Baghdad and of the country overall, but 
the general picture was one of decline which reached a nadir from early 2006 until late 2007. 
The state had  been responsible  for  providing basic  services such as  electricity  and water 
supplies, the ordering of traffic and law enforcement. Although its capacity to do so had been 
weakened during 13 years of a harsh international blockade, Baghdadis for example could 
still expect electricity from the national grid. Mohsin's neighbourhood would expect from four  
to  six  hours  a  day  of  power  cuts  before  2003,  but  would  only  get  two hour's  worth  of 
electricity  from  the  national  grid  post-2003.  Mobility  was  affected  too.  The  climate  of 
insecurity led people to gradually make less and less outings after dark. The growing number 
of checkpoints, concrete blast barriers and dividing walls in the city increased journey times 
significantly for many people in the city, and this in turn was exacerbated by the reported 
increase in the number of new cars coming into the country.
Najma was shocked after she returned to Baghdad from Qadisiya. 
We were going back because we thought that we would go back to our normal lives. But 
we found something else when we went back. We even thought we should have stayed 
there for a while but that while wouldn’t have changed anything. That’s how the situation 
was. We entered Baghdad and found the oil wells were all bombed, and smoke 
everywhere.3 Baghdad surrounded by smoke that reached the clouds. American Hummers4 
and soldiers were in the streets. We were really hurt that we were back to our city and lives 
only to find them not the same. Many people had been killed. Everything was changed, life 
changed tremendously. 
There was no security. None. No one would go out after sunset. After we were back after 
the war, there was no going out at night at all. There was no electricity; it was a whole 
month till we got some electricity. 
The collapse of security and public services were crucial issues. Shaykh Rami was not in Iraq 
3 This is also a reference to the oil fires lit by the Iraqi army. They were not oil wells but oil pools as 
mentioned in footnote no.1.
4 The Humvee, or Hummer, is a multi-purpose wheeled vehicle used by the American Army, and can weigh 
over 4 tonnes.  http://www.army.mil/factfiles/equipment/wheeled/hmmwv.html
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on the day the regime fell but was in contact with relatives in Baghdad.
I heard from my brothers who were there and my parents also. There were so many 
robberies going on, they were afraid to open the gate and look out onto the street. The 
killings, the gangs were killing each other. ... On the day of the Fall [of the regime], my 
sister told me that she would look out of the window and be afraid. She would look out of 
the window and be afraid from what was going on in the street. We lived close to 
Muthanna airport. Cars were stored there [which belonged to the office of the former 
president]. 
After the robbery and looting finished, after the Fall, what was life like?
It didn't finish, it grew worse! After the Fall, it was not safe, there was no security. …  The 
disturbances increased, they didn't decrease. 
It was in this climate of insecurity that the targeting of those perceived to belong to the old 
order  began.  The  International  Crisis  Group  observed  that  “Assassinations  multiplied  of 
former regime elements, as well as of senior officers in the old army and pilots who had flown 
in the Iran-Iraq war” (ICG 2007: 13).
Purging the old order
One such man was Sayf, from the South of Iraq. He worked as an assistant to a senior figure 
in the state owned energy sector. He was a Ba’th Party member, as was his wife, who held a 
senior position in the Student Union closely associated with Uday Saddam Hussein. Both lost 
their jobs in 2003 because of de-Ba'athification: neither was compensated or given any form 
of pension but  both hoped to  remain in  the country.  When their  house was attacked and 
burned, and in the light of attacks on other Ba’th members, Sayf left directly for Syria. His 
wife stayed in a safe house in his home town until he was able to make a visit to Baghdad; 
there they met and left again for Syria where they have remained. 
Abu S was a director in the Ministry of Health, also from a southern Iraqi province. He had 
worked  in  the  ministry  for  many  years  before  assuming  responsibility  for  managing  a 
provincial blood bank and immunization scheme. In April 2004, men who he believed were 
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Badr militia attacked his home while he and his family were inside, using rifles and other 
light weapons. They escaped to a neighbour’s house, eventually moving to another location a 
few streets  away.  That  house was subsequently attacked and the family had to  stay with 
relatives elsewhere in the province but they too were threatened. A note was left at their home 
saying “you are looking after wanted people”. Abu S and his family moved to Baghdad to 
find safety. 
Abu S and Sayf were both high ranking officials in the state administration – well known and 
highly visible.  Were they attacked because they were symbols of the old order, ones that 
aspiring state actors wished to purge with their militias, like the Badr brigade? Were they 
attacked  purely  out  of  retribution,  for  their  association  with  a  regime  that  was  deeply 
unpopular? Both of these suggestions may be true and are not mutually exclusive. They were 
not in a position to find out, only to flee or be killed. What is clear is the relationship between 
their  forced  migrations  and state  formation.  The collapse  of  the  old regime removed the 
protection they previously enjoyed, and the emergence of a new order, in similar ways to the 
examples of Europe cited by Soguk (1999) and Zolberg (1983), was accompanied by a purge 
of the old. 
Sara, a pilot's daughter
Sara, whose late father was a retired colonel in the Iraqi Air Force, also left Iraq in 2004. She 
told me that he had received elite pilot training in France and served in the Iran–Iraq war. He 
had also been a victim of regime violence when in the early 1990s he turned down a request 
to join the intelligence services and received third-degree burns as a result of a car bomb. In 
2004,  the  family  received  threatening  messages  from  the  Badr  Brigade.  However,  Sara 
explained that it was not until they were shown a hit list with her father’s name on it that they 
left the country:
My father’s name was number three on the list. It was a list of I think over 50 persons who 
were working in the military. They said that he’d dropped bombs on Qom and Tehran in 
Iran... This list was brought to us by some guy who knows them, who has some contacts 
within the militia. This guy said, “you have to leave, it’s serious. Your name is the third on 
this list. Look at it”. 
94
The “guy” had married the daughter of a close friend of Sara’s mother and wanted to help her 
family by giving them time to flee the danger.5 After her father saw the list he telephoned 
three friends whose names he also recognized in order to warn them. The family soon left for 
Syria. In a typical  story Sara relates the complexities of their departure and the tragedies 
associated with it. First, her father and brother went to her aunt’s home in Al Adhamiya, a 
Sunni neighbourhood off-limits to Shia militias. After six days Sara and the family set off for 
Syria, her father learning that most of the people he knew on that list had indeed been killed. 
Later her father mysteriously disappeared on his way to Baghdad with a friend during a trip to 
complete paperwork relating to his pension. 
Hassan from Kerbala
Threats were not aimed exclusively at  those with high positions, or in fact any positions. 
Hassan, a Shia from Kerbala, left Iraq for Syria also believing that he was a victim of the Badr 
Brigades.  They  had  wrongly  believed  he  had  been  working  for  the  former  regime.  He 
explained that Kerbala was politically “one of the black provinces” because of the uprisings 
there against Saddam Hussein in 1991.6 He had initially left Iraq in 1998 because of the poor 
economic situation resulting from international sanctions,  returning before the invasion in 
2002.
Before the Fall [of Saddam’s regime], graduates of Tourism and Hotel Management7 would 
all go and work for the Iraqi intelligence services. But us, coming from the “black” 
provinces, we weren’t allowed to work in the intelligence services at all. After the fall, 
people came with an agenda but without experience. So when someone comes to apply for 
a job and they see that he is a Tourism graduate, they’re sure he worked for the former 
regime. You can explain it to him, show him the evidence, that you left Iraq before the fall, 
that you are from this province, that you are from this family, that your brother and cousin 
were executed by the former regime, and then he’ll leave you alone. But he’ll get you in a 
different way. He won’t allow you to get a government job. ...
5 This incident echoes forced migrations in the previous regime. It is common in the stories of Iraqis, who left 
before the fall of Saddam's regime, to hear of a friend with contacts in the security services who warns them 
of an imminent arrest in time to flee. 
6 See Chapter 3.
7  Either from a university or a technical institute.
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The threats come in different ways. Perhaps someone will come to you and ask if you 
belong to a certain political movement. If not, then you can’t get the post. After a while, 
maybe you’ll find a way to get the job, through a connection somehow. Then someone will 
come and tell you that the boss belongs to the so and so party. If you start working for him, 
he may do something to you and your family. 
Then comes the message... I got a telephone call. They said “you’ve applied for this post 
and you’re a graduate of tourism. We can spread slander about you – that you used to work 
in a certain place, so forget about your degree”. I really was afraid.
The “certain place” of work meant the intelligence services of the former regime, a dangerous 
association in Kerbala after 2003. The Badr Brigade had been actively pursuing graduates of 
Tourism. After hearing about this phone call his father told him to leave immediately. He left 
for Baghdad to stay with his sister but the security situation there was becoming worse. 
By 3pm people would be hiding in their homes, so where would I be able to work? People 
from Baghdad were leaving. That was in 2004. So I had to leave... I could see that my 
sister and her sons wanted to get away as well. Then the Sunni-Shia issue started and my 
sister said she was going to return to Kerbala... Going to Damascus was the only way to 
safety. 
His forced migration to Baghdad, and then to Syria, were the final phases of a disruption to 
his life that began with the occupation itself. This was a process in which pressures built up 
that  constrained  his  daily  life,  his  capability  to  function  as  he  chose.  It  was  not  only  a 
restriction on his freedom to generate income in the profession that he had chosen, but also 
constraints on very basic capabilities to function. Access to medicine he needed was restricted 
because of the security situation, basic public services were not being provided by the state, 
and other economic opportunities to generate income had been monopolised by “outsiders” 
with little interest in the welfare of the citizens of Kerbala. The personal threat was the final 
act in a series of increases in pressure that led to his forced migration. 
Hassan spoke of the difference between the Kerbala he left in 1998 and the one he found in 
2002. 
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It was better politically in Iraq in 2002 [than it was in 1998], there wasn't strong pressure 
from the security services. Taking this person and that person away. There was a little 
opening up, even for religious pilgrimages. I was surprised when they said that the 
situation had changed. In 2002 Saddam Hussein had changed his policy and given people 
more space. ... I saw a big difference and there was a lot of work around. There was 
economic activity. I even regretted leaving in 1999, I regretted it. I said, if only I had 
stayed. The economic situation got better, there was activity. People were able to live, buy 
cars, build houses. There was a big difference. 
After 2003 Kerbala was a different place again. 
A lot of things started to change. A lot of people started to think of emigrating. There 
wasn't any work, there wasn't any electricity. There wasn't any electricity at all 
immediately after the invasion.
Hassan recalled that there was a manageable, if patchy, electricity supply in 2002. Thursdays 
and Fridays were days of full supply, to serve the religious pilgrims coming to visit the shrines 
of the Imams Hussein and Abbas in the city. On other days  residents could expect alternating 
three hour periods of national grid and generator supply. After 2003 people had to rely on 
generators almost entirely. A household would typically have a small generator of its own and 
also pay a monthly fee to a person who sold electricity supply to the street from a larger 
private generator. Hassan explained that after 2003, there was no state to pressure the street 
generator owners to keep them running. 
The security situation, the robberies and killings taking place in the city, made people fear 
leaving the house after 6pm whereas in 2002 the streets were safe at 2am.  Adding to an 
already bad situation, soldiers from the occupation forces began to enter people's homes in 
heavy handed ways. 
You know in our areas women would be veiled, a soldier can't just enter a home. But 
soldiers would enter homes, they would search them. In the evenings we were used to 
sleeping on the roof. They would enter homes straight from the roof. … 
97
When they enter your home they don't talk to you. It's just “Go! Go!” and they've entered. 
You can't talk to them because they shoot quickly, he'll shoot you. … But they would 
search your house in an insulting way. I think that the Iraqi people were humiliated during 
this period. 
 Maybe the aim was to insult the people, insult their values. The decision to leave after the 
Fall [of the regime] wasn't based on fun or comfort. The situation was bad. Nobody 
respects you. You are afraid of the police in the street. By police I mean the American or 
British soldiers. First of all, they don't respect you. Second of all, they make mistakes. 
Once I saw American soldiers fire on a car, on the road to Baghdad. I saw it with my own 
eyes. By mistake, their father drove close to the convoy and they fired on the car. When 
there was an American convoy about the cars would keep their distance, maybe a whole 
kilometre. You would be afraid. 
Hassan's access to important medical supplies which he needed was also disrupted by security  
problems. Pharmacies no longer opened after 6pm from fear of armed robbery and hospitals 
were suffering from supply shortages. Even in 2002 at a time of embargo he was able to go to 
a hospital and receive an injection for his stomach related medical problems. One evening he 
was extremely sick and in need of an injection but the government hospital did not have the 
right supplies and the private pharmacies were closed. He remained in pain until 10am the 
next morning when they opened. 
I was not surprised to hear about security and healthcare problems that Hassan mentioned; 
people  in  most  of  the  country's  provinces  were  experiencing  similar  difficulties.  I  had 
expected  them to be better in Kerbala, as it is a predominantly Shia city which millions of 
religious pilgrims visit each year.  Were things not better there because of this prosperity?
Things are better than in Baghdad in terms of security. ... But the problem is that the 
pilgrims that come, they want to stay right by the shrines of the Imam Abbas and the Imam 
Hussein. Around the shrines of Abbas and Hussein are hotels that belong to particular 
people. I don't want to mention names, we're afraid of things on this earth. They belong to 
particular people who are profiting, they don't belong to me and to you. 
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The profits don't go to the citizens of Kerbala. The citizens of Kerbala are like outsiders 
now to Kerbala. After the invasion there was another invasion – a hidden invasion.8 There 
was a second invasion which bought up the important areas, the important shops, and 
forced people out. It wasn't a choice. “You have two choices: either I demolish your house, 
or you sell it to me”. What's the best choice? You sell it to him. When you sell it to him, 
where do you go after that? You're two or three kilometres away from the shrine. So what 
will you get out of the pilgrims? Do you get anything? So there was a hidden invasion. 
It was a monopoly then?
Of course. That wasn't there before the invasion. It wasn't there. We owned a shop, from 
1988, that was maybe ten metres away from the Imam Abbas' shrine. But things are 
different now, everything's different. 
Hassan's family, like many others in Kerbala, were presented with what they believed to be a 
“throffer”. This, as discussed in more detail earlier, is an offer that contains a threat upon its 
rejection (Wertheimer, 1987). They were told to sell their business at a good price or watch it 
be demolished without receiving “good compensation”. Those making the “throffer” said that 
they intended to clear the space, to create an open area for the sake of the pilgrims. But 
Hassan said that the demolitions didn't take place, they held on to “the well of gold” that a 
business close to the shrines is. Certain citizens of Kerbala were being excluded from the 
wealth that the shrines brought to the city by “outsiders”. It was not even possible to set up a 
street stall close to the shrine. 
Who is going to let you? At the moment the people who are responsible for the running of 
the Abbas and Hussein shrines are the same people who have bought up all the land around 
the shrine, all the hotels and the shops. Street stalls are not allowed. 
 Do they have patrols that check?
Of course. They have around 3000 people working for them. 
When did that start?
8  The Arabic term he used was ghazu mubatin [ّنطبم وزغ].
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It all happened after the Fall [of the regime], I think it was 2004. ... It wasn't gradual. It 
happened quickly, very quickly, in a number of days.
He would not mention by name those who were responsible as he was worried that he would 
one day have to suffer the consequences if he must return to Kerbala. 
According to Hassan, a different type of old order was being displaced in Kerbala, families 
and clans who he described as the “deep-rooted” and “original” inhabitants of the city. He 
spoke of it as a second invasion. “Outsiders” were responsible, “scheming people” with huge 
financial resources.  Hoteliers, shop keepers, and others who had long owned businesses close 
to  the  shrines  were  being  displaced,  their  capability  to  generate  income  depleted.  This 
happened to Hassan too. As well as being excluded from employment in the state bureaucracy 
because of a mistaken perception that he worked for the former regime, his family lost their 
business close to the shrine. His sense of security and ability to access medical services were 
also drastically affected before his migration to Baghdad, and then finally to Syria. Hassan's 
final displacement, a forced migration to Syria via Baghdad, like many others I spoke to, was 
part of a process of disruption. The decision to leave was taken under circumstances of duress 
in which the decision to remain was made at the increasing expense of what Sen (1999) refers 
to as instrumental freedoms. When eventually the pressures increased to the point where his 
life was at risk, his father ordered him to leave Kerbala and stay with his sister in Baghdad, 
another decision that was taken exclusively by close family members. 
Former officers in the armed forces 
Abu Bakr was a Major in the Republican Guard, an electronic engineer maintaining databases 
and computer systems. He was aged 34 in 2003 and thrown into economic insecurity once the 
CPA had  dissolved  the  Iraqi  army.  His  salary  stopped  and  the  emergency  grants  made 
available for members of the army were irregularly available and added up to $100 each. A 
state teacher's basic monthly salary in Iraq is now around $500 a month but Abu Bakr's status 
as a former Republican Guard officer excluded him from the recovering salaries in the state 
sector.  The  grants  eventually  stopped  and  some  officers  were  lucky  enough  to  receive 
pensions, but not Abu Bakr. He was without an income for several months, there was no work 
and he was stuck at home. With his brother and some friends, they set up a small business, 
repairing and setting up computers. In early 2004 a customer he had befriended helped him to 
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secure  some  work  as  a  private  sub-contractor  for  a  Kuwaiti  company  that  was  itself  a 
subcontractor for American firm General Electric (GE). Abu Bakr described the income as 
good, but it was temporary work. It ended in the summer of 2007, not long before he left Iraq.  
Abu Bakr's displacement would be completed in 2007 when sectarian violence in Baghdad 
reached a gruesome peak. 
Adnaan, his  brother,  was also an officer in the Iraqi Army but in a different section: the 
special forces. A pragmatic and resourceful individual, as well as a pious Sunni Muslim, he 
established a  Sons  of  Iraq  force  made up of  former  Iraqi  Army officers  in  the  Baghdad 
neighbourhood of Al Ghazaliya in 2007. They worked in coordination with the American 
Army to fight Al Qaeda and other armed terrorists operating in their neighbourhood. He was a 
Baghdadi with family roots in Tikrit, but, like many other Baghdadis he expressed conditional 
support  for  an  American  led intervention  (ICG,  2002:  2).  He had hoped that  Iraq  under 
American tutelage would become as prosperous as the Gulf states and that some of the many 
promises the Americans were making would be realised. The promises were never realised. 
For Adnaan, the invasion resulted in his immediate unemployment with the disbanding of the 
Iraqi Army. He never received a pension and had to work in the private sector, as a taxi driver  
and then briefly  with his  brother  as  a  private  contractor.  His move to  Al Ghazaliya was 
necessitated by a threat from Ayad Allawi's political party. Ayad Allawi was an exile politician 
and the leader of the Iraqi National Accord that opposed Saddam Hussein, returning to Iraq 
after  the  occupation.  Allawi  had  worked  closely  with  Western  and  Arab  intelligence 
organisations (Bremer, 2006). When Adnaan was threatened, Allawi was Prime Minister of 
the Iraqi Governing Council, a body appointed by the United States before the 2005 national 
election in Iraq. Adnaan was living in a government owned apartment.   
The residential areas that were owned by the government were the first to be targeted for 
displacement9 after the Fall. … [T]hey wouldn't let us live in the houses that the 
government had given to us because we were considered to be part of the former regime. 
… I received a threat. It came from the Iraqi National Accord movement of Ayad Allawi. 
They came and set up an office in our residential compound. It was a small compound, six 
buildings altogether. Each one had 38 flats in it, nine storeys high. They were all artisans 
9 The Arabic word that appears in Adnaan's story as displacement was tahjeer [ريجهت],which means to cause to 
migrate. It is the causative, form two, of the verb hajara [رجه] which means to migrate. 
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and officers. The threats came on the basis that all of the apartments had been distributed to 
people who were part of the former regime. They started asking around: where is so and 
so? That question asked in that situation means that they are looking for you. … So I left 
the apartment but my family remained.
Who told you they were looking for you?
They came to my family's house and asked about me. Some of the neighbours immediately 
rode the wave, they immediately signed up for the National Accord and became members. 
But they were my neighbours. They came and warned my family that they were looking 
for me because I was an officer and so on, and that I shouldn't show there. They were good 
boys, looking after me. That I shouldn't show up there, that was the first forced migration. 
So I left the apartment. I owned some residential land in Baghdad which I sold. I had a 
small amount of money and bought a small house with it in Al Ghazaliya and settled there 
with my family. That was in 2004. I worked as a taxi driver, I had my own car, so I would 
go out and work, live off what I earned. I had no salary, nothing. 
It was not until later that Adnaan had to leave Baghdad and then Iraq altogether. After he set  
up  the  Sons  of  Iraq  movement  in  Ghazaliya,  he  appeared  on  the  radar  again.  Once  the 
American Army passed control of the Sons of Iraq patrols to the Iraqi government, Adnaan 
was targeted again. His home was raided by Iraqi security forces prompting him to leave for 
Tikrit – his family's town of origin where one of his brothers lived - and then for Syria. But it  
was in the immediate aftermath of the occupation that his displacement began. He was thrown 
into  immediate  economic  insecurity,  and  then  compelled  to  move  to  a  different 
neighbourhood to evade a threat from one of Iraq's new ruling parties, the new order purging 
elements of the old one.  The rest of his story will continue in the next chapter.
What  was  also  interesting  was  that  he  explained  the  armed  resistance  to  the  American 
occupiers as emerging from a defensive response to a  purge under the new regime. Iraqi 
society,  he  said,  was already equipped for  armed resistance,  thanks to  years  of  war  and 
military training. But it wasn't enough. They needed leaders, and that is where the officers 
came in.  
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I don't want to lie to you. I was amongst the people who was convinced that, with my 
military background, that the best way to free the country was through armed resistance.
… Soldiers alone are not enough to win a battle. That's where the role of the officers came 
in to play. They were mostly high ranking officers in the former Iraqi army who were 
excluded from the new army on the grounds that they were Sunnis or former Ba'thists. 
It wasn't just an operation of exclusion, it was a physical purge. They were exposed to 
attacks, to killing. Eventually they were pushed into the resistance, to defend themselves. 
The activities broadened and America reached a point where they would have been 
defeated had it not been for the pressures from the Shia parties and militias that were 
present. 
This targeting of army officers seemed to be happening in Al Adil in Baghdad where Mohsin 
lived. His father was a retired teacher who used to teach in a Baghdad military university. 
Their neighbourhood was once quiet and relatively self contained. After 2003 it was the site 
of frequent and deadly American Army raids. It consisted of three parallel streets, one housed 
many high ranking war veterans in  accommodation granted to them by Saddam Hussein. 
Mohsin explained that when the American Army came, setting up bases in the city, in schools 
and other buildings, they welcomed any information they could get about “their enemies”. 
People were encouraged to inform on others in a similar fashion to times under Saddam, and 
there were no consequences for giving false information. 
You could go and tell them that this person has lots of money and he's funding terrorism, 
things like that. The American army didn't care, they would give you $100 and you could 
go. But that house is going to suffer. They'll raid the house at night, arrest the women, the 
children, the young men. If there was any resistance, even if you tried to escape they would 
kill you. They've come thinking that you are their enemy. You are their enemy so they're 
willing to do anything. … You'll be investigated and then a year later they'll release you, 
apologise, say sorry, that they have nothing on you, God be with you. This after a year of 
torture. 
Mohsin was very aware of the dangers. Arrest on charges of terrorism would guarantee long 
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term detention and some torture, whether guilty or not. He heard from other neighbours that 
soldiers would confiscate documents, ID cards, weapons, gold,  jewellery, and anything of 
value. He heard first hand accounts from some of the families he knew well in the area that 
the young men had been taken away by American soldiers. It was when the house next door 
was raided, neighbours who he had grown up with and were as close as family, that Mohsin 
had to leave.   
They arrested all of the young males in their family. There were six of them, maybe more. 
Two of them died during the arrest, it was during the arrest they were killed by mistake. 
They tried to escape, to run, so they were killed. At that time my parents said “you have to 
go, forget school, take your things and go and live with your paternal uncle, or with 
anyone. The important thing is that you have to get out of this neighbourhood.” 
The soldiers had seized documents and photographs from the house, including photos they 
had taken together. Mohsin's parents insisted that he leave the country soon. They could not 
all  leave  together  because  of  financial  constraint.  They believed that  Mohsin was  in  the 
greater danger as a young man and so he moved to the UAE in October 2005 to live with his  
uncle. Mohsin eventually moved to Syria where his parents had, by 2006, also moved because 
of the intense violence that took hold of Baghdad. 
But Mohsin's displacement had also started before his migration, and before the deadly raid 
on his neighbour's home. Daily life was disturbed in a number of ways. In the first six months 
of occupation, his family had no income, his father's pension payments stopped. Mohsin went 
out to work, against the will of his parents, and despite the threat of bullets from soldiers,  
gangs, militias, and of deadly explosions. The street had “become like a jungle, the toughest 
rules” and “everyone could do as they pleased”.   
... It got to the stage where if we left the house, we would only leave in groups of three or 
four, just in case something happened to us. This is something I've just remembered, I'd 
forgotten about this before. We made an agreement between us. If something happened to 
us then at least one of us might be able to escape and let our families know that Mohsin 
had been killed for example, or that something had happened to him. At the time, those 
who were killed on the street, their corpses would go missing. You wouldn't know where to 
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find the corpse. It might be burned, dumped in the rubbish. You wouldn't know.
The occupation had disrupted his education and capacity to learn. 
Half of the teachers weren't attending school because of the [security] situation. Some of 
them transferred to a different area. The cadre of teachers was getting weaker, there were 
less of them. … To study you need to be at ease, psychologically. You need to be in the 
right condition to absorb the knowledge. We didn't have that. What was driving us to study 
was the hope that we had. When you have a dream and you want to achieve something it 
drives you. 
The pressures  of  daily  life  had  made studying extremely difficult.  There were  no public 
services providing reliable energy or transport.  Studying at home became difficult and he had 
to study by candlelight some evenings. Within the family, there was a debate as to whether it  
would be better for Mohsin to take a year's deferral in the hope of the situation improving, or 
to  hastily  finish  his  final  high  school  exams  and  then  study  elsewhere.  As  well  as  the 
American Army raids in their  area,  sectarian killings were becoming more widespread in 
Baghdad. Mohsin was a young Sunni man but with a name more commonly associated with 
Shias. The American Army raids had become more frequent in his neighbourhood and he had 
already  spent  several  months  living  with  relatives  in  different  areas  of  Baghdad  before 
finishing his exams in June 2005. When American soldiers arrested and killed some of his 
neighbour's in October 2005, his parents were both in agreement that he had to leave. First he 
left the neighbourhood and then, in December 2005, he left Iraq for the UAE. 
The Palestinians of Iraq and Abu Waleed's story
The Palestinians had never been citizens under any Iraqi government. There were fluctuations 
in the level of rights they had since their arrival in 1948 with regards to property ownership 
but had full access to education and healthcare and had long enjoyed secure residency. Their 
situation changed drastically in 2003, as Abu Waleed explains:
Several months after the occupation, the residency directorate, which was connected to the 
Ministry of Interior, required of the Palestinians that they sign to confirm their presence in 
Iraq each month at the directorate. … We had never had to deal with such a law until 2003. 
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After 2003 we had to go there with our ID and travel document and confirm our presence 
there. Your document would be stamped along with another paper to confirm that you had 
checked in. With that law we lost our permanent residency. … There were special ID cards 
for Palestinians in Iraq issued by the Iraqi government. They stopped issuing them, and 
they stopped issuing and extending travel documents. More importantly they stopped 
issuing documents and ID cards to those who were born in Iraq. All of the Palestinians who 
were born in Iraq from 2003 until the middle of 2006 were not issued with birth 
certificates.  ... They started issuing them again in mid 2006 but with conditions. 
At  a  stroke,  thousands  of  Palestinian  refugees  in  Iraq  were  transformed from permanent 
residents into foreigners, but ones without a sovereign state. There were echoes here of the 
displacements of statecraft after the French revolution that simultaneously created categories 
of citizen and foreigner. Power relations were realigned under a new rubric which provided 
for novel forms of eligibility and ineligibility. The revolution invented “the national citizen 
and  the  legally  homogeneous  national  citizenry”;  at  the  same  time  it  also  invented  “the 
foreigner” (Brubaker, 1992: 46-47).  Essentially, to craft and empower the notions of national 
citizen, indispensable new forms of foreignness also had to be constructed. Thousands were 
displaced after the revolution as part and parcel of the process of inventing the nation-state. 
The new France cast  out those falling victim to the readjustments that produced the new 
category of “foreigner” (ibid.). Seen through this lens the new laws turned the Palestinians 
into foreigners as part of a process of strengthening the state, a purge of those that the state 
deemed to be a  threat,  real  or imagined, to  the new order.  The residency issue could be 
explained by the loss of records which resulted from the looting of government ministries in 
2003 (Zaman, 2011: 266). But Abu Waleed saw it differently. 
We didn't interpret those laws as a coincidence, or something casual. We understood the 
connection between those laws and the new Iraq. With the occupation of Iraq, we began to 
see and feel, as Palestinians, and also as Iraqis, that Iraq had entered a new type of era. It 
was different. Values, understanding, behaviour, the political system, it all changed. 
This new era meant losing the relative security that the former political order had provided 
them. His  views were  understandable given the context.  Shortly  after  the occupation  the 
American Army raided the Palestinian Embassy in Baghdad and arrested diplomats and staff. 
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The  Chargé d'Affaires was  not  released  until  April  2004  (Mohammed,  2007:  78).  The 
American Army was apparently searching for weapons and fighters during the May 28th 2003 
raid.  The embassy was forced to  close for 70 days (Shar'aan,  2003).  It  was an important 
organisation for Palestinian refugees in Iraq. It had intervened on behalf of many families 
facing eviction in 2001 and was a reminder that their presence was still welcomed by the 
authorities.
In addition to this symbolic attack and the loss of secure residency, they no longer enjoyed 
security of tenancy. Abu Waleed explained that the Iraqi government was renting property 
from private landlords to house the Palestinians, but the government froze the rents after the 
Iraqi  dinar collapsed in  the 1990s.  The landlords  were receiving the  equivalent  of  a  few 
dollars in monthly rent and laws were in place that prevented them from kicking out their 
tenants. In 2001 the courts agreed to some landlords' eviction requests. Some families were 
evicted but the Palestinian Embassy and political groups in Iraq intervened and the rulings 
were frozen by a Minister. 
That was in 2001. But after 2003 there was no state. ... The property owners threatened 
families, they had weapons. They did it with menace, it wasn't pleasant. They gave some of 
them a week to leave, others a month and a half. 
Around 400 families were evicted and set up a camp in a football stadium. “The Camp of 
Return” was located in Nadi Square. Palestinian organisations - the National Council and the 
Popular Council - tried to solve the issue.  Eventually the UNHCR, with help from the Qatari  
Red Crescent, rented buildings in Baghdad and transferred the families there. Abu Waleed 
experienced displacement, similar to the ones he described above, which came with what he 
understood to be a veiled threat. The rent on his apartment was not at the low levels of the 
1990s but an affordable $140 a month. His landlord trebled the rent to 500,000 Iraqi dinars 
and one day sent his older brother to speak to Abu Waleed.  
“How are you going to pay 500,000?” he asked. I said that maybe we would borrow some 
money. Then he told me that he was going to see Haydar Al Abbaadi about something. 
Haydar Al Abbaadi lived about 300 metres away from my house, he was a politician in the 
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Da'wa party10 who came to Iraq after the occupation, he's well known.  I read it as a 
warning. I asked him to give me the chance to find somewhere else to live. … That was in 
2004, in May. I found a different house in August 2004.
This was an example of an action which takes on a threatening meaning in an environment of 
imminent threat, of community wide insecurity. A visit to a politician living close by would 
not necessarily constitute a threat in itself, certainly not in the securer era of the 1990s. But 
read in a context of insecurity in Iraq and the increasing targeting of the Palestinians, Abu 
Waleed decided to move house – he was aware that many Iraqi politicians had connections to 
armed groups and it was possible that his landlord's older brother was issuing a thinly veiled 
threat to summon an armed group to intervene.
In addition to the evictions, Abu Waleed spoke about an anti-Palestinian media campaign 
which began in 2005. On the morning of May 12th 2005, a bomb was detonated in a market in 
Baghdad Jidida, killing dozens of people. That evening four Palestinians were arrested and 
charged  with  the  crime.  The  next  day  Al  Iraqiya  TV,  the  state  channel,  broadcast  their 
confessions. Their faces were swollen, they had clearly been beaten and tortured. Abu Waleed 
believed the whole thing to be a fabrication which further exacerbated the security situation in 
Baghdad.  The  four  men  were  eventually  released.  A documentary  was  available  on  the 
community website of the Palestinians of Iraq,11 which is based on interviews with the falsely 
accused men. They give detailed accounts of their gruelling experiences after being arrested 
by the Wolf Brigade, an armed unit attached to the Ministry of Interior. Confessions were 
forced from them in detention through an intensive daily routine of torture. Part three of the 
series  begins  with  a  clip  of  the  May  14th broadcast  on  Al  Iraqiya  TV.  An  interrogator 
aggressively berates a subdued Aamir Mulham, one of the accused, when he asks:
Can you tell me what grudge you hold against the Iraqi people, for you to do what you 
did? 
I have no grudge sir.
10 Hizb Al Da'wa is one of the exile parties that returned to Iraq after the occupation. They are a nominally Shia 
religious party with a sectarian agenda and are backed by Iran. See Chapter 3.
11 The documentary was previously hosted on the website Filastiniyu Al Iraq [The Palestinians of Iraq] 
www.paliraq.com but is now hosted on YouTube. See Part 3 of the documentary: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geqdP8pgyMQ
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You have no grudge? You're Palestinian aren't you?
Yes sir.
You eat and drink in Iraq. Iraqis spent their years doing military service, you never had to 
do military service. Iraqis couldn't travel, yet you could travel.12 Iraqis don't have houses, 
but you have a house. What was the crime that Iraqis committed against you? You even get 
more money than Iraqis do! Measure it, what the Iraqi martyr's salary is and what the 
Palestinian martyr's salary is!13 Is that the crime?!14
The day after the confessions were screened, Abu Waleed went to the Baghdad Al Jidida 
market to do some shopping, he lived close by in Al Ghadeer. He saw some banners directed 
at  the  Palestinians,  about  Iraqi  blood  that  had  been  spilled  for  them,  alluding  to  Iraqi 
participation in the 1948 war in Palestine. It contained historical inaccuracies but he also saw 
it  in  Al  Ghadeer  and  Palestine  Street.  The  banners  remained  for  several  months  and  a 
campaign began against the Palestinians.  
… newspapers like Al Sabah and others began media campaigns which accused 
Palestinians of being behind the suffering and oppression of Iraqis. They were saying that 
the Palestinians had benefited a lot from the former regime and that they were dependants 
of the regime and that they received special privileges. They were all lies. The facts 
disprove these claims. This media campaign was a precursor to the targeting of the 
Palestinians. ...
The Palestinian refugee experience in Iraq showed a striking resemblance to the displacement 
of the émigrés of revolutionary France in the late 18th century. A series of legal measures was 
introduced, starting in 1791, which rendered them “more visible than their actual numbers 
would warrant” and which created an antagonistic climate toward them (Soguk, 1999: 78). 
The  laws  ostensibly  targeted  only  the  properties  of  the  émigrés,  but  almost  all  of  them 
engaged in problematizing them as a group of “bad nationals” who were to be excluded from 
12 A reference to the situation in the Iran-Iraq war when Palestinians were able to travel as they were exempt 
from service, but Iraqis were not as they were expected to serve on the front. (Zaman, 2011: 268)
13 He is most likely referring to the meagre war pensions that Iraqis get. They are meagre in comparison to the 
$10,000 that Saddam announced he would be sending to the families of Palestinian martyrs in Palestine, but 
not to those in Iraq.
14 See Part 3 of the documentary: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=geqdP8pgyMQ
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the body politic until they embraced the new nation-state as the perfect form of representation 
(ibid.). They were cast as a group who did not belong in this new order, who were trying to 
undermine it, and were thus denounced. Laws were enacted decreeing the death penalty for 
émigrés on verification of their identification in November 1791 and March 1793 (ibid.). In a 
country whose  population was  estimated to  be  26  million in  2003 (World  Bank,  Google 
Public Data), the 25,000 Palestinians estimated to be living in Iraq by the UNHCR in the 
same year (ibid.) represented less than 0.01% of the population. In Baghdad, where the largest 
number lived, an estimated 22,000 Palestinians (Mohammed, 2007: 27) composed less than 
0.05% of the city's five million residents. Yet the actions of the Ministry of Interior - the 
exclusionary  measures  and  the  media  campaign  -  rendered  them  highly  visible  and 
vulnerable. Palestinians reported harassment and abuse when seeking residency renewal at the 
residency directorate of the Ministry of Interior. Others even reported having their documents 
confiscated by staff there,  putting them at risk of arrest  for not  carrying valid documents 
(HRW, 2006: 30-32).   
The Palestinians of Iraq knew that other Iraqis believed they had enjoyed privileges under 
Saddam Hussein. During the Iran-Iraq war, Palestinians were exempt from military service 
and allowed to travel abroad, putting them in a relatively privileged  position vis-a-vis other 
Iraqis. They were also accused of being Saddam loyalists (Zaman, 2011: 268). The Iraqi Ba'th 
had, like regimes in other Arab states, used the Palestinian issue as part of its legitimizing 
propaganda. Israel was a target of comprehensive hostility in regime discourse (Bengio, 1998: 
134-139). The issue became more salient during and in the build up to the 1991 Gulf War 
when Saddam Hussein cast the conflict in apocalyptic terms relating to the struggle against 
Imperialism and Zionism (Bengio, 1998: 200-201). He eventually ordered missiles to be fired 
at Israel, something which the state-run media reported enthusiastically (ibid.). Payments of 
thousands of dollars to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers and of those killed in the 
second intifada, and Saddam's announcement of a  €1 billion aid package for Palestinians in 
the Middle East in 2001 came at a time when the Iraqi population was enduring the hardships 
of the international embargo (Human Rights Watch, 2006: 10). The affect of these actions was 
to strengthen the idea that the devastating 1991 war was fought on the Palestinians' behalf, 
and  that  the  Palestinians  had  been  favoured  clients  of  the  regime,  even  though  Iraqi 
Palestinians received none of the aid themselves (Zaman, 2011: 267). 
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The  Palestinians  immediately  lost  their  protection  after  the  Iraqi  state,  which  had  been 
dominated by Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party, collapsed. A different type of state was being 
formed along ethno-sectarian lines. Its violent methods of control did not represent a break 
from the past, there was much continuity (Harling, 2010; Chatelard, 2012). But it did define 
itself against the former regime. Those who came to dominate the state building process after 
2003 were former exiles, anti-Saddam opposition groups with no popular base, who were 
using  the  de-Ba'thification  campaign  to  consolidate  their  power  by  “stocking  the  state 
apparatus with loyalists” (Harling 2011: 45). 
The Palestinians were an ideal target for a weak government that wanted to make a show of 
strength  to  hide  its  own  weaknesses.  The  former  regime's  vociferous  claims  to  be 
championing their cause made it easy to spread disinformation alleging their loyalty to it. 
Mohammed (2007: 82) explains that the Al Sabah newspaper, the Al Iraqia channel and Al 
Forat TV sought to create a popular public opinion that was antagonistic to the Palestinians, 
making them scapegoats for decades of Iraq's woes. The four Palestinians accused of the 
Baghdad Jidida market bomb were arrested by the Ministry of Interior's Wolf Brigade just 12 
hours  after  the  bombing.  This  campaign against  the  Palestinians  took place  shortly  after 
Ibrahim Al Ja'fari announced his government and appointed Bayan Jabar Solagh as Interior 
Minister  (ibid.).  Iraq's  Minister  of  Displacement  and  Migration,  Suhaila  Abd  Al  Ja'far, 
reportedly held a press conference in October 2005 calling on the Ministry of Interior to expel  
the Palestinians. She said that those who did not have Iraqi citizenship should be sent to Gaza 
after  the  Israeli  withdrawal  and  used  the  alleged  involvement  of  Palestinians  in  terrorist 
attacks  in  the  last  two  years  as  justification  (HRW,  2006:  32).  The  accusations  were 
unfounded but like refugees elsewhere in the world there were no powerful voices to speak on 
their behalf.  The Palestinians had no militia to defend them either, no part of Baghdad or Iraq 
to go to where they would be protected at least notionally by any of the armed groups that 
flourished after 2003. The consequences were deadly. Abu Waleed recalled how it reached the 
stage where:    
A week wouldn't pass without a Palestinian being kidnapped and killed. … It was in that 
environment that people were becoming increasingly convinced that they were under threat 
and that we shouldn't remain in Iraq. Most people were trying to get along with their lives, 
to evade the effects of the situation. But all Palestinians were anxious and afraid, 
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individuals and families.
Identity killings – such as murders at  armed checkpoints based on the victim's perceived 
confessional affiliation - became widespread and intensified after the February 2006 bombing 
of the Al Askari  shrine in Samarra.  Being caught with any Palestinian identification at  a 
checkpoint effectively became a death sentence, partly because of the vilification campaign, 
and partly because they were Sunni Muslims. Abu Waleed no longer spoke in a Palestinian 
dialect in public, speaking only Iraqi and saying he was from the northern city of Mosul to 
explain any linguistic discrepancies and instructed his children to do the same. Like many 
other Iraqis he also obtained forged identity documents to evade threats at checkpoints.
The Palestinian Authority's Minister of Refugee Affairs wrote to Ali Al Sistani, the highest 
clerical authority in Shia Islam based in Najaf in southern Iraq, late in April 2006. He asked 
for  a  ruling  to  help  protect  the  Palestinians  of  Iraq.  Sistani's  office  released  a  statement 
confirming  that  they  should  not  be  attacked  and  should  be  protected  shortly  afterwards 
(Sistani, 2006b)15.  Sistani had earlier released a fatwa, a religious ruling, dated February 21st 
2006 in response to a request from the Islamic Human Rights Association. He stated that it 
was not permitted to harm them even if they had been accused of crimes, and that any accused 
must be given their rights to a just judicial process (Sistani, 2006a).16 Sistani's words appear to 
have had little affect on Abu Waleed's situation, or that of other Palestinians. We shall hear 
more from Abu Waleed in chapter 6. Let us now look at another vulnerable group in Iraq, the 
Sabean Mandaeans.  They asked Sistani  for  a  protective  fatwa more  than once,  but  their 
requests were denied. They too lost the protection that they had from the state after 2003, with 
similarly tragic consequences. 
The Sabean Mandaeans
The  Sabean  Mandaeans17 are  another  vulnerable  group  affected  drastically  by  state 
transformation. Like the Palestinians and many other Iraqis, they had relied on the former 
regime for a level of basic security. They had enjoyed complete religious freedom in modern 
Iraq. Historically they were artisans and in Iraq they specialised in the jewel and precious 
15 http://www.sistani.org/index.php?p=824163&id=239  
16 http://www.sistani.org/index.php?p=320138&id=193  
17  I shall refer to them interchangeably as the Sabeans or the Mandaeans which is how they referred to 
themselves.
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Figure 10 (above): A Mandaean priest teaches complex rituals to priests in training and to followers, Jaramana, 
Damascus 2011.
Figure 11 (above): A Mandaean baptism, Jaramana, Damascus 2011.
113
metals trade. They were not exempt from the problems that afflicted Iraqi society at large, 
such as those associated with war, sanctions, and the violent methods of the regime. Their 
religion forbids them from carrying arms but they still  had to complete military service - 
hundreds were killed in the Iran-Iraq war according to the Mandaean Human Rights Group 
(MHRG, 2011). The MHRG  Annual Report of 2011 documents the crimes that have been 
committed against the Mandaeans since 2003, including robberies, killings, kidnappings, and 
forced conversions. In Damascus I learned that the Mandaean Association there had registered 
between 13,000-14,000 Mandaeans between 2006 and 2007. This had declined to around 
5,000 in 2011. This was from an estimated 45,000-50,000 total in Iraq before 2003, a figure 
now said to be under 6,000. 
They are the followers of an ancient gnostic and monotheistic faith. Scholars differ on when 
they migrated to Iraq from the Jordan valley but the Mandaeans are discernible from the 
second century C.E. (Buckley, 2002: 3). They are mentioned in three separate verses of the 
Quran as people not to be feared because they believe in Allah.18 This was something each of 
the Mandaean men I interviewed wished to emphasise to me. This was a response to the false 
labelling of the Mandaeans as “infidels” by armed groups wishing to justify attacks on them 
with an incorrectly manipulated interpretation of the Quran. It was also perhaps because they 
saw me as a Muslim and feared I had taken on those prejudices. Every Mandaean I met took 
pride in the belief that they were “the original inhabitants of Iraq”, “the origins of Iraq”, and 
the oldest monotheistic faith. One even told me that the Mandaeans preceded the Christians in 
Iraq by 2000 years. 
The Mandaeans are known for their distinctive baptism rituals which must be conducted in 
clean  flowing  water,  preferably  in  a  river.  In  past  times,  gatherings  of  a  few  thousand 
Mandaeans along the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates were not uncommon during important 
religious dates. In the mid 1990s there was a Mandaean cultural revival which included the 
translation from Aramaic into Arabic of the Ginza Rabba, their most important holy text. The 
Mandaeans distributed copies to institutions across the country. Importantly, they made sure 
that every courtroom in Iraq had a copy so that Mandaeans' testimony could no longer be 
rejected on the grounds that their book was not present beside the Quran and the Bible. They 
18 They are mentioned in the Quran in three separate verses – in Al Baqara 62, Al Hajj 17 and Al Maida 69 – as 
people who believe in Allah.
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sent copies to Muslim scholars including Ali Al Sistani, the highest authority in Shia Islam 
today. Sistani returned positive comments on their holy book. 
They experienced discrimination in the 1990s, which Hadi described as being isolated rather 
than widespread, but the state provided them with protection. In 1994 a delegation from the 
sect was granted a meeting with Saddam Hussein. As was the custom, they had brought him a 
lavish gift: an open book sculpted from silver with script from the Ginza inlaid in gold, in 
Arabic and Aramaic. Hadi explained that
As you know, if you were meeting Saddam Hussein, it was an opportunity for you. 
Whatever you asked from him you would get. Saddam Hussein was the state, he was the 
government. He was everything.
They informed him that a school text book defined the Mandaeans as worshippers of the stars 
and planets, and that some Muslim preachers had referred to them as infidels in their sermons. 
He said “Where is that written?” We told him it was in one of the school books. He said 
“no no no, I do not accept that. You are the origins of Iraq. You are the original Iraqis. 
People who say those things do not know you and do not know your value, or the history 
of Iraq”.
Saddam said that?
Yes! He immediately said that a committee must be formed to remove those words and the 
Sabeans should choose what they want to replace it. He gave an order to the Ministry of 
Endowments that any one [preacher] who says bad things about us in the mosques must be 
punished. 
After the translation of the Ginza, they requested another meeting with Saddam in 2001 and 
presented him with a copy of the translation. The number of sermons against the Mandaeans 
was rising, something Hadi believed was a result of the National Faith Campaign that Saddam 
had initiated, though he did not say so in the meeting.19 Shortly afterwards, Saddam appeared 
19 Ali A. Allawi (2007: 56) supports this view stating that with the National Faith Campaign, the regime 
intended to buttress its authority and legitimacy with displays of piety, but ended up with a growing presence 
of radical Islamist preachers in Iraq and could not control their radicalising effects on Iraqi society.
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on television and spoke about the Mandaeans and after that the discrimination stopped. At the 
meeting he had also given them permission to build the largest Mandaean temple in Iraq on 
the banks of the Tigris in Baghdad. The land was given to them by government decree but 
they were  unable to  see construction begin before the  war  and the  3000m2 plot  remains 
empty. 
Hadi told me these things in detail because he wanted to emphasise that although there were 
problems for  the Mandaeans and they had suffered like other Iraqis,  their  objections and 
requests were heard. According to him, they were generally well respected in Iraqi society. 
Hadi was certain that the non-proselytizing nature of the sect, and the traditional craft that 
Mandaean goldsmiths had provided to Iraq's ruling elites for decades, made it clear to Saddam 
that they were never a threat to his rule. They were in fact Al Tai'fa Athahabiya, “the Golden 
Sect”. When Saddam initiated the National Faith Campaign, he wanted to fashion an image of 
Iraq as the centre of all faiths. The ancient sect fitted well with this image. 
He said he was going to build us the biggest and best palace for us in the whole of 
Baghdad. He was a crazy man, he had ambitions to make the world see that Iraq was the 
centre of all faiths. He wanted a great mosque and a church, and a temple. He wanted it to 
have everything. 
The situation changed drastically for the Mandaeans after the occupation. They began to feel 
that they were being excluded from the new “Islamic” Iraq as symbols of the old secular and 
pluralistic one. Discrimination and acts of violence against them were becoming widespread 
and going unpunished. Shaykh Rami, a Mandaean priest  from Baghdad, was also from a 
family of goldsmiths. One day, in the market where his family business had been for decades:
 
Some primary school children came to the market, there were maybe 15 or 20 them. They 
were calling out “Sabaen infidels” and making trouble in the market. They were shouting 
“the Subba are filthy infidels” and making a racket in the market. It was in the goldsmiths' 
market, the Qaysarriya market.
Haleem, a Sabean man in his 60s was from a goldsmiths' family, but also a retired teacher. He  
was in his 60s and his granddaughter experienced similar problems at school.
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My son's daughter, the children in her school, they would threaten her. The girls that were 
with her would pressure her to change her religion. They were her friends. They quickly 
changed because of pressure from their parents,  the effects of religious extremism, the 
sudden and surprising effects of it.  There wasn't extremism before. Had all this extremism 
appeared in two or three years? What was it that meant all this extremism appeared? Her  
friends  that  had  been on trips  with  her,  that  used  to  laugh together.  There  wasn't  any 
religious discrimination and then the same students start saying “why don't you change 
your religion and become a Muslim? Why are you still Sabean?” She told her parents about 
this, she told my son. We had to take this kind of thing seriously. A girl at middle school.  
What was behind this? A student that says something like that, where does she get it from? 
From her parents, or possibly her neighbours. So we took it seriously.
The Sabeans are citizens of Iraq and could not be turned into foreigners by a change in the 
law as the Palestinians had been. But there was a perception that as non-Muslims, they were 
being  excluded  from the  new  Iraq.  Hadi  was  unhappy  with  the  new  constitution  which 
contains a paragraph declaring Iraq to  be “a state whose platform is  the Islamic religion. 
That's despite the presence of other religions.” He was referring to Article 2 which states that:
First: Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation: 
A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam 
B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy. 
C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this     
Constitution.
 But it also mentions Iraq's minorities: 
Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi 
people and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice of 
all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandaean Sabeans.20
20 http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf  
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For Hadi, the declaration that no law can be passed which contradicts Islam was enough for 
him to feel that the constitution had “cancelled the other”. He was uncomfortable with the 
dominant  position  given  to  Islam.   And  although  the  Mandaeans  and  other  non-Muslim 
groups in Iraq were constitutionally enshrined in the new Iraq, they experienced things very 
differently. Parliament has allocated eight seats for Iraq's minorities. The Shabak, Yazidis, and 
the Sabeans were allotted one each, the remaining five went  to Christians (Visser, 2010). 
Shaykh Rami was not hopeful: 
As for us being given some seats, what's the point of that, of having a seat if you can't 
actually make any decisions? What's the point if you don't have an opinion? We have an 
official in Baghdad province, he's director of religious endowments for the Sabean 
Mandaeans. We also have an ambassador and a representative in parliament. They hold 
positions in the state and they're supposed to be entitled to ask for any kind of rights. But 
they're not allowed to. They're only allowed to ask for personal entitlements, they're not 
allowed to ask for people's entitlements. It's impossible. That's a red line that you're not 
allowed to cross. You are just something cosmetic to show to international public opinion 
on satellite television. They want to show that the country doesn't discriminate.
The Sheikh had lost faith in the Iraqi state, believing that it was unable or unwilling to provide  
Mandaeans with security. Together with a Mandaean delegation, including Sheikh Al Sattar – 
the head of the sect – he went to Najaf to meet Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the highest Shia 
religious authority in Iraq. They asked for a fatwa – a religious ruling - to protect Mandaeans 
but Sistani refused each time, citing as the reason the need for a meeting of 25 religious 
scholars to issue a fatwa. The Sheikh described the closing exchange: 
Sheikh Al-Sattar said: “We’re being threatened by your people, by Shia political parties. 
Our sons are being killed and robbed by your people – your people are the reason. We’re 
asking for a fatwa from you. These are our rituals, this is our holy book. We are mentioned 
in the Quran. So why are we being killed and attacked like this?” Sistani replied: “I can’t 
issue you with that fatwa, so don’t embarrass me any more”. 
Hadi offered this analysis: 
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Sistani is a politician. He has a strategic agenda for the future, one that’s in the interest of 
religious parties. He wants to rid the country of all the non-Muslims, even the non-Shia 
groups, so that in the future they can declare Iraq to be an Islamic state on the model of 
Wilayet al-Faqih.21 The presence of religious minorities prevents them from doing this.
 It  is  not  clear what Sistani's  motivations were in refusing a  fatwa.  His website contains 
hundred of fatwas, public proclamations, and answers to questions. They seem to cover every 
aspect of life, from food preparation and prayers to the Iraqi Constitution and the situation of 
Palestinian refugees in Iraq. It is easy to see why the Sabeans were offended. Visser (2006) 
and Cole (2006) discuss the extent of Sistani's commitment to Wilayet al Faqih and popular 
sovereignty in a depth that there is not space for here. What is important is perception in the  
eyes of those who took the decision to leave Iraq and how they  understood Sistani and his 
refusal  to  make  a  strong  pronouncement  about  the  Sabeans.  Hadi  and  the  Shaykh  both 
believed  he  was  a  figure  powerful  enough  to  help  them.  After  the  rejection  they  had 
concluded Sistani was conspiring with Iran to turn Iraq into an Islamic state based on Wilayet  
al Faqih. 
Hadi spoke with the head of the sect before the meeting and made his position clear.  He 
desired clarity so that he could advise his community accurately. 
... I told him [Sattar] to ask for a fatwa and if he hesitates or doesn't give it then insist on a 
fatwa to declare that we are infidels. ... Whatever the outcome, I need that written down. I 
need it so I can tell people that that is what the Hujja22 of the Shias, the Muslims, that's 
what he believes. This is what Ali Sistani thinks about me. They obey him, they do what he 
says. If he doesn't believe that then he should say it so that I can know that I can no longer 
live in Iraq. If the Hujjat Al Islam doesn't accept me here, he thinks that we are infidels, 
then we have a problem with him. He won't ... let me live with his people, and that's why it 
is dangerous for Mandaeans to remain in Iraq. 
Sistani was correctly understood as a powerful figure of influence in the new Iraq but his 
21 Wilayet al Faqih means “the rule of the jurisprudent”. It is a model of Shia Islamic theocracy, currently used in 
Iran, which grants political power to the highest Shia clerical authority. Sistani is recognized as the highest 
authority and thus the system would, in theory, suit political ambitions he may harbour. The next highest 
authority is Khamenei, currently the Supreme Leader of Iran. 
22 Hujja or Hujjat Al Islam is a title given to Shia clerics of high authority. 
119
ability to make the Shia community obey his pronouncements was overestimated. The power 
of his rulings was overshadowed by Iraq turning into a state of violence. The Palestinian 
Ambassador to Iraq, Dalil Al Qusoos, is quoted as saying that despite meeting Shia figures 
like Sistani and Muqtada Al Sadr, the Sunni cleric Harith Al Dhaari, and Iraqi president Jalal 
Al Talabani, and them offering their genuine services to the Palestinians: “the exceptional 
circumstances were more powerful than any official initiative could be.”23 Hadi and Shaykh 
Rami never mentioned Sistani's  fatwa for the Palestinians but they knew enough about the 
range of rulings he issued on his website to feel shunned by the cleric. In looking for a leader 
whom they believed that Muslims would “obey” they were hoping would produce the same 
protective result for the Mandaeans as Saddam Hussein had in the past. I also think that Hadi's  
analysis - that there is a concerted effort to rid Iraq of its minorities – is also an example of 
meaning making, an effort to make sense of the acute and violently imposed changes to the 
Mandaeans'  status in Iraq since 2003.  It  is  what  Colin Davis24 says is “the need to make 
habitable  meanings  from uninhabitable  truths.”  This  interpretation  of  the  past  provides  a 
logical (and persuasive) framework through which to understand a past which is so intimately 
linked to the moment of the telling. The assessment that it is “dangerous for the Mandaeans to 
remain in Iraq” makes sense through this framework and justifies the projection of their future 
paths into a geographical space far removed from Iraq. It therefore also justifies the decision 
to be in Syria, however difficult the situation may be, waiting for the opportunity of refuge in 
a third country, as long as it is safe to do so.
Conclusion
The cases discussed in this chapter show the causative relationship between displacement and 
both state collapse and state transformation. The collapse of the Iraqi state in 2003 had direct 
implications for displacement. Security and public services disappeared with the state. This 
allowed criminality to flourish and also meant that specific groups of Iraqis could be targeted 
with impunity as part  of purges.  I  related the cases of high ranking administrators in the 
former regime and military officers who were directly preyed upon by the emerging new 
order. The institutions - such as Ministries and many public buildings - of the old Iraqi state 
collapsed and were looted. The bureaucracies and apparatuses may have been ransacked or 
destroyed  by  invading  armies,  but  the  occupiers  and  emerging  order  believed  that  the 
23 See http://www.paliraq.com/news.aspx?id=5451 
24 Davis (1991:302) quoted in Skultans (1998: 43).
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perceived embodied symbols of the former state had to be targeted in order to secure power. 
As Gardner notes, the powers of the state can be conceived as inseparable from the bodies of 
associated citizens (Gardner, 2012: 28). Former army officers and high-level administrators 
were obvious targets. The Palestinians of Iraq were subsequently attacked. They were also 
perceived as beneficiaries of the former regime, loyalists to it who could be targeted in ways 
potentially beneficial to agendas of statecraft. 
Among the Mandaeans I interviewed there is a strong belief that they have been excluded 
from Iraq. Other Iraqis in this chapter related experiences at the hands of occupying forces 
and the state itself, which suggest that exclusion is part of the process of reshaping the nation 
state. From 2003 intensive episodes of conflict in which rival groups attempted to seize state 
resources and to occupy the political spaces of the state have entailed the identification and 
exclusion of Iraqis formerly seen as part of the fabric of national society. The narratives here 
show that purging the old order not only means removing selected former employees but also 
removing symbols of the idea that Iraq was once a state tolerant of religious pluralism, and 
among such symbols are the religious minorities. The accounts from this chapter provide an 
indication of what it is like to experience first hand the consequences of transformations of 
state. Those affected have been part of political processes, ambitious and protracted in nature, 
in which entire social groups are targeted as part of agendas to create a new political order. 
These  processes  lead  to  disruptions  and  constraints  in  people's  daily  lives  which  create 
pressures to leave. In some cases the pressure is intense and violent to the extent that leads to 
abrupt  decisions  to  leave.  In other cases the  displacement process  is  as  protracted as  the 
process of abolishing the old order. In the more protracted cases, what has emerged so far is a  
pattern  whereby  individuals  and  families  experience  episodes  of  constraint  which  they 
attempt to adapt to, or episodes of intensifying threat which they attempt to evade, or both. 
The two can be intertwined and the process of threat can lead to an increase in the constraints 
on a person's ability to function in a valued way. As the threats accumulate, the aggregation of 
constraint can develop into a threat to survival. The choices become extremely limited, they 
become hard choices whereby all of the options are unpalatable but moving is the lesser of 
evils. 
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I also demonstrated the coercive effect of cumulative causation. Migration alters the context 
within which the  decisions  of  others to  leave are made – or  not.  The departure of  large  
numbers of people from Baghdad to the provinces altered the contexts in which remaining 
Iraqis made choices pertaining to migration. The context was perceived to be less secure as a 
result of large numbers of the city's residents leaving. This exerted pressure to leave on those 
who had not initially desired to leave but were coerced into it by an altered context which felt 
insecure. I discuss in more detail the coercive effects of cumulative causation in the next 
chapter. 
The experiences presented in this chapter also provided insights into the gendered nature of 
migration decisions. In all of the cases, the men were the principal decision makers. In Farah's 
case,  the adults  met to discuss whether to  leave Baghdad for rural  Iraq or not.  The men 
ignored the advice of the women and initially remained in Baghdad. In Anwar's situation, we 
heard how the women in his family decided to leave and spend time with relatives in Iraq's 
countryside. Because of gender roles, Anwar and his father had to remain in Baghdad. In the 
period before the invasion, many Iraqi men of military service age were called up by the state 
and therefore forbidden from leaving Iraq to escape the bombing. Anwar himself remained – 
as a young man he was expected to watch over their property, something the women in his 
family were not expected to do. In these cases men held the decision making powers but were 
also exposed to greater risk of harm.
Material resources play a role in mobility. Majeed was able to muster up the resources to 
leave Iraq but assumed it would only be temporary. Now he is stranded in Syria without the 
financial resources to return to Iraq or move to a third country of resettlement. We shall also  
see examples in the next chapters of the effects of material resources – or lack thereof – on 
mobility and the capacity to evade threat. 
We also saw glimpses of the different ways in which transformations of state manifested 
themselves as changed to the social relations in people's daily lives. Adnaan could no longer 
live  in  his  apartment  building  because  a  hostile  political  faction  had  set  up  office  there.  
Mohsin's  neighbourhood changed and  became a  hostile  space.  In  both  cases  the  changes 
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contributed to the decision to leave in a coercive way. It is this type of coercive transformation  
which forms the central subject of the next chapter where I show how these emerging threats 
constrained the lives of Iraqis.  Their  social  spaces were transformed in threatening ways: 
circumstances presented Iraqis with coercive proposals forcing them to adjust their lives and 
routines often in disruptive ways. In some cases the constraints accumulated to the point of a 
hard choice situation, forcing them into a decision to leave their homes, and in some cases 
Iraq altogether. 
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Chapter 5 
Coercive transformations of space and the 
emergence of the coercive landscape
Most of them said that they would be protected by the Mehdi Army. 
They would tell us that "you should feel lucky because you are 
protected, you have the Mehdi Army to protect you here."
Did you feel lucky?
No.
- Farah
In the previous chapter I presented the experiences of those who were directly targeted by the 
nascent Iraqi state. The subjects of this chapter were not threatened as part of a purge against 
perceived  symbols  or  embodiments  of  the  former  state.  However,  they  experienced 
threatening changes to their daily lives which were shaped by transformations taking place at 
the state level. These permutations affected their lives profoundly but were ones over which 
they had no control. Their environments changed in ways which presented them with coercive 
proposals – situations of constrained choices all of which left agents below valued baselines. 
Some of the subjects in this chapter were presented with hard choices – a set of proposals so 
unpalatable that  all  of  the few available choices led to  dire  straits.  For some,  the valued 
baseline was staying alive and was threatened by the re-ordering of their social world.1 By 
looking  at  the  experiences  of  Iraqis  in  this  chapter  through  the  conceptual  framework  I 
outlined in Chapter 1, the process of displacement can be more thoroughly understood.  
Here displacements took place inside what Harling (2011) describes as “a state of violence” - 
in distinction to a state of law.2 The post-invasion Iraqi state was unable to “provide peaceful 
mechanisms for addressing political conflicts, to form a common frame of reference, and to 
enforce its monopoly over the use and legitimization of violence” (Harling, 2011: 45). Three 
1 See Chapter 1, “Coercion: the missing concept”
2 See Chapter 3 and Harling (2011).
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interrelated  processes  conspired  to  create  this  situation  of  generalized  and  indistinct 
insecurity:  an  exclusionary  post-2003  political  process;  sectarian  differentiation;  and  the 
privatisation of violence: gangs, militias, mercenaries and insurgent groups filled the security 
vacuum caused by state collapse (Harling, 2011: 45-48). Intense violence in Baghdad was 
triggered by the bombing of the Al Askari shrine in Samarra in February 2006 - a holy Shia 
shrine. It peaked during 2006 and 2007 but its legacy continued to affect people's lives in the 
years afterwards. These characteristics were typical of many contemporary armed conflicts, 
what Kaldor (2012) refers to as “new wars”. In these conflicts, civilians are targeted by a 
range of armed state and non-state actors who typically make claims to power based upon 
identity labels. Forced population movements are standard tactics deployed by such groups. 
The aim is to homogenise populations on the basis of identity labels in order to exert greater  
control over them.3 
It was in this environment that many Iraqis found that their social world had been transformed 
into what I call a coercive landscape - one in which threats were perceived in a multitude of 
social spaces and which is likely to force migration. It refers to a social world in which threat 
diminishes choice as well as to the physical environment itself. In this chapter I focus on 
component  spaces  of  the  coercive  landscape.  I  refer  to  school,  work  and neighbourhood 
spaces as well as the routes to and from them. This is not of course an exhaustive list but 
draws attention to how threats can transform daily life and how agents adapt – sometimes 
with migration. When multiple spaces in daily life contain threats, agents can find themselves 
in a coercive landscape. In Chapter 6 I shall outline the emergence of a coercive landscape 
from the perspective of longitudinal case studies from members of Iraqi  minority groups. For 
now, the specific spaces remain the central focus of the chapter. I also explain the ways in 
which dynamics of cumulative causation (Douglas Massey, 1990) played a coercive role – 
both in forcing agents to move, and forcing them to remain. 
I use Doreen Massey's concept of space, understood as being constituted of social relations. 
These are never static but inherently dynamic. As with all social relations they are inevitably 
"imbued with power and meaning and symbolism" (Doreen Massey, 1994: 2-3). Displacement 
occurs  when  power  relations  within  them become  relations  of  subjugation  and  potential 
threat. It takes place in everyday life when spaces such as those of the school, the workplace, 
3 See Kaldor (2012) for further discussion of new wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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and neighbourhood become ones of insecurity, transformed in a way that puts people into 
increasing circumstances of constraint. I address displacement here as a process (Marfleet, 
2011:  281).  It  is  not  merely  expressed  through  migration  and  physical  relocation  is  not 
assumed to be its defining feature (Lubkemann, 2008: 454). Displacement also happens  in 
place  as a result of involuntary immobility (ibid.). Not everyone who wishes to relocate is 
able to do so in ways they deem acceptable, as Farah and Yousif's stories show.
In  understanding  the  decision  to  leave,  the  neighbourhood  is  a  crucial  space.  When  the 
integrity of this space is threatened or breached, it can add pressure to leave on the people 
living there. This integrity is subjective - its understanding varies among different groups. The 
growing presence of the sectarian Mehdi Army militia in a neighbourhood may have made 
some  impoverished  Shias  feel  protected  but  made  Christians  and  other  families  feel 
threatened. The experience of Farah is a poignant example that I shall present in this chapter. 
Another important space is the school, which for Raz, Jasim, and Baan became an area of 
danger, discrimination, or both. Lubkemann (2008: 470) identifies what he calls “key social 
life  projects”  that  are  highly consequential  in  relation  to  displacement.  Such projects  are 
crucial to the social well being of individuals; their disruption at an early stage can sabotage 
future social life projects. Disruption to high school education for these students would also 
potentially deny them a university education and thus with it their entry into the professional 
class. The appearance of threats in their educational spaces was not, in all cases, a key episode 
in their families' eventual decision to leave but it was an important part of the displacement 
process. 
Similarly, when threats appear in the space where a person works, what Sen (1999) refers to 
as the instrumental economic freedom to generate income can be disrupted - this too is a key 
part of the displacement process. For many Iraqis even the route to work became littered with 
threats.  These may have been checkpoints  controlled by hostile  militias:  at  the  height  of 
sectarian killings during 2006 and 2007 many Baghdad neighbourhoods were understood to 
be  off  limits  to  those  without  the  correct  identity  documents.  The route  to  work  can be 
changed but the place of work in  a climate of economic collapse and insecurity is  much 
harder to change. When Mehdi Army militia men came for Raz's father, it was a pressure the 
family  could  not  deflect,  despite  their  neighbourhood being  protected  by  the  Resistance. 
Knowing that the militia was seeking him out, the neighbourhood effectively became the only 
126
safe space for his father in the whole city and the family decided to leave Iraq altogether. 
I shall also note that a small number of Iraqi students that I interviewed have experienced 
what Lubkemann (2008: 456-457) has called “socially fortuitous wartime migration”. This is 
when a wartime relocation leads to an increase in social opportunities and empowerment. 
They were able to take advantage of a scholarship programme, based in Syria, to study in 
American universities. This was created after the military occupation to redress some of the 
enormous devastation wreaked upon the Iraqi education system by sanctions and invasion. 
Those lucky and able enough to succeed were to receive a better education than they could 
ever have had in Iraq. At the societal and national level of analysis however, the handful of 
students the programme has helped is not significant. Rather, it is fortuitous if the individual 
in particular, and perhaps the nuclear family, is the only unit of analysis. 
Threats in the school space
In the lawlessness of the state of violence that was Iraq after 2003 the school space was 
changed by military occupation and became laden with threats. Students risked being caught 
in fire-fights and parents risked the dangers of driving their children to school at a time when 
car bombs exploded daily. There were also threats to a student acquiring an education as 
sectarian  discrimination  entered  the  school  space,  which  in  Raz's  case  became a  site  of 
exclusion.  Raz  attended the  highly regarded  Baghdad College  High School.  It  had  large 
grounds and made a convenient place for American Army Humvees and Bradleys4 to use as a 
stationing point in between patrols. Luckily for Raz no one attacked the soldiers in his school 
but his journey to school increased from 30 minutes to 1hr and 15 minutes because of the 
direct effects of the occupation. As Raz said: "it was because of all the road blocks and the 
checkpoints, and of course the unexpected car bombs or fire fights." In Jasim's school in the 
Khadhraa district  of Baghdad the American Army stationed themselves in a police station 
nearby. There was a road bridge next to the school above a highway used by American Army 
vehicles, from which Resistance fighters would launch their attacks. Jasim was in the school 
field  playing  football  when  an  explosive  device  blew up  underneath  an  American  Army 
vehicle across the street twenty metres away. It shattered the school's windows and left him in 
4 The Humvee can be mounted with a rotating heavy machine gun, or missiles. 
http://www.army.mil/factfiles/equipment/wheeled/hmmwv.html  The Bradley is an armoured personnel 
carrier equipped with a 25mm chain gun cannon, a heavy machine gun, and anti-tank missiles. It can weigh 
upto 30 tonnes when fully loaded. http://www.army.mil/factfiles/equipment/tracked/bradley.html 
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shock for hours. His parents immediately transferred him to a different school in Mansour 
district. There was another explosion there on the very day they went to register Jasim: that 
was the decisive event which made his parents leave Iraq. As with other forced migrations, 
there were many events of displacement before it, as we shall see later in the chapter. 
Baan attended an all girls' school. By 2006 her teachers became afraid to speak openly about 
politics and any other subject matter that would highlight their sectarian identity. They feared 
being targeted. One day the school enforced a strict dress code - all the girls had to wear the 
hijaab, a headscarf which covered their hair, after the school received a threat. It was also in 
Khadraa, a "hot zone"5 where she said frequent clashes would occur between the American 
Army and different militias. She added that: "We had an indoor playground and we all had to 
stay on the ground. I remember there were bullet holes in some of the windows."  A girl 
survived after a stray bullet hit her leg. The frequent clashes and the growing danger from 
gunmen and explosions on the route to school led to her mother transferring her to an inferior 
school but one close to where they lived and out of the "hot zone". Baan's mother told me she 
had to drive along “The Road of Death” to get her to school. One day in May 2006 her mother 
and brother were lucky to escape the rotating canon fire from a Humvee vehicle as it chased a 
car full of armed men. Baan lived in Al Ghazaliya which itself became the site of intense 
fighting, a further reason why her family relocated to a different neighbourhood. We shall 
return to the rest of their displacement experience later. 
Teachers were targeted in many schools, putting pupils in danger of being shot in the crossfire  
and also depleting the teaching cadre in the school. In Farah's school some teachers were 
killed, including the principal, who was a replacement for another who had fled the country. 
Farah's history teacher was shot after being threatened and her teachers in general showed a 
similar fear to Baan's: they were afraid of saying anything which might draw attention to their 
sectarian identity.  In some classrooms power relations had been reversed.  In the  past the 
students were afraid of the teachers, authority figures who could fail them. In a climate of 
lawlessness the teachers feared the militia or political party to which the students may have 
been connected to. Sara explained that teachers were targeted for revenge by failed students. 
5 “Hot zone” is the term used by Iraqis to describe an area of intense armed conflict. In Arabic it is a mantaqa 
saakhina [ةنخاس ةقطنم].
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In Raz's school, teachers were required to have a Masters or PhD. This, he explained, made 
them into targets because of their status as intellectuals. His teachers began carrying pistols 
for self-defence; many teachers were killed in other schools in the city. In 2005, as the nascent 
state was beginning to assert its authority, his school space changed again and the power 
relations within the school changed too. Hizb Al Da'wa6 had taken control of the Ministry of 
Education and installed one of their people as Dean7 of Raz's school. Consequently all Sunni 
students from Anbar province in western Iraq, and from Al Adhamiya in Baghdad, were given 
unexpectedly poor grades that year. Some students from Al Adhamiya received a grade of 
zero even though a student could expect to get 10% for writing his name. Raz's family name 
indicated that he was a Sunni Arab with origins in western Iraq. The areas mentioned were all 
sites of resistance to the occupation and to the new political order in which Shia politicians 
with sectarian agendas dominated. The resistance in these areas consisted predominantly of 
Sunni Arabs and Raz understood this as a type of collective punishment. Raz was a high flyer 
in his school and had expected a grade average in the high 90 percentiles for his year six final  
exams,8 that determine which university a student can attend as well as the choice of degree 
subject. He was given a 76% average which meant that he had to attend a private university in 
Baghdad, considered inferior to state universities. It cost his father $1,400 in fees for the first 
year;  this was wasted as his family had to leave Iraq halfway through the academic year 
because of a threat to his father's life.
Not everyone was displaced by sectarian corruption and the collapse of order in schools. 
Some less talented students benefited - they were able to get high grades by taking exams in 
stronghold areas of sectarian militias, where militiamen could intimidate teachers, or install 
their people into positions of influence in schools. In fact, the reason Raz and others were so 
certain that they had done well in their exams was because students in the classroom had been 
helping each other and checking their answers. He told me that the teachers did nothing about  
it because by then militias were breaking into schools and allowing students of the same sect 
to cheat in exams: “This was happening all over Iraq. Our neighbour's niece, I was tutoring 
her English. She was miserable in English. ...  She goes and takes the test in Najaf. Her grade 
6 Hizb Al Da'wa is one of the exile parties that returned to Iraq after the occupation. They are a nominally Shia 
religious party with a sectarian agenda. They are backed by Iran. See Chapter 3.
7 In Raz's school, the head was referred to as the Dean.
8 I taught academic English to Raz in Damascus and believe he was not exaggerating on this point. 
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average was 98%.”9 
For  all  of  these  Iraqi  students,  the  changes  to  their  school  spaces  resulted  in  coercive 
proposals presented to them through coercive circumstances - the school spaces contained 
threats. For Baan and Jasim they were direct physical threats which meant that remaining in 
those schools to acquire an education entailed the risk of being injured or killed by a bomb or 
bullets. The choice presented to Baan was to remain in her superior school and risk fatal  
injury or move to an inferior but safer school. Her parents decided the latter was best as it also 
entailed less danger to life to get to it from their home. Jasim's parents chose to take him out 
of Iraq altogether as the dangers in his school space were the final episodes in a series of 
threatening experiences which I  discuss later.  His parents had already moved him from a 
different  school.  Raz  could  not  attend  the  university  of  his  choice  because  of  what  he 
understood clearly as communal discrimination against students with Sunni origins. Attending  
an inferior university was a threat to his educational and career prospects. These changes 
represent a part of the displacement process, an increase in constraints upon people's freedom 
to live in a way that they value.  
Threats in the work space
Threats also appeared in the work space and constrained people's economic freedoms. This 
was one of the pressures that affected Jasim's family before they left Iraq. His father was a 
doctor in Baghdad, working in the Yarmouk Hospital in the mornings and in his private clinic 
in the evenings. His clinic in Bayaa' district was open for 20 years before the Mehdi Army 
seized it in 2004 and has been closed ever since. Farah's father had to adapt after the store  
where he repaired and traded cars before 2003 was taken over by masked armed men. He 
opened a new business with a neighbour in Habibiya close to his home. Farah's family are 
Christians. In the building where her father's store was, it became the only business not run by 
a Shia Muslim. 
This woman came to my dad, she was trying to buy something. He told her the price but  
she wanted it for less. He told her to go, he wouldn't sell it at that price. She went and then  
9 As a Shia she was able to attain high grades in Najaf, a Shia shrine city which is under control of Shia 
political parties. Raz believed that everyone in Najaf and the Shia cities was receiving high grades whether 
they had earned them or not because of Hizb Al Da'wa's control of the Ministry of Education. 
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came back with two men, two armed men. They asked my dad "what's going on?" He had 
to sell it to her [at the lower price], he didn't say anything. 
Does that happen a lot?
That happened just once but it was a pretty clear message. 
His work space underwent a transformation that presented him with a coercive proposal and 
put him in a vulnerable position. If he wanted to continue generating income in this space, he 
would have to accept certain constraints. He could no longer operate as a trader on his own 
terms and it was clear that he may have to make similar concessions again in the future – he 
had no militiamen to protect him and had to avoid conflicts with such customers in the future 
with a  potential loss to  his  income. That  moment of  intimidation was part  of  a series of 
transformations to their social spaces that increased the vulnerability of Farah's family, and 
which I shall exposit later.
Danger appeared in Anwar's work space in south Baghdad in Dora. He ran a stall there from 
1997 to 2005 and was able to support his family and make modest savings. Dora was also an 
area of escalating conflict. There was an empty square behind his shop about 50 metres away 
from the main street. Once a place to play football, it became a dumping ground for corpses. 
He would pass by them each morning on his way to work. Anwar saw more and more corpses  
as the violence intensified. Worse still, a woman who ran a similar shop just 50 metres away 
was shot by a young man who calmly drove away. 
That was an incident that really made me afraid to stay in my work. I was thinking “are  
they going to kill shop owners now?” There was a time when they were killing the ice 
vendors. Then they started killing people who sold fruit and vegetables. 
Attacks  on  shopkeepers  were  not  unusual  in  the  city  as  militias  fought  for  control  over 
different  areas.  They  were  systematically  targeted  to  disrupt  the  social  fabric  of  a 
neighbourhood so that residents had to flee for lack of supplies (Harling, 2011: 50). This was 
another  tactic  common to new wars:  creating “an unfavourable  environment  for  all  those 
people it cannot control” (Kaldor, 2012: 104). Anwar decided to close his stall in 2005. We 
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shall  hear  more  from  him  later.  These  developments  constituted  a  general  threat  to 
shopkeepers in Dora. Circumstances presented them all with a coercive proposal: continue 
generating income in Dora and risk being assassinated, or cease generating income and risk 
poverty. Anwar chose to preserve his life.
Raz said his father had less time for deliberation in February 2007 when he received warning 
of an incoming threat in the workplace. It was a decisive moment in their decision to leave 
Iraq. They lived in a neighbourhood that was off-limits to the Mehdi Army militia as it was 
protected by Resistance fighters, unlike the predominantly Shia district where he worked as a 
cosmetics merchant. Raz's father received a tip-off from one of his concerned workers who 
belonged to the militia, phoning him to say: “Don't even bother closing up shop, just get in 
your car and drive as soon as possible, they're coming to kill you.” His father passed the 
militiamen on his way home but luckily they did not see him. 
So they weren't going to come and get him in his home. But the thing is the situation 
became unbearable  for  us  because  we couldn't  leave  the  city,  we couldn't  even move 
around the  city  comfortably.  Even if  our  relatives  wanted to  wire us  money,  that  was 
risking your life [going to collect it]. 
Suddenly Baghdad outside the confines of their protected neighbourhood was off-limits. After 
escaping a personal threat his father and family were now faced with unbearable coercive 
circumstances.  The  threats  from  generalized  violence  had  been  manageable  but  being 
confined to the neighbourhood because of the Mehdi Army was not. Two weeks later they left 
for Syria after intense deliberation. 
Other  neighbourhoods  in  Baghdad  did  not  offer  enough  security;  new  neighbours  were 
viewed with suspicion and fear during this period of intense violence in the city. This was true 
of other provinces in the country so leaving the city was not an option either. Like many 
Baghdadis,  Raz's  family  had  been  to  the  informal  camps  on  the  outskirts  of  the  city  to 
regularly donate blankets and food to refugees from the American assault on Fallujah. The 
conditions were miserable and they had no desire to  end up in a similar camp outside a 
different city. Baghdad offered no alternative source of income for the family at the time. The 
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freedom to generate  income disappeared  with freedom of  movement and personal  safety. 
Raz's  family  was  faced with  what  Wertheimer  (1987:  233)  describes  as  a  "hard  choice" 
situation. This occurs when a proposal is too unpalatable to accept but accepting it similarly 
leaves you in dire straits. The importance of the choice and the lack of scope for options 
makes it coercive (ibid.). Circumstances presented Raz's family with this type of coercive 
"hard choice". Remaining in Baghdad effectively meant being confined to a prison the size of 
their  neighbourhood,  and  with  no  instrumental  freedom to  generate  income.  Leaving  for 
another  neighbourhood was  no  remedy  as  none  were  more  secure  than  theirs.  Going  to 
another province provided no guarantees of economic or personal security. Leaving for Syria 
would put them into economic insecurity and forfeit Raz's year at university - but they would 
have personal safety. That was the hard choice they made: not unwilled, but against their will 
(Wertheimer 1987: 302).  We shall hear more about the pressures that affected them before 
their relocation later in the chapter.  
Coercive transformations of the neighbourhood space
Farah lived in Habibiya which bordered Sadr City, an impoverished, mostly Shia district in 
east Baghdad which was a stronghold of the Sadrists and their Mehdi Army militia.10 Many 
Christians lived in Habibiya but it was not an exclusively Christian district as Muslims lived 
there too.  Habibiya changed for Christians after 2003, but particularly after 2006 when the 
Mehdi Army began to run amok in Baghdad (Harling, 2011). Farah lived with her father, 
mother,  younger  sister,  younger  brother,  and  two  older  sisters.  Before  the  war  her 
neighbourhood  felt  safe.  She  was  allowed  to  walk  to  her  friend's  house  nearby 
unaccompanied, and to the local church for religious and other activities like piano lessons. 
But  as  the  Mehdi  Army's presence  there grew stronger,  so too  did  feelings  of  insecurity 
among the Christian population. She told me that many Christian families left Iraq and others 
moved to the predominantly Christian neighbourhood of Ghadeer. Shia families moved in to 
the neighbourhood.
Most of them said that they would be protected by the Mehdi Army. They would tell us 
that "you should feel lucky because you are protected, you have the Mehdi Army to protect 
you here."
10 See Chapter 3.
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Did you feel lucky?
No.
How did you feel about the changes in the neighbourhood?
It was scary. That's when we felt that our neighbourhood was different. My friends in other 
neighbourhoods, I mean it wasn't safe anywhere, but for them it was okay to go out and do 
things. But for us we should be extra careful, and even dress differently. Going to church, 
that changed, we didn't go a lot. 
The church reduced its activities and made a conscious decision to lower its profile and to 
persuade  its  congregation  to  do  the  same.  The  church  recognised  the  coercive  proposal 
evident in the transformations taking place in the neighbourhood. In the insecurity of living in 
a state of violence, the growing presence of Sadrists and the Mehdi Army took on a very 
threatening meaning. They understood that the circumstances required of them to persuade 
members of their congregation to adapt their behaviour to draw less attention to themselves, 
or risk the dangers of attention from the Mehdi Army. 
You said you started to dress differently as well?
Yes. Even when we go to church every Friday, we used to go and sometimes they would 
talk  to  us,  the  teachers  and  the  priests.  They  would  say  "You  should  dress  more 
conservatively because you live in this neighbourhood", and they would question what you 
are  doing:  "we don't  want  that,  don't  attract  any attention".  ...  We are  pretty  obvious, 
especially in that neighbourhood because everyone's wearing an abaaya and a veil.11
What other things did they advise you to do at the church?
The church was always afraid of something, they always wanted to keep quiet, not attract 
any attention, you know, live with these people until everything is calm. And they did a 
pretty good job of that.
This fear was absent before the war. The church was open to everyone, even Muslims would 
go and visit  during Christmas and holidays out of curiosity. Now the church has security 
guards in front of all the doors. Members of the Shia community asserted their dominance in 
11 The abaaya is the black clothing that many Shia women wear. 
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other ways which transformed the neighbourhood space. 
Even sometimes in Sunday mass ... people would be upset because it would be at the same 
time as the mosque, when they call their  azaan [for prayer]. It would be so loud that we 
couldn't hear anything [laughs]. It's okay, just let it go. 
The call to prayer had always been loud but Farah said: "it was only four loudspeakers, then it  
became six, and then ten. And now we have the [religious] speeches." These were broadcast 
almost daily and at a volume so loud that everyone in the neighbourhood heard.
 
The  church  was  deeply  fearful  for  its  congregation.  Kidnapping  was  rife  in  Baghdad, 
something that  affected all  Iraqis in  the city  but  Christians  felt  particularly vulnerable  in 
Habibiya.  The  Mehdi  Army  was  known  for  sustaining  itself  on  the  profits  of  criminal 
activities; armed robbery, extortion and kidnapping. It eventually began to exploit its own 
social  base -  the  local  Shia population  -  but  the first  targets were  Christians and Sunnis 
(Harling, 2011). The church wanted the congregation to avoid inviting attention to themselves 
and give the Mehdi Army an excuse to cause problems. The militia would enter people’s 
homes looking for alcohol, the consumption of which they had forbidden and would punish 
anyone caught possessing it.  
They would search people's houses for alcohol?
Yes, but with another excuse. Once on New Year's Eve they came. It was obviously the 
Mehdi Army. It was after 12. We were sitting and eating, but there wasn't any alcohol. 
They knew it was New Year's Eve and they knew that it was normal for Christians to have 
alcohol. They came and said, "we heard some shots from your roof and we need to check it 
out". They came inside, went upstairs I think, then went out.
That happened as her family welcomed 2007, almost a year into the Mehdi Army's attempted 
takeover of Baghdad (Harling, 2011). Farah had heard that some Muslims in Sadr City were 
tortured and killed after being caught drinking alcohol. She also heard that most alcohol shops 
in the area had closed. Her uncle had decided to close his alcohol store before any threats 
could come his way, and left for the north of Iraq.  The Mehdi Army intruded again in early 
2007. Three armed men came to the door asking Farah to let them in when her parents were 
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out. They had been chasing a man who they eventually caught in her garden, where they beat 
him and drove him away. When Farah's mother arrived and asked one of the armed men what 
was happening, he said "don't worry, we respect you, we are the Mehdi Army and we don't 
hurt Christians, we just want this guy". With the growing presence of the Mehdi Army in their 
spaces, Farah told me that her family "didn't go out very much and we didn't socialise with the 
neighbours after the war, so we didn't attract any attention for them to come every time there's 
something."12 The  family  were  vulnerable  and  attempted  to  leave  via  the  International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) resettlement program which had an office in Baghdad. Her 
father did not want  to take the risk of going to Jordan or Syria to  wait  for third country 
resettlement  via  the  UNHCR.  Their  relatives  had  unsuccessfully  attempted  to  do  so, 
expending their savings in the process. 
Others in the neighbourhood may have taken comfort from the presence of the Mehdi Army, 
but Farah's family did not, showing that threats are understood in subjective ways. The space 
around  them and  the  power  relations  and  meanings  within  it  had  changed  and  now felt 
threatening. The Mehdi Army were in charge and they felt confident enough to enter people's 
homes at will. Teachers and priests in the church recognised the possible dangers and asked 
the congregation to change its behaviour and reduce their visibility as much as they could 
until safer times. Farah described these changes as scary, everyone knew that the militia was 
capable of extreme brutality and would not be held to account for its actions in this lawless 
time - on what was now its own territory. The extra speakers and more frequent speeches 
coming from the local mosque were not just a constant reminder of the changes happening in 
their neighbourhood space but a part of it: they can be seen as an acoustic intrusion on their 
space. 
Yousif, a Christian resident of Baghdad, who was originally from a northern province, had 
relatives in Dora. Part of southern Baghdad, it became a site of intense conflict after 2003. 
Sectarianism was being expressed in a brutal conflict. Sunni armed groups had the upper hand 
and once they had purged the area of its Shia residents they turned on the Christians. The 
number of Christian families falling victim to kidnapping and murder at the hands of militias 
was on the rise. Threat letters were landing at their gates. His aunt's family decided to leave 
12 She's referring to any special Christian celebration where alcohol might be consumed. It would give the 
Mehdi Army an incentive to search a Christian house. If they found alcohol there, they could use it as an 
excuse to harass the family in potentially brutal ways.
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Dora before their turn came.   
You couldn't imagine it, your neighbour who you'd been living with side by side for 15 or 
20 years and then after a while you get a note. You would doubt it was him but then it 
would turn out to be him. You wouldn't know who really sent you the paper. You wouldn't 
ever imagine that the people from your neighbourhood would evict you. [My aunt's family] 
They heard about these things and thought “let's leave, let's try our luck, go elsewhere like 
our relatives have, and maybe we'll get there”. They left before that all started happening. 
They suffered in Syria. A lot of Christians left Dora after they did, after they suffered. We 
heard about a lot of awful things that happened to them there.
Yousif's immediate family became the last remaining members of his extended family in Iraq. 
The departure of Yousif's  relatives would impact  upon his nuclear family in  ways I  shall 
discuss later in the chapter. 
Raz lived in Yarmouk district, another part of Baghdad which became the site of conflict but 
was relatively secure because it was under control of the Resistance. This middle class part of 
Baghdad had a high number of senior military officers and high ranking regime officials. 
These groups, says Harling (2011: 54), had strong "connections to people and parts of the 
country  involved  in  the  insurgency",  and  because  of  political  considerations  had  fewer 
prospects  abroad  than other  middle  class  Iraqis.  It  "never  became an  epicentre  of  Sunni 
insurgent activity" but held out against the advances made by the Mehdi Army militia (ibid.). 
Raz explained that it was a confessionally mixed area in which all the families looked after 
each other. He and his neighbours took turns to guard the street at night, spending many 
nights on their flat-roofed homes holding rifles. They would shout at any suspicious activity 
or  sign  of  trouble  on  their  street  and  were  prepared  to  shoot  a  person  threatening  the 
neighbours. Crime and militia activity were the things that they were guarding against.13 The 
Resistance was focused on fighting the American military presence but came to regard the 
militias as enemies too – particularly the Mehdi Army. Residents of the neighbourhood shared  
the Resistance's animosity towards the Mehdi Army, its brutality was well  known. People 
from the neighbourhood could communicate with the Resistance as a member would be in the 
local mosque most of the time. 
13 The lines were blurred between these two activities.
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The Resistance could not offer full protection though, especially in 2006 after violence peaked 
in Baghdad. A stray bullet narrowly missed Raz while he was in his garden. One day he was 
close to his school when a group of men jumped out of a pick-up truck and riddled a house 
with bullets. Raz was caught in a fire-fight another day whilst out shopping with his mother, 
as he explained: "the police were involved, ... one of their cars burst into flames and we were 
right there in the middle of it. Luckily a family that was living nearby, they ... took us to their 
apartment which was 50 metres away from the whole thing." Daily explosions in Baghdad, 
stray bullets, firefights, rooftop guard duties became part of daily routine. His parents thought 
of leaving Iraq, temporarily perhaps, but did not make a permanent migration until his father 
was threatened. His mother had earlier taken Raz and his younger brother with her to visit 
relatives in Jordan and Syria to explore the possibilities. They spent two weeks in Jordan in 
the spring of 2005 and two months in Syria in the summer of 2006. During both visits his 
mother made inquiries of friends and relatives there about the cost of living. His family chose 
Syria because it was easier to enter and life was cheaper there and more similar to life in Iraq.
I noted earlier that Jasim's parents decided that they should leave Iraq after the explosions in 
Jasim's school spaces.14 But these were the final parts of a series of events leading to their 
forced migration. His father was a doctor in Baghdad, working in the Yarmouk Hospital in the 
mornings and in his private clinic in the evenings. His clinic in Bayaa' district was open for 
twenty years before the Mehdi Army seized it in 2004 and has been closed ever since. In their 
neighbourhood of  Hay Al  Jamia  there  was  a  huge  increase  in  crime.  Many doctors  and 
professors  lived  there;  abductions  of  children  for  ransoms  of  thousands  of  dollars  were 
frequent.15 News from neighbours and relatives reached them of kidnappers killing hostages 
even  after  receiving  a  ransom.  These  stories  were  circulating  in  the  city.  One  day  they 
experienced violence on their doorstep.
We had our car stolen from in front of our house. It was a sixteen year old kid and he was 
holding a gun. He came near my father and he told him to give him the keys and get out. ...  
It's okay if they steal the car. The thing with militias is not to get yourself killed, and not to 
make them angry during this process of stealing the car. 
14 See p.124.
15 Professional families can be expected to pay $50,000 for the release of a child with no guarantee the child 
will be released alive.
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People gradually began to leave his neighbourhood after 2003, but then more rapidly after 
2006. There was no neighbourhood defence force similar to Raz's. This was typical of the 
middle class neighbourhoods that were a defining feature of Baghdad, as Harling comments. 
They were inhabited by a state-employed bourgeoisie "prone to emigrate rather than join the 
fight" (Harling, 2011: 55-56).  In Jasim's case we can ask how much of a primary issue the 
integrity of the neighbourhood is in the decision to move. His parents remained even though 
its integrity was breached: their car was stolen at gunpoint on their doorstep. Perhaps because 
the culprit desired only the car the danger felt manageable. Threats in the neighbourhood were 
manageable in this case because they were not read as personal threats to family members. It 
was when school spaces became places of lethal danger that they eventually decided to leave. 
The explosions in Jasim's school compounded earlier pressures and the family relocated to 
Syria. Their move was intended to be temporary. But after his father died, after his other sister 
left a continuously deteriorating  security situation in Baghdad, little remained that connected 
his family to Iraq. I shall say more about that later. Jasim's family had adapted to the coercive 
proposals  which  were  presented  to  them  by  the  transformations  to  their  social  spaces. 
Remaining  in  Iraq  meant  enduring  the  threat  from  robberies  in  the  neighbourhood  and 
evading the threat of kidnapping – Jasim was not allowed to go anywhere unaccompanied 
while he was in Iraq.  These were threat-evasion strategies which they could endure. But the 
explosion in Jasim's second school represented an episode of threat which they could not 
endure. The school space had shown itself to be potentially lethal and it was a risk they did 
not wish to take. 
Anwar's neighbourhood was another affected by the Mehdi Army. The potential threats in his 
work space came as undesirable changes were taking place in his neighbourhood.
After  the  war  …  Shias,  some of  them started  to  sell  CDs,  containing  Husseiniyaat,  
lamentations and readings about Al Hussein. … That was banned under Saddam.
You mean like a basta [street stall] in front of the house?
There was a street behind our house, it was the main street. On that street there was a big 
stall in front of a shop. He'd have all the CDs out on display, with the  Husseiniyaat on 
them. 
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People  from  the  area  pooled  their  resources  together  to  build  a  Husseiniya16 in  the 
neighbourhood on empty land belonging to the state. Locals would contribute financially and 
young men would give their labour. That began in May 2003. Anwar said that after that the 
young men began to gather in large groups, around the CD sellers and the Husseiniya: “They 
were  quite  insular  and  were  gradually  affected  by  the  growing  religious  activity  in  the 
neighbourhood.” 
By 2005 the Husseiniya had a dome and there were frequent gatherings there. In the growing 
climate of sectarian politics the new Husseiniya became a site of sectarian segregation. “They 
started becoming more separate from the Sunnis. ... One was becoming extreme and the other 
was  becoming  extreme  too.”  Anwar  was  from  a  Shia  family  who  maintained  friendly 
relations with  all  of  their  neighbours  but  some people were different.  It  was  common in 
Baghdad for a family to cook and distribute food to neighbours and passers by on days of 
religious significance. But some people began using it as an excuse to impose upon their 
neighbours:
They might knock on their neighbour's door and demand a hose pipe for water and draw 
water from the neighbour's house. Or they might demand a large pot from them. If he was 
Sunni and would say that he didn't  want to give it  to him, then that would become a 
problem for him. People started asking for more than they were entitled to [from their  
neighbours].  
Sectarianism was growing. He believed it was present in 2005 but less severe and less visible. 
After the bombing of the Al Askari shrine in 2006 it plagued the city, expressed in extremely 
violent forms. Identity killings became daily occurrences: people were being killed on the 
basis of their perceived confessional identity. Two of his Sunni friends were shot in the street 
on their way to work by masked men. Anwar avoided spending a lot of time with the young 
men who gathered in his neighbourhood: “I was afraid to spend time outside with the people 
there because I didn't want to be carried away by those Shia – well let's not say Shia, I mean 
the fanatics who were meeting up on the street who were stirring up sectarianism.”  Many 
Sunnis  he  knew  were  killed  and  others  departed  after  receiving  threat  letters.  The 
16 A Shia mosque and community centre.
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neighbourhood became exclusively Shia and Anwar disliked the prevalent sectarianism.
I don't want that, I want a mixed area, I want my friends with me, the ones that I know, 
Sunnis and Shias, Christians. They were all my friends, I didn't want them to leave the 
neighbourhood  and  I  didn't  want  to  be  with  the  militia  that  had  taken  control  of  the 
neighbourhood. 
The militia was the Mehdi Army. Anwar recognised its local members as the crooks and 
thieves  of  the  area  who  had  “nothing  to  do  with  religion”.  Some  were  known  in  the 
neighbourhood as being amongst the petty criminals released by Saddam shortly before the 
invasion. 
He decided to leave Iraq in 2006, temporarily for safety reasons. His parents exerted pressure 
on him fearing that he would speak out against the activities of the militia men one day and be 
killed. The family understood this as a coercive proposal: remain together in Baghdad and 
potentially risk Anwar's death, or separate but be assured of Anwar's safety. From 2003 to 
2005,  Anwar  had not  stepped outside  his  front  gate  in  Baghdad after  10pm. There  were 
curfews, there was no electricity or street lighting, and gunfire and explosions peppered the 
city's acoustic and physical landscape. In 2005 he made a short trip to Jordan. It changed his 
perspective on what life could be like with functioning public services and security, it changed 
his perception of a key baseline. 
You would be thinking about how to invest your time in Jordan [instead of about electricity 
and water]. That was the comparison that I was always making. Two months after that, I 
decided I was going to leave Iraq, but not [to register] as a refugee. 
He made a second trip to Amman in 2006 and worked for a decorating company which taught 
him new skills and offered him long term employment. The Jordanian government ended 
Anwar's economic opportunities with immigration restrictions that had negative implications 
for Iraqis.  He had become accustomed to living in  a secure environment  by this time so 
decided to leave for Syria which, at the time, was giving visas easily to Iraqis. Anwar made a 
short visit to Baghdad in October 2008. He had heard that security had improved, that even 
some of the displaced Sunni families had returned. But he left after ten days because the same 
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militiamen were there: “At any point it could ignite again. … It's true that there wasn't any 
violence but sectarianism was there.” He deliberated about what to do next and calculated that 
leaving Iraq was the best option.  
Anwar's economic position had improved six months after the invasion but the increasing 
potential threats to his life where he lived and worked proved to be more powerful factors in 
his decision to leave than increasing his financial resources. Those spaces were transformed 
and contained threats. The social relations changed into ones of domination and subjugation: 
Shias were infringing on the rights of their Sunni neighbours. Anwar's baselines of being alive 
and  achieving  his  simple  ambitions  in  a  non-sectarian  environment  were  threatened. 
Circumstances in  Baghdad exerted serious coercive pressures:  remaining would mean the 
possibility of being murdered at work or closer to home. If he did stay alive he would be 
financially safe and able to achieve his simple material goals but in a sectarian environment 
that he found distasteful.  After visiting Amman an important baseline changed: it  was no 
longer just about personal safety and simple ambitions. He wanted the freedom to invest his 
time in productive and enjoyable ways, something he could not do in a sectarian Iraq with  
poor  security  and  public  services.  Remaining  in  Iraq  meant  remaining  below  the  new 
baseline, leading him to the conclusion that Iraq was no longer a place where he could live in 
a way that he valued.
Maher was a student in the Fine Arts department at Baghdad University when the invasion 
happened. He lived with his parents who were government employees, members of the Iraqi 
middle class that lost the most during the UN embargo: they found it hard to provide for their 
three sons. He would make small amounts of cash selling paintings to the small contingent of 
foreigners present in Baghdad at the time, and to Iraqis of the diaspora visiting their relatives. 
Each would sell for between $20-25. 
After the occupation began in 2003, Maher said: “You could always feel that there was a kind 
of wave of dust in the sky. It was because of the movement of the helicopters, the movements 
of the tanks, of the army. The roads were ruined because of the weight of the heavy weaponry 
that used them.” Traffic increased exponentially as new cars could now be imported and the 
streets near where he lived felt more crowded with cars.  In his neighbourhood, American 
forces set  up a  base in a compound that belonged to one of the former regime's  security 
142
services: “It was an area where people used to say that whoever entered it would never leave.” 
Helicopters would regularly take off and land there, flying low above the houses. “The sound 
they  made was  very  unpleasant  for  the  whole  neighbourhood,  the  sound  of  the  military 
helicopters and vehicles. These noises weren't present in the past.”
The base in fact provided him with a brief period of economic opportunity. His parents were 
out of work in the immediate period after the occupation when no salaries or pensions were 
being paid to government employees. He had sold few paintings: there had been no foreigners 
in the country for some time as they had evacuated before the invasion; diaspora Iraqis also 
stayed away.  One day an American soldier asked Maher about the paintings in his hands and 
offered to buy them. Maher realised he could sell paintings to soldiers at the local base. It was 
in the midst of the neighbourhood meaning that Maher could use his English to speak to them 
in the early days of the occupation. With the help of one particular soldier, who he suspected 
of profiting from the exchange, Maher began selling paintings for $50 each, delivering them 
through a basket lowered on a rope from the watchtower. Maher would paint portraits based 
on the photographs that soldiers gave him and they soon invited him into the base. 
It was a big change, the people who used to be there were Iraqi security forces. ... For it to 
become a place full of American soldiers playing basketball and building a swimming pool 
for themselves, it was a strange thing.
He was earning $300 during many busy weeks but he declined invitations to work inside the 
base. But as the occupation went on and American forces were under increasing attack from 
Resistance fighters, the personnel in the base changed and the soldiers became hostile. “Some 
of them didn't want to talk to me at all. On a few occasions a soldier pointed his rifle at my  
face.” The building itself  changed too as  they added sand crates  and barbed wire to  the 
perimeter. 
I used to go twice a week, in 2003 and in early 2004. … Later they were always carrying 
their weapons ready to fire. … I stopped going as often, I would only go at certain times, 
like in the morning.
The  social  relations  changed  with  the  personnel  and  the  increasing  insecurity.  The  base 
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became a hostile space, a space of threat and not social and economic opportunity. By that  
time armed groups were killing people for the slightest association with American forces, 
labelling them as collaborators. From mid 2004 to the beginning of 2005, he only went two or 
three times and took a small amount of work.   
But the American army was not the only group to affect change to his local space. Regime 
change left  another empty space in his  neighbourhood, a military base that was filled by 
strangers to the area. 
One day it was a military camp with a large wall, you couldn't see what was inside. Then in  
the space of an evening, the wall came down and lots of people came and erected buildings 
there. … The building method was very poor and disorganised. You could see that there 
were a large number of families living in small spaces. You felt that an ugly piece had 
appeared in the neighbourhood. I mean ugly in an aesthetic way because of the buildings, I 
don't mean in a social way. It felt like the neighbourhood had become two and one was 
built badly not safely, and in an ugly and disorganised fashion.
But  the  architectural  change  was  a  symptom  of  the  social  transformation  of  the 
neighbourhood. Most of the residents where he lived were university educated but Maher 
believed that the new neighbours “hadn't been to school”.
Crime was very low, security was very high [before they moved in, but afterwards] … 
there was more crime in the area, the people who lived there became afraid. 
What kind of crimes? Theft? 
Theft,  in  the  beginning.  There would  be  theft  and then people  started  firing  weapons 
randomly into the sky. People started walking in large groups, not gangs, but almost like 
gangs. 
He did not know the real origins of his new neighbours. He heard from some that they were 
from outside Baghdad, that they were families that had nowhere to live. “Some people said 
that they were families who had been victims of violence in the past, marginalised people.” 
Maher explained that in the climate of insecurity that engulfed Baghdad, this fear of the other 
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led to many old residents selling their homes. Iraqis liked to build close relations with their 
neighbours. 
When you live in a house and you've known your neighbours for ten, 20, or even 30 
years, you feel safe. Why? Because you don't feel that your neighbour is going to 
turn out to be someone harmful. But later you would be living in the area and not  
know the people around you, so you would be afraid. It would add to the sense of 
fear, in addition to the fear from the security situation. 
These changes in the neighbourhood space combined with three episodes of violence and 
coerced Maher into leaving. The first took place on a taxi ride. A man in the car in front got  
out and fired two bullets at the taxi. Afterwards Maher wondered: “Was it now this easy to 
lose your life? If I had just had my face turned one way or another way then I might have  
been killed.” The second incident happened just before dusk in the busy shopping district of 
Karraada. Maher told me it was among the safest areas in Baghdad at the time but he and a 
group  of  friends  were  all  robbed  at  gunpoint  and  his  friend  kidnapped.  These  incidents 
appeared to be random acts of violence of which he found it difficult to make sense. They had 
the effect of increasing his sense of insecurity as he now carried with him the sense that every 
taxi ride and shopping trip could result in a repeat of the above. The random nature of the  
incidents meant that he could still tolerate living in Baghdad but he now perceived a coercive 
proposal in each journey he made in the city: make the journey and risk exposure to shootings 
and robberies, or remain immobile to avoid this risk. There was already a similar coercive 
proposal that Baghdadis had to consider with each journey they took across the city because 
of the high number of car bombs and gun fights in the streets. But because of these incidents 
above, this proposal took on a more intense meaning for Maher. 
The third violent episode was decisive and put Maher in a hard choice situation. It took place 
after Maher's close friend was attacked in his own shop, which was next to the new settlement 
in the neighbourhood. Some unknown men had come to the store and told him to close it early 
instead of at 10pm. The next morning his shop had been damaged by an explosion set in the 
road. Maher's friend was convinced that it was the men who visited him the day before, he 
knew they lived in the new settlement. Maher didn't trust the police so he tried to report the 
incident to the soldier manning a watchtower at the local American base. “I wanted them to 
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arrest that group so that the neighbourhood would be secure again. But they didn't want to 
hear anything so I went home.” The next day he received a threat letter which said: “Leave 
your work with the pigs or your life will leave you”. But there was no group named on it so 
he thought it was a prank. The following day news arrived that his friend had been killed: men 
had  fired  bullets  at  the  store.  Another  friend  was  present;  he  survived  to  warn  that  the 
attackers had asked about Maher by name. As well as dealing with the tragic loss of a friend, 
Maher now realised that the threat letter was not a joke. He moved to his paternal aunt's house 
elsewhere in the city, hoping that he could eventually return home. Unknown men frequently 
inquired about Maher at his parents' house and one day wrote the phrase His blood is spilled 
on the gate of their house. After seeing the writing on their gate his mother phoned Maher and  
urged him to leave Baghdad as soon as possible. The threat letter put him in a hard choice  
situation. He could leave for an uncertain future in Syria, not knowing if he would see his 
parents again, or remain a prisoner in his aunt's home and face the real possibility of being 
killed. Maher chose Syria and left with his wife. 
We heard earlier from Baan about threats and conflict in her school space. Her parents moved 
her to a school in a different district of Baghdad, closer to where they lived after deciding to  
leave their home of 25 years in Al Ghazaliya. Ghazaliya itself had become a “hot zone”. This 
was a confessionally mixed, sprawling residential area on the western fringe of the capital. It  
was built on land distributed in the 1960s and 1970s to government employees, including 
army officers (Harling, 2011: 53). Ghazaliya contained migrants from Anbar province, west of 
Baghdad. After 2004, the link between Ghazaliya and Anbar increased with the influx of 
refugees  from  heavy  American  Army  counter  insurgency  operations  there.  It  became 
progressively fused with Anbar province, from where resources flowed to hold off attempts by 
the Sadrists to purge the area (ibid.). Al Ghazaliya was adjacent to Shu'la, an impoverished 
and mostly Shia neighbourhood that was a Sadrist and Mehdi Army stronghold: from 2006 
there were regular  exchanges  of mortar  fire  between armed groups from both  areas.  Um 
Ahmed told me that one landed on a neighbour's  house,  killing a child and maiming the 
mother.  These  were  coercive  circumstances  which  directed  a  general  sense  of  threat, 
indiscriminately,  towards  all  the residents of  Ghazaliya.  No house was safe from mortars 
being fired at densely populated urban areas. Remaining in Ghazaliya now carried this risk 
with it.
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She and her family felt increasingly vulnerable in the neighbourhood. They were Shias in a 
mixed area where Sunni militants were gaining the upper hand. Mortars did not discriminate, 
but Abu Omar Al Baghdadi's militia did. They were part of Al Qaida in Iraq – they loathed 
Shias and posted anti-Shia slogans and threats in the neighbourhood. The hostility in  the 
neighbourhood space intensified. 
Wherever we'd go, we'd see posters on the walls: “Get out you dissenters” They called us 
Shias dissenters.17 “Get out you infidels” and I don't know what else, “whoever stays will 
have their house burned down”. That would be on the streets. Underneath it would say Abu 
Omar  Al  Baghdadi's  Brigade.  We felt  afraid seeing  these  things  written  on  the  walls. 
Wherever you'd go, you could see them. 
This constituted a general threat to Shias living in Ghazaliya. These posters took on added 
meaning in a state of violence – they were threats that had been carried out against Shia 
families already. The pressures on Um Ahmed's family were growing. One day, armed men 
boarded Baan's school bus and threatened to take her away because she was the only girl not 
wearing a headscarf. She tried to cover it with the curtain of the bus window. The driver 
begged the men not to take her, kissing the hand of one until he agreed not to take Baan away. 
She escaped that time but she would often see armed men hiding in the side streets on her  
way home from school. Her older brother Ahmed would be out on the street in the evenings 
with his friends and would observe the events around them. One day Ahmed saw a family 
gunned down in their car. At night, armed men would ask Ahmed and his friends why they 
weren't carrying rifles: “People from Shu'la are coming to get you”. It was unclear who these 
armed men were – they may have belonged to Al Qaida and may have been responsible for 
the anti-Shia slogans. What was clear was that their visible activities added to the coercive 
proposals already presented to her family on account of their living in a “hot zone”. Living in 
Al Ghazaliya posed a risk to her children of being accosted by armed men.
Um Ahmed was becoming more and more anxious about remaining in Ghazaliya and wanted 
the family to leave on their own terms. Despite being a strong and independent woman, she 
could not persuade her husband to agree. The actions of a sinister neighbour would change 
that. Abu Fareed didn't like Shias yet he would visit Um Ahmed's house. Baan told me that: 
17 Dissenters in the sense that the Shias are accused of being heretics, rejecting the example of Sunni Islam. 
147
He didn't want Shia families on the street, … But he used to like my Dad ... and he used to 
say: “You're different, you're not very Shia”. 
Abu Fareed felt differently about another Shia family on the street who originally hailed from 
Najaf in southern Iraq. One night, one of Ahmed's friends saw Abu Fareed place a note at 
their house. When they quickly fled it was clear he had dropped them a threat letter. The 
family returned only for him to place another. After the second letter they did not return. From 
July 2006 the Shia families on their street were leaving one by one. Ahmed and his friends 
listened as news would come of each family's departure, presumably after receiving a threat 
letter or feeling coerced in another way. They did not know if Abu Fareed had a role in each 
incident. Baan's father, Hesham, did not believe there was good enough reason for them to 
leave Ghazaliya until December 2006 when they became the last remaining Shia family on 
the street. Um Ahmed had wanted them to leave sooner - she feared receiving a threat and 
having no control of their move elsewhere – but her husband resisted. Once he had agreed, 
she and her son began loading the car with their belongings. They did this in secret to avoid 
drawing attention to themselves and their imminent move. Hesham would then drive Baan to 
school in the morning and then go to his parents' home and unload the car. Ahmed had heard 
of a Shia family whose belongings were torched as they moved out of the area. Within ten 
days they had transferred all but  the largest  pieces of furniture and kitchen appliances to 
Hesham's relatives' home in a less violent part of Baghdad. 
Hesham perceived  the situation differently to Um Ahmed – she understood that they were in 
a hard choice situation before he did. In fact she told me that they may not have moved at all 
– without receiving a direct threat – had it not been for her own efforts. Her husband was not 
present when I interviewed Um Ahmed but I sensed he was part of what  Langellier (2001: 
174) refers to as the “ghostly audience” -  the story was being told for his benefit as much as 
mine, she wanted him to appreciate how much she had done to remove their family from the 
imminent dangers in Ghazaliya. To her the hard choice was clear: remain in their home and 
face the danger of mortar fire, armed men, and the risk of having to abandon their home and 
belongings abruptly should a militia threaten them – or leave their home in a manner closer to 
their choosing, even if it entails uncertainty in another neighbourhood in Baghdad. This hard 
choice  situation  was  imposed  on  Um  Ahmed's  perception  of  events  after  a  process  of 
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intensifying threats and constraints, each one adding to the pressure to move – certainly in the 
eyes of Um Ahmed.18 
Shortly after they left Ghazaliya, they went to Syria for a few months. Baan's older sister, 
Belsem,  needed  complicated  surgery  on  her  spine.  The  flight  of  doctors  and  the  steep 
deterioration in the healthcare system led her to Syria where the Red Crescent also helped pay 
for the operation.19 This was another type of displacement resulting from the invasion's death 
blow to Iraq's health care infrastructure after years of deterioration under sanctions. Belsem 
could not find the healthcare she needed in Iraq. Baan accompanied her mother and sister to  
Syria. After the family returned to Iraq, Um Ahmed wanted them to have their own place to 
live.  To  avoid  the  risks  associated  with  making  long  journeys  in  the  city  she  rented  an 
apartment in a relatively secure Sunni neighbourhood close to the school where she taught, 
but where Shias still lived.  When they moved in Um Ahmed was with her sister who made 
sure to speak in Mosul dialect in earshot of the new neighbours to give the impression that  
they were Sunnis. She also told me that their family name was commonly associated with 
Sunnis and that her ID card showed her city of birth in Mosul province. 
Twice police  raided their  house in  Ghazaliya  while  it  was  empty as  a  law was imposed 
stipulating that a house should not remain empty lest terrorists use it to cache explosives. 
They rented it out at $100 a month to avoid further raids. Their new apartment cost $470 a  
month so their relocation was coming at an expense of $370 a month, adding financial burden 
to their displacement. Another law stipulated that any one moving furniture out of a house had  
to acquire a permit to prove they were the owners and not looters. The neighbours were very 
supportive. Not only had they acted as witnesses at the police station where Um Ahmed got 
the permit, but they had twice prevented armed men from taking over her house when it was 
empty. 
They brought my neighbours out of the house at gun point and questioned them about our 
house. “We heard that house belongs to Shias.” They told them it didn't, it belonged to 
Sunnis but they'd gone away and they'd be coming back. 
18 I did not interview her husband but his view of events would have been very interesting.
19 I met other Iraqis who had come to Damascus for treatment. Farah's mother had surgery on her spine in the 
same hospital in 2010. I met an Iraqi woman who came to Syria for fertility treatment. I was also surprised to 
learn that a man living in the Kurdish controlled areas had stocked up on medicine while visiting his brother in 
Syria because he no longer trusted the quality controls of medicine in Iraq. 
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As the number of forced relocations grew some people devised house swapping strategies for 
protection. 
For example, there’s a part of Ghazaliya that’s all Shia because it’s close to Shu’la, and a  
part  that’s all Sunni – the part  where we lived. Some people started swapping houses. 
People understood each other’s situation. It wasn’t what people wanted. … For example, 
Shias living in a Sunni area, if they’d been forced out of their home, they might go to a 
Sunni house in the Shia part of Ghazaliya and say: “Look, we’re Shias we’ll stay in your 
house, you’re Sunnis, you stay in our house. We’ll protect your house, you protect ours.” 
Baan is now studying in the United States but her family remain in Baghdad, displaced in 
place. She told me that they never left because of the potential economic risk. Her father 
collects a state pension but as it is not enough to sustain her parents, her mother's income 
from teaching is needed. Their house in Ghazaliya is now empty and they are considering 
selling it to build a house in a different part of Baghdad or buy an apartment in Jordan or 
Lebanon. Um Ahmed told me that she was losing her patience with the tribulations of daily 
life in Iraq, fed up of seven years without a regular electricity supply. She and her husband 
had both spent time living in Syria with Baan as she prepared for her scholarship application. 
They had grown used to a secure environment with adequate public services. Circumstances 
require of them that they lie about their religious affiliation, and that is clearly not a desirable 
situation for them. 
Threats in the neighbourhood accumulated and coerced the family to leave. Um Ahmed was 
the driving force in the decision to leave but her husband had the final say. They did not start 
packing their belongings until he had agreed to it. The neighbourhood became a hostile space.  
The social relations changed. Sectarian slogans notified the Shias that there was an armed 
group in the  neighbourhood actively working to  expel or  kill  them. One neighbour,  Abu 
Fareed, had threatened another Shia family, even though he had no bad feeling towards their 
own household.  Not all  of the relations changed and became hostile but the activities of 
militias overruled the work of their unarmed neighbours. Mortars were falling in the street 
close  by  and one  by one  Shia  families  left  the  street  until  they were  the  last  ones.  The  
decisions of others to leave before them added to their growing feelings of insecurity. They 
150
assumed they would eventually be threatened and wanted to have more control of their move 
to another neighbourhood in order to protect their belongings. As the pressure increased, they 
were faced with a hard choice of little scope. Remaining came with the risk of death of a  
family member, and the chance that they would be expelled from the neighbourhood with 
little time to take their belongings. Leaving would give them more control of the move, and  
lessen the dangers to family members, but leave them in an uncertain situation. They decided 
to leave - a financially burdensome decision but better than losing a relative. 
In the desert  of western Iraq,  about  30km from the city of Fallujah,  lies a  mujamma' - a 
residential compound that once housed workers from three nearby military industrial projects. 
Bessaam's father was a mechanical engineer who worked on missile design and construction 
and lived in the compound. Its modern housing had a 24 hour electricity supply, unlike the rest  
of Iraq before 2003. The military project where his father worked was 10km away from the 
confessionally mixed mujamma'. Bessaam's father had worked there for over 15 years and was 
thus entitled to ownership of the apartment where they lived. There were three residential 
blocks in the compound and in the centre was a mosque and a market. A ditch and fence 
separated the compound from the rest of the desert and there were armed guards at the only 
entrance point. Due to the sensitive nature of the work, entry to the compound was restricted 
and tightly controlled even for visiting relatives. Nomads from the surrounding desert were 
forbidden from entering to buy or to sell their goods. Before 2003 this self-contained modern 
settlement in the desert was safe and secure. Afterwards it underwent immense transformation.
Bessaam explained that for the nomads and for lower grade workers in the compound, the war 
and collapse of the state represented an opportunity to seize properties for themselves. He 
believed that sectarianism was used as a cover by these "outsiders" to steal homes and cars 
inside the  mujamma'.  The American army was not interested in providing security for this 
modern  village  in  the  desert,  only  in  extracting  information  from  the  military  projects' 
directors who were never seen again after being taken away by American soldiers. After the 
CPA abolished the Iraqi police force as part of the purge of the former regime20, the residents 
of  the  mujamma'  formed  their  own  security  patrols,  much  like  in  Raz's  neighbourhood. 
Fortunately there were no immediate confrontations.  The problems began when the police 
were reformed. The vetting was poor, as it was with police recruitment across the country 
20 See Chapter 3.
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after 2003 (Harling, 2011) and Bessaam blamed the security problems on the new recruits. 
The police, he said, were conniving with gangs to steal the new cars coming into the country 
after 2003.
Police collusion in car theft became clear after the whole local police department was arrested 
by the Fallujah province police, the  baladiya,  early in 2004. New recruits were brought in, 
many from outside the  mujamma'. Security improved a little but the compound was still a 
coveted prize in the desert. One day seven young police officers were killed at the security 
gate  by  gunmen.  Bessaam  argued  that  it  was  not  a  political  incident,  it  was:  “about 
controlling, taking control. It was part of the plan to take control of the houses there.” The 
deteriorating  security  situation  in  the  mujamma'  issued  a  coercive  proposal  to  all  of  its 
residents: remain at the risk of armed robbery, or abandon their homes to face uncertain living 
conditions elsewhere.
This plan included the use of exemplary sectarian violence to vacate properties where Shia 
residents lived whilst sending a clear message of threat to Shias who remained. One day an 
announcement telling Shia residents to leave within 48 hours was made with the loudspeakers 
of the mosque. The announcers had killed the minister of the mosque for refusing to make the 
announcement himself and three Shia men were killed the same day. This act of exemplary 
violence was an explicit coercive proposal directed at all the residents of Shia origins, and 
implicitly at any others who did not cooperate with the armed men making intrusions into the 
compound. This happened in early 2004. Some residents had nowhere to go and remained. 
Bessaam's family soon left the mujamma' . In addition to the threat announced to all the Shias, 
his father received a personal threat to his family. Men claiming to be from the Resistance 
asked his father to build a missile launching base for them but he refused. 
Did they come to your house?
Yeah, ... there were three people. We knew them, they were from the mujamma'. ... They 
said  "we  are  working  for  the  resistance"  but  my  Dad  didn't  believe  them.  My  Dad 
refused. ... So they said "we will come back, we will give you a second chance, we are not  
going to do anything, but watch your kids". ... And they left. A week later we just grabbed 
our stuff and moved. 
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His father forbade him and his siblings from leaving their apartment that week, at the end of  
which they fled the mujamma'  saying goodbye only to very close friends. Leaving was very 
difficult for Bessaam, despite the murders taking place near his home. It was a hard choice 
situation for his father. He knew that leaving their home would mean abandoning it to the 
armed men that were taking over the compound but remaining meant risking the lives of his  
children as well as his own.
The  men  his  father  recognised  were  once  low  ranking  members  of  the  former  regime's 
intelligence services and were taking advantage of the lawless post-invasion environment. 
Bessaam and his family went to stay with his grandparents in Babil. He and his siblings were 
refused entry into school. "They said 'you've come from Fallujah, you are Saddam's agents' 
and 'now you've become the terrorists, we can't accept your children in our school'." They 
belonged to a well  known Shia clan from Babil but their ID cards stated they were from 
Fallujah, a site of heavy resistance to the occupation. Two months later they moved to Syria 
after being put into another situation of hard choice. Leaving for Syria meant facing economic 
uncertainties but remaining in Iraq ensured that the children would not receive an education 
and possibly faced other threats. They remained in contact with people from the mujamma': 
that is how they learned that by 2005 all the Shias and Christians had fled and by 2007 nearly 
all of the original Sunni inhabitants had fled too. Bessaam believed that the "outsiders" were 
not just nomads. They also consisted of low grade employees from the compound colluding 
with criminals they knew from their towns of origin: "They made deals to kill, kidnap, and 
confiscate houses." 
Breaches to the integrity of Bessaam's residential community of around 20,000 people living 
and  working  together  in  the  desert  compound  began  immediately  after  the  occupation. 
Security deteriorated but they did not want to leave; they had no other place to go and this had 
been their home for over 15 years. But when his father received a coercive proposal he was 
put in a hard choice situation. He could stay and make missile bases as ordered to by people 
who he felt were criminals. If he did not make the bases and remained, his children were 
likely to be harmed. Even if he had constructed the missile bases he may still have fallen 
victim to an ostensibly sectarian murder. Leaving entailed the possible loss of the apartment 
he had earned from 15 years of government service. All of the proposals were unpalatable: his 
choice was made under duress. The family left for Babil but they realised that living there 
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would mean forfeiting Bessaam and his younger brother's schooling. Despite their well known 
Shia family name, their Fallujah ID card had become a "terrorist" label in the mostly Shia 
province. So what other potential threats awaited them? Should they stay in Babil,  forfeit  
schooling,  and risk  worse  outcomes?  They decided under  duress  to  leave  for  a  different 
uncertainty in Syria. Fortunately for them it was to be a good decision. 
Socially fortuitous wartime migration
A decision to leave at a time of war, even if taken under duress, can be socially empowering 
and  therefore  classed  as  socially  fortuitous  wartime  migration  (Lubkemann,  2008).  The 
wartime migration of Bessaam and his father can be seen as socially fortuitous, though they 
did lose the apartment they had in the mujamma'. On the advice of their only relative in Syria, 
Bessaam's father applied to work for the Syrian government.  He had a highly specialised 
engineering skill. After a fortnight he was hired to work in north west Syria where the wages 
were low but accommodation was provided for free, as it had been in the mujamma' in Iraq. 
His co-workers advised him to seek employment in the private sector and he successfully did 
so after two months, earning enough money to build a house for his elderly parents in Babil. 
His father briefly returned to Babil but could not stand the endemic level of corruption. With 
his  high  earnings  in  Syria  he  paid  for  Bessaam to  acquire  the  same specialist  technical 
qualification as he had from an institute abroad. In Syria Bessaam was able to earn $1,000 a 
month with a private company, even though he was not an engineer or a university graduate. 
Bessaam then signed up with a non-government, non-profit agency based in the United States 
and  in  Damascus  which  helps  Iraqi  students  to  apply  for  scholarships  for  undergraduate 
studies in  the United States.  The agency applies to individual  universities for scholarship 
waivers  and  full  maintenance  grants  on  behalf  of  each  student.  Bessaam  acquired  a 
scholarship  to  study  in  the  United  States.  They  did  lose  the  apartment  they  had  in  the 
mujamma' but were able to earn enough to build a new house in Babil. The future prospects of 
his younger brother and sister are uncertain, especially with the deteriorating situation in Syria 
but the family unit arguably has better long term prospects now. Had they remained in Iraq 
their social and economic prospects could be worse. The education system is far from being 
restored to its pre-sanctions level and a government worker's salary is in the region of $500 a 
month. It is far from certain what kind of work his father could have been doing in Iraq.
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Other students I interviewed also acquired scholarships to study in the United States. Farah, 
Mohsin,  Raz,  Sara  and Baan made successful  applications and are now reading for  their 
degrees in the United States. They will receive an education superior to anything available to 
them in Iraq. Farah had always wanted to study abroad. The corruption and nepotism in the 
institute in which she studied in Baghdad made her more determined to find opportunities for 
study abroad. However, it is something she told me she had intended to do regardless of the 
occupation. The agency in Damascus allowed her to realise that dream. 
Baan expressed frustration at the Iraqi university system which, she said, never encouraged 
creativity: only one professor she knew bucked the trend by deviating from the curriculum. 
Jasim found the school system frustrating too. He told me of a teacher who gave him a zero 
because he solved a maths problem with an equation that differed to the one in the textbook. 
Baan also dreamed of  studying abroad,  partly to  escape the restrictions that  Iraqi society 
imposed on women. She loathed the unfair restrictions it imposed on women but not on men.
Guys can just go places by themselves and just hang out and we can't. We always have 
someone to drive us, always with us. And also in education, my neighbour got married and 
just stopped going to school. I hated that society.
Graduating  from  an  American  university  will  provide  better  social  opportunities  than 
graduating from an Iraqi one and can therefore be seen as socially fortuitous and potentially 
empowering.  While  in  the  United States  she  will  also  be  free  from the  restrictions  Iraqi 
society imposed on her as a young woman. 
These bright students may even become providers for their families but the benefits must not 
be exaggerated. Their wartime migration has been socially fortuitous only to a limited extent. 
Sara lost her father and her family cannot return to their home in Baghdad. Jasim lost his  
father, and Mohsin lost a close neighbour. Raz's family still feel it is not safe enough to return 
to Iraq and, like Mohsin's family, are living through uncertain times in Syria. Baan's family 
was forced to relocate within Baghdad and perhaps her family has lost the least from this 
group of  students.  On the  societal  and national  level  all  the  students  were  aware  of  the 
enormous amount of damage caused by the invasion and occupation, adding to the problems 
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inflicted by sanctions in the 1990s. They expressed desire to help the country on its road to 
recovery, some determined to return and re-construct. It remains to be seen whether Iraq will 
be a place that will welcome and allow them to do so.
The depletion of kinship networks and its effects on migration 
The flight of close family members can be a coercive pressure on those who do not leave. 
Remaining  becomes  less  and  less  appealing  with  each  depletion  of  family  and  kinship 
networks. Taking the choice to remain can mean a choice to remain isolated from the family. 
If the social relations that comprised the living space disappear then a person's attachment to 
that space is weakened. 
Jasim's family became fragmented as, one by one, a sibling left the country. First his brother 
left for the UAE because of security concerns. From there he pressured the family to leave 
Iraq, fearing that Jasim would be kidnapped as the son of a doctor. Then his sister married an 
Iraqi resident in Jordan: they chose not to remain in Iraq because of organised crime and 
violence. The migration of his sister and the presence of other relatives in Syria facilitated 
their  relocation.  But  Jasim's  migration can  also  be  understood as  part  of  the  cumulative 
depletion of family relations that made his family feel attached enough to Iraq to remain there.  
After the second explosion in his school his parents abruptly decided it was time to leave Iraq. 
That was in September 2006. There was a discussion about whether to go to Jordan or Syria. 
They consulted relatives in both countries and chose  Syria for its lower cost of living, free 
schooling, and kinder residency system than Jordan's. Their relatives outside Iraq affected 
their decision to leave, but so too did those who stayed. Jasim's parents had intended their 
migration to be temporary,  until  the violence would recede in Iraq.  They were in regular 
contact with his sister and neighbours in Baghdad and monitored the situation. His parents 
returned briefly to Iraq to arrange for their pensions to be collected, to see his one remaining 
sibling in Baghdad, and also to inspect their home after neighbours informed them that their 
house had been raided - but they did not know by whom. Tenants have lived there ever since. 
Farah's eldest  sister had worked for an NGO that helped Iraqis receive medical treatment 
abroad which was unavailable in Iraq. She later worked for an American newspaper's bureau 
in Baghdad. The security situation had declined to the point at which Iraqis who had worked 
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for any foreign organization were under threat. She applied for family resettlement with the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) intending for the whole family to relocate 
somewhere safe abroad. The IOM split the family in two by granting resettlement only to her 
two  older  sisters.  Separation  was  added  to  the  list  of  displacements  the  family  had 
experienced. It is also interesting that the effect of Farah's relatives leaving, and suffering for 
it,  consolidated her father's  already risk averse nature and reduced the likelihood of their 
migration. He would not accept any risky relocations and was the final decision maker in the 
household. Their attempt at less risky migration through the IOM had failed. Their family was 
separated. Farah and her younger sister are today studying in the United States but her parents 
remain in Baghdad with her younger brother in an increasingly vulnerable position. This can 
be understood as displacement in place, a loss of resources for those who are unable to move, 
enduring involuntary immobility (Lubkemann, 2008). 
Yousif told me about the macabre stories circulating about the kidnapping of Christians. Huge 
ransoms would be demanded for daughters taken hostage. Kidnappers were known to return 
bodies, murdered after being raped, even if a ransom was paid. His paternal aunt was among 
many of Yousif's relatives who left Iraq. They began leaving in 2005: “My father's paternal 
cousins, my maternal uncles, my paternal aunt. My paternal aunt was not the first but left just 
after  the  first  ones.  Most  of  them came here  to  Syria.”  The decisions  of  those  who left 
impacted on their relatives who remained. Extended family members who left Iraq helped 
others to join them. 
My paternal  cousin  left,  for  example.  He got  there  and told  me he'd  worked,  he  was 
studying  and  within  a  year  or  two  he'd  made  something  of  himself.  …  So  he  was 
encouraging me to leave, his name's Ameer and he likes to be helpful. He said come here 
and we'll help you. With most of our relatives it was like that. Will you help us if we leave? 
Leave! One helps the other, he helps another, and then our relatives there [in Iraq] had run 
out because they were getting lots of help from the relatives abroad.  
The  pattern  he  described  was  that  of  cumulative  causation.  Those  who make  the  initial 
journeys make the path easier for future migrations. As more and more relatives went, the 
easier it became for those who remained in Iraq to leave. Nearly all of Yousif's relatives now 
live in Australia, and all of them have offered to help his family join them. Most of them left 
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in 2005 and 2006, and by 2008 only his nuclear family, and his uncle, remained in Baghdad. 
If you saw our situation in Baghdad now, you'd see that we don't have anybody to visit  
during Eid. I don't have a single relative in Baghdad now. Well, there's my uncle the priest 
but I see him just once. But he doesn't have any children, he's not married because he's a 
priest. But there aren't any relatives who are like my friends, my age, who can be like your 
brothers and sisters. That's something we're really missing. The majority of our relatives 
are in Australia and Canada.  … How can we build families if our relatives are not around? 
Yousif's family had an uncle living in the north of Iraq but moving there was undesirable. He 
told me of discrimination against people who spoke Arabic and not Kurdish. There was little 
chance of finding work there without patronage from: 
… one of their parties.21 What then if you don't want to join one of their parties? Have we 
gone back to Saddam's ways then? We've had this war to get rid of that kind of behaviour. 
Yousif told me that his family had wanted to leave Iraq and reunite with relatives abroad but 
his father reasoned it to be too risky a venture. Their extended family abroad were phoning 
them regularly, trying to persuade them to leave and assuring them that they would support 
them financially if they needed it. 
My father … he'd say “what if … we didn't have enough money? Are we going to call  
everyone in the world [the family] and say we need money for it?” … It's not easy to call 
people and … ask them to send you money, it's degrading. 
Cumulative causation has the effect of prompting migrations among those who remain, and 
can  do so in  a  coercive  fashion.  Yousif  experienced a  depletion  of  social  resources  that 
provide him and his nuclear family with psycho-social support. It also seemed as if this was 
happening in other Christian families he knew from his local church. “All of a sudden you'd 
hear that so-and-so was leaving.  … Three quarters of my friends from the church are [now] 
in  Europe  or  in  America  and  Canada.”  Yousif's  father  was  unwilling  to  risk  becoming 
21 He is referring to the two dominant political parties that control the Kurdish Regional Government in 
northern Iraq. The Kurdish Democratic Party is ruled by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan is ruled by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani.  
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financially  dependent  on  his  extended  family  abroad.  The  Christians  in  Baghdad  are 
dwindling in numbers.  They have experienced displacement in place through the depletion of 
the social relations that form their extended family and religious community. 
The church in Yousif's neighbourhood tried hard to persuade the congregation to stay but 
would also help those who had decided to leave.  
They would say things like “ … don't think of leaving because this country is ours, we've 
been here longer in this country. We shouldn't think to go and leave everything.” … With 
some people, it goes in one ear and straight out of the other, they don't pay any attention. 
Some people were persuaded to remain. 
In addition to mass, there were also lectures aimed at young men, to encourage them to be 
active in society and to remain in Iraq. They would say things like:
“If you leave, and then another leaves, who's going to rise? Who's going to get the country 
back on its feet again? It's going to stay in the hands of those who are messing up the  
country, and the country will stay messed up, in a state of ruin.” But I was young when I 
was at  the  church,  I  remember  that  we didn't  really  take those words seriously.  When 
you're a teenager you just want to enjoy yourself. … But then when you grow up, you 
become more aware, you realise that what they were saying was right. 
The priests were also able to provide supporting documentation for Christians who wished to 
emigrate. Yousif did not know what this was exactly as his family had never attempted to 
leave Iraq. The role of his church was advisory but did not seem decisive.  
Yousif lived close to his church in the area around Waathiq square. It was a quiet middle class 
Christian neighbourhood where foreign diplomats had also lived. His family lived there for 
eleven years in different rented houses. From 2005 to 2010 they lived in the home of a family 
friend, a doctor who fled for Jordan with his family after a relative was kidnapped in 2005. 
They trusted them enough to allow them to live in the house without paying rent, but not 
enough to give them much information about their departure.
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You wouldn't have thought that they were going to leave or that they had any intention to  
migrate. It was a surprise to us when the father came and said “here take the keys and 
move into our house and look after it”. 
This was typical of the decision to leave: it would be taken within the nuclear family, and few 
others, if anyone, would know about it until it had been decided. Adnaan, whose story we 
heard in Chapter 4 did not even give his brother an exact address after he moved within the 
city. He feared his brother's wife would accidentally mention it in a situation that could put his 
family in danger. There was also the fear of being robbed. Households who believed that 
criminal gangs and militias were operating in the area feared that news of their departure 
would  attract  hostile  attention  from  these  groups.  A household  on  the  move  was  more 
vulnerable to robbery. Yousif didn't  mention any militia activity in his neighbourhood and 
nothing of the kind that took place in Farah's area. But he did experience the same collapse in 
public services that millions of others in the city endured. There was no reliable supply of 
electricity from the national grid, the water supply was infrequent and not potable: “You have 
to chase after services, they don't come to you. There's very little water. You have to get 
electricity going so that you can power the water pump so that you can draw some water.” 
Electricity on the street was supplied by two private generator owners. They would run cables 
to houses on the street for a tidy profit.22 
How much did you used to pay?
One of them cost 70,000 dinars, about $60 a month. The other generator cost 80 or  
90,000 dinars but it had more amperes. One would work in the morning and the other 
from the afternoon until the night. … Those two generators would keep us supplied. 
Sometimes the supply from the street generators would cut out and we would switch 
on our house generator.
As a teacher, his mother's salary is around $600 a month. His father works as a freelance 
electrician:  his  income is  irregular.  His  mother  spends  over  20% of  her  salary  on  street 
generator payments. He and his brother work to supplement the family income. In this new 
age of wretched public services, the roads where he lived fared poorly too. He said that a
22 Recent hikes in fuel costs have made it a less profitable venture. See Radwan and Marques (2012) Generator 
Man, a recent documentary about a man in one of Baghdad's poor neighbourhoods who runs a 
neighbourhood generator. 
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Figure 12 (above) Generator wires criss-cross a Baghdad street, 2012 (Sundus Al Bayati).
Figures 13 & 14 (left and right): Generator wires blemish the streets of Baghdad in 2012 (Sundus Al Bayati).
Figure 15 (middle): A small private generator sits in the garden of a house in Baghdad, 2012 (Sundus Al Bayati).
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section of  road was dug up to  lay pipes but  remained open for  two years  before  it  was  
repaired. I saw photographs of Yousif wearing plastic bags on his shoes one rainy day to 
prevent his shoes and trousers from being completely mud soaked before reaching the top of 
his street. 
Yousif's family remain displaced in place. Public services in their neighbourhood are woeful, 
like they are in most of the capital. They have to spend a considerable amount of their income 
on electricity alone, in a country sitting on the second largest known reserves of oil. More 
importantly, their relatives have nearly all gone, as have many of their Christian friends in the 
city.  They  have  experienced  a  heavy  depletion  of  their  social  resources  but  the  risk  of 
financial dependency after migration is one Yousif's father does not believe is worth taking. 
Yousif's story also tells us about the active but not decisive role of the church in migration 
decisions. His displacement in place continued with the tragedy that struck his church late in 
2010, some months after he left Syria. A group of terrorists stormed the church and massacred 
dozens of worshippers. The death toll increased after a botched intervention by government 
security forces. Yousif told me, after I interviewed him, that he lost many friends in the attack.  
Still, he and his family remain in Baghdad.  
Conclusion
Forced migration decisions and displacement processes can be better understood if coercion is 
properly examined. I have mobilised Wertheimer's (1989) concept of coercive proposals and 
hard choices and identified ways in which they have been presented to agents by changes in 
their  physical and social  spaces.  Agents value a  range of different baselines and coercive 
transformations  of  different  spaces  can  jeopardise  these  baselines  to  a  point  at  which  a 
decision to leave is taken. The displacement experiences in this chapter all involved intrusions  
of  threat  into  important  social  spaces.  The  social  relations  that  comprised  these  spaces 
changed,  as  did  the  power  relations  within  them.  The  threats  in  the  school  spaces  were 
sometimes physical,  lethal  threats.  In  other cases  they were threats  to  the  key social  life 
project of educational advancement as power relations changed in a way that made the school 
space a site of sectarian exclusion. Threats appeared in the neighbourhood space too. When 
threats are only to property, they are manageable, even if they involve doorstep violence. They 
still form a pressure to leave but it is when threats become personal, lethal threats to the life of 
a family member, that the threat is most likely to translate into forced migration. In Raz's case  
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the neighbourhood formed a safe haven of sorts, protected from militias by the Resistance and  
an armed neighbourhood watch. But being confined to the neighbourhood after his  father 
narrowly escaped from the Mehdi Army in his workplace was a threat to their livelihood. 
They  had  no  safe  space  in  which  to  generate  an  income,  the  neighbourhood effectively 
became a prison and it was time to leave for Syria. 
The gendered nature of displacement was evident in these narratives. Men were the decision 
makers again and even in Um Ahmed's case where she had a  strong role in moving, her  
husband had the final say. Men were more at risk of violence in these case studies mostly 
because of their roles as breadwinners and protectors. It seems that women were not expected 
to work if it entailed danger, so long as there was a man in the household capable of doing so. 
Of course many households did send women out to work – the assassinated shopkeeper close 
to Anwar's stall was a woman and Um Ahmed continued to support her family by working as 
a teacher. But the women were also not expected to guard their neighbourhoods at night with 
rifles. There was a greater fear of women being targeted for sexual violence – Yousif related 
stories he  had heard about  women being attacked in Dora as part  of strategies  of forced 
population movement. There are countless other stories of this taking place across the city. 
Young women like Farah and Baan had their overall freedom of movement restricted because 
of  such  fears.  Farah's  congregation  advised  the  young  Christian  women  to  dress  more 
conservatively to avoid attention from militias. The girls in Baan's whole school had to wear 
headscarves but she complained that the same restrictions did not apply to young men. Gender  
and communal identity intersected with Um Ahmed. She was able to drive her car alone in 
certain parts of the city – she was not seen as a threat and she did not feel threatened in many 
neighbourhoods because she could pass for either a  Sunni or a Shia Muslim.  In the next 
chapter we shall hear that Mandaean women, from Hadi's family, were not able to drive alone 
but the resources at the family's disposal allowed them to mitigate the constraints for some 
time. The intersection of gender, confessional association and material resources affected their 
experiences of displacement. 
I have shown how the flight of a person's social networks can coerce agents to leave. The 
most significant is the family network but networks in the religious community and in the 
neighbourhood are also important. Familiar neighbours can provide a sense of security and 
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their  departure can create a feeling of insecurity,  particularly during a time of social  and 
political upheaval. But even though a family unit is under coercive pressure to leave, decision 
makers may not have the material resources to migrate as this can entail economic insecurity. 
The experiences of Farah and Yousif show how a lack of resources can immobilise a family to  
a considerable extent. Both their fathers were risk averse and it is no coincidence that both 
families did not own properties. Broadly speaking they could be categorised as part of Iraq's  
middle class but this was a class which had been impoverished by 13 years of sanctions. They 
were therefore not part of Iraq's  monied class and this, I believe, is what made their fathers 
risk  averse.  In  the  next  chapter  the  stories  of  Hadi  and  Shaykh  Rami,  from families  of 
goldsmiths, will contrast with these stories in terms of the resources at their disposal.
This observation about  resources  can be  linked to  another  about  cumulative causation  in 
forced migration. Massey (1990) noted that migration alters the context within which others 
make future decisions about migration. The presence of migrants in a destination can facilitate 
further migration to it. He also noted that feedback mechanisms encourage further migration. 
An  example  he  gave  was  that  of  Mexican  migrants  returning  to  their  rural  towns  after 
profitable work in the USA and spending money on cars and property. This pressured those 
who had not worked in the USA to do so in order to alleviate their new sense of relative 
deprivation. In the forced migration context of Iraq, Marfleet (2007) commented that those 
who left devalued the psychosocial resources of the people who remained, pressuring them to 
leave. As I have shown already, cumulative causation can coerce those who remain into a 
decision to leave. This may be because they cannot complete key social life projects in a  
depleted social world or because being separated from communal networks fosters insecurity. 
What  can  also  be  said  about  cumulative  causation  is  that  there  are  negative  feedback 
mechanisms  which  discourage migration.  As  information  feeds  back  about  unsuccessful 
journeys of others, journeys which did not lead to resettlement in Western countries and which 
drained the limited financial resources of a family unit, decision makers with similarly limited 
resources become even less inclined to take the risk of migration. Cumulative causation can 
coerce agents into leaving, but also into remaining.  
Displacement has many aspects and can be a complicated process. Transformations of spaces 
can feel threatening to some but not to others. When threats appear in the neighbourhood 
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space, they act as coercive pressures that restrict choice. These may come in the form of 
threatening posters and graffiti sprayed in public places. A household may be able to endure 
the presence of some level of threat. However, threats can accumulate to the point at which 
they present a decision maker with highly circumscribed proposals of which relocation is the 
least unpalatable. When many of the physical and social spaces in an agent's world come to 
contain threats, the agent faces a coercive landscape. The situations of Raz, Maher, and also 
Um Ahmed in Al Ghazaliya gave us some idea of  what the coercive landscape can be like.  
Um Ahmed was able to escape the multiple threats in Al Ghazaliya by moving to a different 
part of the city and by pretending to be a Sunni Muslim. Raz's father perceived threat in every 
part of Baghdad outside his neighbourhood. Maher did not even have a safe neighbourhood in 
the city. In the next chapter I present the experiences of coercive transformations of space, of 
the accumulation of multiple threats and episodes of constraint in a longitudinal way. I shall 
use  Mandaean  and  Palestinian  case  studies  to  show  how  members  of  Iraq's  minorities 
experienced displacement. Hadi's story will show us what it was like to be targeted for being 
an outspoken Civil Society activist and a Mandaean community figure. He dared to challenge 
the new order and was forced out of Iraq by an accumulation of specific attacks and general 
threats from the growing coerciveness of his physical and social world. Shaykh Rami shall 
explain  the  restrictions  to  religious  freedoms  the  Mandaeans  experienced  as  well  as  the 
tragedy visited upon his family by those who colluded with police to rob their gold store. Abu 
Waleed will tell us more about the Palestinian experience in a state of violence and how he 
navigated the coercive landscape before escaping from it for the sake of his family's safety.
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Chapter 6 
Minority experiences of displacement
In the following pages I mobilise case studies from Mandaean Iraqis and the Palestinians of 
Iraq, both minority groups whose sense of vulnerability increased in the aftermath of invasion 
and  state  collapse.  Their  narratives  overlap  with  issues  raised  in  previous  ones:  purges, 
neighbourhood  transformations,  the  depletion  of  what  Sen  (1999)  refers  to  as  people's 
instrumental freedoms and how these factors affect decisions in times of crisis. The effects of 
cumulative  causation  are  present  again.  However,  their  identity  as  Mandaeans  and  as 
Palestinians shaped their  displacements  in  specific  ways which  I  shall  make clear  in  the 
coming pages. 
I continue to demonstrate how the conceptual framework I outlined in Chapter 1 can better 
explain the process of displacement and how it can eventually lead to a forced migration 
decision. Coercive proposals came to permeate the social and physical spaces in the lives of 
Iraqis in this chapter and threatened valued baselines along the way. In the last chapter I 
arranged the experiences around the component spaces of daily life which eventually became 
a coercive landscape. Here I present specific perspectives of Mandaeans and Palestinians, and 
in a more longitudinal way to give an enhanced sense of the evolving coercive landscape. I  
show  how  the  aggregation  of  threats  eventually  imposed  a  “hard  choice”  situation 
(Wertheimer, 1987) upon decision makers: leave Iraq for uncertainty in Syria or remain and 
face lethal threats. 
Again, the displacements here occurred inside what Harling (2011) calls “a state of violence” 
- as opposed to a state of law.1 The post-invasion Iraqi state could not “provide peaceful 
mechanisms for addressing political conflicts, to form a common frame of reference, and to 
enforce its monopoly over the use and legitimization of violence” (Harling, 2011: 45). This 
situation of generalized and indistinct insecurity was created by three interrelated processes: 
an exclusionary post-2003 political process; sectarian differentiation; and the privatisation of 
violence: the security vacuum, caused by state collapse, was filled by militias, mercenaries, 
1 See Chapter 3 and Harling (2011).
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gangs, and insurgent groups (Harling, 2011: 45-48). The Shia Al Askari shrine in Samarra was 
bombed in February 2006 and triggered intense violence in Baghdad which peaked during 
2006 and 2007. Although it  abated to some extent in 2008, its legacy continued to affect 
people's lives in the years afterwards. The pressures of living in a state of violence - where 
threats permeated and constrained daily life - transformed the environment into a  coercive 
landscape and forced many Iraqis to leave their country altogether. As I have stated already, 
threat  perception  is  specific,  particularly  when  it  relates  to  an  understanding  of  broader 
circumstances of threat and not solely to a personal threat letter or bullet delivered in the letter 
box. This specific nature of threat is particularly salient when it is directed at a reference 
group. In Chapter 4 I showed how aspiring state actors issued a collective threat to those 
whom they deemed  to  belong to  the  old  order,  or  to  represent  it  symbolically,  and they 
included the Palestinians and Mandaeans. In the following pages I expand upon the particular 
ways  in  which  members  of  these  reference  groups  understood  threat,  individually  and 
collectively. 
Mandaean stories
Shaykh Rami, a priest and a goldsmith 
Shaykh Rami became a priest2 in 2008 after being an Ishkanda, or priest's assistant, to his 
father since the early 1990s. They were also a family of goldsmiths, knowledge passed to the 
Shaykh from his father. They had run a gold store from a market in Baghdad for over 60 
years. This was the same market where in 2008, some children shouted abuse at its Mandaean 
traders. The Shaykh's family had lived in their Baghdad neighbourhood since the 1970s. After 
the  occupation  and  the  deterioration  of  security  many  families  departed.  The  area  was 
confessionally mixed, roughly divided in half between Sunni and Shia families, and relatively 
poor. The Sunnis mostly lived on the outskirts of the area. The Shias mostly lived in the 
centre, hailing from Amara in the south of the country. After 2003 the Sunni families fled 
violence from people who the Shaykh described as “Muqtada's men”3, members of the Mehdi 
Army. One household lost four sons. Another large Sunni family, consisting of 18 families, 
fled the area. The Shaykh related how the people who moved into their homes were Shias. 
There were transformations in his neighbourhood similar to those we heard of in the previous 
2 The Mandaeans refer to their priests as Shaykhs or rujaal deen [نيد لاجر]. I use the terms priest and Shaykh 
interchangeably in the thesis.
3 This is a reference to the leader of the Sadrists - Muqtada Al Sadr. 
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chapters. As well as a decline in security and public services, old neighbours were replaced by 
strangers. Militia men established a visible presence. But these transformations were not the 
main part of his family's story of forced migration.
The neighbourhood transformation was not the key to understanding why the Shaykh had to 
leave Iraq. Muqtada's men were active where he worked. One day his friend, a barber in the 
market, and his sons were beaten with cables in the street. This was after a boy whose father  
worked in  a  Mehdi  Army office  in  Kadhimiya  had  made trouble  with  the  barber's  sons. 
Eventually,  the militia would rob the Shaykh's store,  killing and wounding several  of his 
relatives and threatening his whole family. We shall come to that later. As with others we have 
heard from so far, the Shaykh's migration to Syria was part of a process of displacement that 
began long before his eventual decision to leave.
First though, I shall look at how the religious freedom of the sect as a whole was curtailed, 
how they were no longer able to practise their faith unharmed. Earlier, the Shaykh spoke of 
how the looting began close to his home, on the day the regime fell, how it continued and how 
insecurity  grew  worse  -  the  violence  became  generalized  in  Baghdad.  The  Mandaeans 
suffered  with  other  Iraqis.  The  Mandaean  Human  Rights  Group  (MHRG,  2011)  has 
documented murders and other crimes committed against them. Many of these crimes took 
place during journeys within the city. Mobility was constrained in that it  now contained a 
coercive proposal: travel within the city and face violent attacks, or remain confined to the 
relative safety of the home. This was a threat which all Baghdadis faced but the Mandaeans 
felt particularly vulnerable as a non-Muslim group. Haleem told us earlier that his daughter 
experienced  growing  sectarian  abuse  from  her  school  friends  after  2003.  Attacks  on 
Mandaeans became common where once they were extremely rare. Their priests were not 
spared:
We have a priest in Basra, Shaykh Mazen who was threatened three times. Recently, the 
governor of Basra assigned two units to protect him and the temple. One unit is stationed 
close to the temple and the other near his house ... that's in addition to increasing his 
personal body guard from four to eight, and increasing the number of police men guarding 
the temple. But it's not going to help.
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Mandaeans depend on their priests to perform fundamental rituals. They are complex and 
must be supervised by a priest in the ancient Mandaean form of Aramaic. The most important 
of  them is  the  baptism.  A Mandaean is  not  expected to  perform it  frequently but  it  is  a  
mandatory component during birth and marriage which are what Lubkemann (2008) calls 
“key social life projects”. Without the priests to conduct the rituals, marriages remain on hold, 
newborns remain unbaptised. This represents a constraint on the Mandaean sect collectively 
and not just in Basra. Interactions with Shaykh Mazen come with the implicit threat of being 
caught up in an attack on the Shaykh, so too with the now guarded temple. Attacks on priests 
and  prominent  community  figures  are  characteristic  of  strategies  aimed  at  coercing  a 
population into fleeing by weakening community resources and solidarity (Marfleet, 2006: 
245).  “The initial  targets  of  such campaigns  are  usually  leading male  figures.  The  more 
effectively they are removed the more vulnerable becomes the community as a whole” (ibid.). 
Shaykh Rami told me that there were areas in Iraq which had no priest to serve the faithful. 
This affected his own duties as a priest. Even before the robbery and the personal threats to 
his family, he spent a considerable amount of his time away from Baghdad, serving the needs 
of Sabeans who no longer had a priest  close by. Some priests had been killed or fled, or 
Mandaens would find that no priest lived in their place of refuge. Shaykh Rami spent over a 
year in  northern Iraq in Kirkuk where there was a  Mandaean temple without  a priest.  In 
Damascus, he served those living in Syria as well as those who had resettled in European 
countries without a priest. 
According to Hadi, who was involved in Mandaean population estimates in the 1990s, and 
with the Mandaean Association in Damascus, the community in Iraq has shrunk overall and it 
is not only the priests who have left: before 2003 the Mandaeans were estimated to number 
between 45,000 and 50,000 but now it is below 6,000. From 2006 to 2007 there were 13,000-
14,000 registered at the Mandaean Association in Damascus. This is a problem for a sect that 
forbids marriage outside of the faith.  If their  dispersal is  sustained, in  the long term it  is 
potentially an existential threat. 
Living under the circumstances of a state of violence constrained their freedom to practise 
their faith in other ways. Even in Baghdad where priests remained, it became dangerous to 
enact their distinctive baptism rituals in the Tigris river which meanders through the city. 
They had done so  safely in the past, under the Jadiriya bridge, but this had changed. 
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At one point in Baghdad we were told by the head of the sect – and they themselves had 
been told by officials in the state – that the only people allowed to attend a wedding ritual 
were the bride and groom. Just the bride and groom, nobody else was allowed to attend 
apart from the father of the bride and the father of the groom. 
We were exposed to gunfire, under the Jadiriya bridge. That happened three times. At the 
temple we were shot at. It was for our own protection that they limited the number who 
could attend.
So people attacked you inside the temple?
No, they fired at the temple.
As with the Mandaeans in Basra, those in Baghdad had to consider a coercive proposal before 
partaking in previously routine religious activities: practising their rituals in the river and the 
temple contained the threat of being shot. The suspension of large gatherings took place in 
2008 for three to four months. The Shaykh's own consecration as a priest had to be done in 
Syria. The rituals involve the priest staying awake for seven days and the people around him 
have  to  keep  him  awake  in  a  celebratory  way.  But  his  consecration  coincided  with  the 
leadership of the sect instructing them to avoid commotion and large gatherings that might 
draw attention to them.
We told Mandaean families that even on religious occasions, during festivals, that as soon 
as they completed their rituals, they had to return to their homes. 
Wasn't there a place where there was a pool like the one in Jaramana?4
There was a place in the temple but there were problems with electricity and water. The 
water would cut off. It would cut off every two or three days, even if you had electricity 
and you were running the generators, the water would cut off.
4 Jaramana is a suburb south of Damascus where many Iraqis live. It was mostly an agricultural area, farmland 
owned by Druze Syrians until fairly recently when it experienced a real estate boom, partly stimulated by the 
influx of Iraqis. There are enclosed outdoor spaces for hire for leisure activities that have swimming pools 
and smaller free flowing water pools, designed for leisure but suited to occasions of baptism. The Mandaeans 
had hired such a place in Jaramana and I was lucky enough to be invited to watch baptism rituals that 
included weddings.
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Even when there was water flowing,  the temple  was too  small  for  large gatherings.  The 
Mandaeans were used to having 500 people attend wedding and baptism ceremonies. There 
would be as many as 150 done in the river, the temple's capacity was around twenty. Hadi told 
me that there were no such restrictions in the 1990s.
I remember in the past, in the 1990s, they used to practise the rituals there, and there might 
be 4000 to 5000 people there, if not more. But back then, we were free to do so. People 
couldn't hurt us then. People used to come and watch us from the bridge, take photographs. 
Nobody would dare to harm anyone. 
People would watch, it was something intriguing for them, they'd never seen anything like 
it before. They would watch, see how this sect does its rituals in the river, how they did 
their baptisms. Nobody would harass us then. But now it's dangerous. Someone could 
come along and throw a hand grenade and kill 50 or 100 people. They can do it easily, 
killing people is easy in Iraq now, 50 or 100 people might die and nobody will ask about it. 
They're still present in Iraq today. There are two or three priests in Baghdad and they 
practise their rituals in the temple, but there are hardly any Mandaeans left in Iraq. There 
might be 4000 left in Iraq.
These new constraints added to the pressures on Mandaeans remaining in Iraq. Though not in 
themselves enough to make a person decide to leave, they added to the feeling that Iraq was 
no longer a place for them to function as Mandaeans. I asked the Shaykh if the priests had 
tried to influence migration decisions in the community. There had not been attempts in the 
temples to encourage them to remain as had been in the case of Farah and Yousif's churches,  
and he explained that: 
You couldn't encourage people to emigrate, but at the same time, you couldn't encourage 
people to stay either. Now, and after the Fall [of Saddam's regime], remaining in Iraq is 
something that Mandaeans will pay for with their money and their lives. The tax is their 
money and their lives. That's because there is no place for Mandaeans in Iraq any more.
Hadi, from the Iraqi Minorities Council, added that the Mandaean clergy initially:
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… were against emigration because they knew that it would lead to the destruction of the 
sect.  … but you can't forbid someone from leaving. He'll say to you: then provide me with 
security, provide me with work. Can you protect me? We couldn't do that. Therefore [the 
decision to leave] it became an individual issue. If a Mandaean wants to leave you can't tell 
him not to.
Even the head of the sect, himself a priest, no longer lives in Iraq. Hadi informed me that 
Shaykh Sattar now lives in Australia and spends a few months of the year in Iraq and Syria 
attending to the needs of the sect. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  occupation  when  violence  was  less  general,  the  Mandaeans  I 
interviewed perceived a coercive proposal in which remaining in Iraq came at the cost of 
exclusion from the political process but not yet with threats to their ability to practise their 
faith and maintain the integrity of the community altogether, or threats to their lives. In a state 
of  violence  the  coercive  proposal  evolved  into  a  hard  choice  situation  where  remaining 
entailed the threat of all of the above. Remain in Iraq and live a life of religious unfreedom, 
where practising rituals came with lethal dangers and where the decline in the Mandaean 
population was damaging to marriage prospects. Or, leave and live an uncertain economic 
situation  individually,  and  face  a  threat  to  their  collective  religious  identity  altogether.  It 
became a hard choice situation as both of the proposals were unpalatable. The Shaykh and 
other Mandaeans believed that the ancient sect was under threat from the ensuing dispersion.5 
Marriage  outside  the  community  is  forbidden.  He  explained  that  those  who  resettled  to 
countries like Sweden found themselves transformed into “a summer sect” as that was the 
only time rivers were warm enough for baptisms. They knew it would be harder to sustain the 
interest in the faith of a new generation of Mandaeans in the diaspora.6 He also told me that 
those remaining in Iraq had become hesitant to leave after seeing what happened to other 
Mandaeans in the “waiting countries” like Syria and Jordan: their savings dwindled and many 
were living in,  or close  to,  poverty and with  no sign of  hope for  resettlement  in  a  third 
5 I attended a discussion at the Mandaean Association in Damascus during January 2011 where many aired the 
anxieties they had about the future of the community as a diaspora scattered across the continents. Mandaean 
refugees now living in Australia have expressed fears about cultural extinction within the next few 
generations. See Nickerson et. al. (2009). 
6 Mandaean men spoke extensively about this during the discussion. Among the questions they asked were: 
would their children forget that they were Mandaeans as soon as they reached America? Would Mandaeans 
gravitate towards Christian churches in the United States who offered assistance, and greater clarity about 
their faith than the Mandaeans? Would they be able to encourage their children to study Mandaean Aramaic 
in the diaspora?
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country.  The security situation in  Iraq was coercing many into leaving, but the economic 
situation of those in Syria and Jordan was simultaneously coercing many into remaining, 
further compounding their displacement.    
For the Shaykh though, it was the deadly robbery at the gold market that resulted in his abrupt 
departure from the country in 2009. He told me how a gang had planned the robbery some 
time in advance in collusion with police officers. The police force by this time was known to 
have been infiltrated by the Mehdi Army. At 9:30am one April morning a gang member shot a 
nearby army officer. A crowd formed around him and the gang entered the market in the  
shadow of this distraction. The Shaykh continued:
[The] market has three gates. At each door there descended a gang. The other shops, there 
was a sweet shop there, and they told them not to interfere. They first approached my 
nephew, his friend was sitting with him. My nephew put up a fight, but they shot him in the 
head, two bullets. His friend tried to run away but they shot him. There was gunfire. They 
would enter the shops, shoot, and then move. There were other men with them carrying 
bags and they would fill them with the cash and with the gold. My young nephew ran to 
the police and told them about the gang. The police were just at the top of the street, maybe 
500 metres away. They told him “We haven't been ordered to intervene”.  It was an ugly 
crime.
According to Shaykh Rami, the gang stole 28 kilos of gold, and $125,000 in cash. They killed 
three of his relatives, and wounded two, one is still disabled by it. The Mehdi Army lacks the 
same kind of funding from foreign states that the Supreme Council and Da'wa receive (ICG 
2006c)  and  funds  itself  through  robberies  and  extortion  rackets.  It  has  been  plausibly 
compared to mafia groups and crime syndicates in southern Italy (Davis, 2011). This was 
something not lost on the Shaykh.
These gangs, who supports them? There's nobody to finance them, they're not provided 
with an income. So where do they get their income from, their livelihood? They live off the 
people, mostly off the goldsmiths. It's the easiest and quickest and most profitable way. If 
they rob three [gold] stores, if they steal from three stores and kill people – killing is 
nothing for them – but if they can take three stores, they can live off that. They will 
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sacrifice [the lives of others], anything to support their leadership. A sacrifice for which 
another person will pay the price. 
The gang was arrested the next day by a unit of the intelligence services separate from the 
Iraqi police. His nephews and other witnesses confirmed the arrested men were the culprits. 
The offenders confessed and revealed details of the plan. Death sentences were expected to be 
passed on them in court. Despite this and other evidence, they are yet to face a trial. The 
Shaykh spoke to a Brigadier General in the intelligence services who explained that pressure 
had been applied on them and the judge in the case. The police officers complicit in the 
robbery had been released, the robbers themselves were still detained, but two members of 
parliament, one the Sadrist Bahaa' Al A'raji, were lobbying for their release. As well as losing 
family members and a substantial amount of gold and cash, it was now clear to the Shaykh 
that living in Iraq meant accepting the loss of “transparency guarantees” (Sen, 1999:39-40). 
This type of instrumental freedom allows people to operate on a level of presumption of what 
they are being offered and can expect to receive in their social interactions. This creates trust  
and prevents corruption and underhand dealings. When that trust is seriously violated, the 
lives of many people may be adversely affected (ibid.). The Shaykh had lost trust in the Iraqi 
police and in the Iraqi state to enforce the law fairly altogether. Again this is something that 
affected Iraqi society as a whole but was particularly damaging for those like the Shaykh 
whose livelihoods were in the precious metals trade.
At the wake for his deceased relatives, a group of men turned up and threatened his whole 
family. 
They said that those men are not guilty of anything. They said that they were speaking on 
behalf of their families. “If anything happens to them, we will hold you responsible.” One 
of them even said “If they are executed, we won't leave a single one of you alive”. Later, 
we learned that two of them were senior members of the Mehdi Army, senior leaders. 
After  this  threat,  the  Shaykh  and  most  of  his  extended  family  quickly  left  for  Syria. 
Neighbours are now living in his house, to prevent it being seized. Their store remains shut. 
The  government  recovered  some of  the  gold  but  has  yet  to  return  it.  Nobody  has  been 
punished for the murders and the robbery. 
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After 2003, being a Mandaean brought with it dangers and constraints. Less able to practise 
their faith, their religious freedoms were curtailed by violent threats. Those in the precious 
metals trade became primary targets with no police force they could trust in to protect them. 
The Shaykh's family experienced all of these things. His life was disrupted by the need to 
spend time away from Baghdad to serve the needs of those who had fled to northern Iraq, to  
Damascus,  and beyond.  Eventually  his  family's  economic  freedom was  destroyed by the 
robbery, and their safety threatened for wanting the culprits to be punished. After a sequence 
of intensifying pressures, his family were put into a hard choice situation: remaining in Iraq to  
face certain death, unless they dropped charges against the men who they believed murdered 
their  relatives,  or  leave  for  economic  uncertainty  in  Syria,  away  from  their  store  and 
properties in Baghdad. Leaving Iraq was the least unpalatable of the proposals but the Shaykh 
and his  family  appeared  to  have  enough  financial  resources  to  sustain  a  period  in  Syria 
without an income from their gold store. There is also the possibility of renting their store to 
another trader. Some relatives who were too old to travel to Syria are now living in the family 
home and should the security situation improve – admittedly not likely in the near future - 
they have a home and potential source of income in Baghdad. His situation contrasts with that 
of Majeed in Chapter 4 with no assets to aid his livelihood if he returns to Iraq, and also with 
Yousif and Farah in the previous chapter whose families did not own their own homes or 
stores and so did not feel able to take economically risky journeys. However none of them 
experienced armed robbery or were threatened in the same direct way as the Shaykh and his 
family were – also related to his resources in that they made him doubly a target. 
But it was not only Shaykh Rami's family whose lives were changed by the robbery. After  
hearing of the crime, the police complicity and the silence of the clerical class in condemning 
the attacks on the Mandaeans, Hadi spoke up in a television interview. He was asked for his 
opinion about the robbery over the phone by Al Sharqiya satellite news station. He chided the 
Iraqi police and chastised the Shia clerical establishment in Najaf for their mute response to 
the fate of the Mandaeans. It  would lead to the final part of his displacement, his forced 
migration from Iraq after years of resisting threats and coercive pressures. They had combined 
to put him in a hard choice situation - he too left Iraq against his will and in circumstances not 
of his choosing. 
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Hadi - civil rights activist, goldsmith, and businessman 
Hadi was a wealthy man who provided his family with a comfortable life in Baghdad, even 
during the 1990s at a time of embargo. They lived in a large house in one of Baghdad's better 
neighbourhoods. He was a well travelled goldsmith and jeweller with a long established store 
in central Baghdad. It was chosen as one of only four stores in Baghdad to act as official 
agents for American Express. In Iraq he owned agricultural land, a poultry farm managed by 
his brother, and a textiles factory. He also ran a trading office in Turkey. From the mid 1990s 
he gradually diverted his energies more to civil society activities. We heard earlier in Chapter 
4 about the success enjoyed in bringing about a Mandaean cultural revival in the 1990s. Hadi 
would continue his efforts after 2003 as a new political order was forming in the country, 
elections were held, and a new constitution written. His interest in activism at a time of a 
general  collapse of  security  meant  that  he had no income after  2003 and he stopped his 
business activities altogether. Hadi prioritised making use of new political freedoms over his 
economic freedoms which now carried the  dangers of  armed robbery.  The 2003 war had 
thwarted some of the community's earlier achievements. Hadi went on to say that the temple 
that Saddam had promised them was never built,  the prime plot  of  land by the Tigris  is 
registered  to  the  Mandaeans  but  lies  empty.  Their  social  club  and  community  centre  in 
Zawraa' park was seized by presidential order in 2002. The Iraqi Army used it as a weapons 
cache and it was subsequently destroyed by American air strikes in 2003 and Hadi told me 
that they reluctantly accepted a paltry $80,000 in compensation. 
Regime change increased instrumental political freedom for Iraqi society to a limited extent. 
The Mandaeans and other Iraqis could organise politically and speak about politics with less 
restrictions  than  under  the  Ba'ath  regime.7 The  Mandaeans  established  the  Mandaean 
Democratic Association (MDA) in 2004 so that they could collectively advocate for their 
rights as a community at a time when communal politics was the new order of the day. In the 
insecurity of post 2003, the MDA's membership depleted as professionals were targeted, they 
fled Iraq, some were killed. Hadi recalled that: “We lost three quarters of the members of the 
MDA in a month. They all left so we suspended our work.” Hadi and others later formed the 
7 A briefing on the prominent groups and figures of the 2005 election can be found here: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4051977.stm. A report by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) spoke of an expanded 
media and information landscape in 2003 after the end of the Ba'athi state monopoly on media and 
communications. Self censorship owing to fear of reprisals from political parties and the Ba'ath was still 
widespread. Around 200 Iraqi journalists were killed between March 2003 and August 2010 (RSF, 2010: 3-
6). Many media outlets had to relocate to Jordan, such as Baghdad TV after two of its reporters were killed 
and 17 injured (RSF, 2010: 12).
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Iraqi  Minorities  Council  (IMC) in 2005 with  Christians,  Yazidis,  Fayili  Kurds,  Shabaks,8 
Armenians, and Turkomans. They hoped to have a better chance of being properly represented 
in the constitution writing process if they worked together. International organisations listened 
to  the  IMC  and  funded  some  of  their  activities,  but  the  Iraqi  politicians  drafting  the 
constitution did not. Those writing the new Iraqi constitution rushed the process to produce a 
weak document that lacked consensus (ICG, 2005).9 Despite this, the IMC continued its work 
but its members found threats coming their way because they were speaking out for minority 
rights in Iraq. Their duties involved great risk to their lives. Hadi remembered that:
The situation became especially bad in 2005 and 2006. Things were getting worse. We 
reduced our activities in the IMC because it was hard for us to move. Our work required us 
to go to the Green Zone and have meetings in Embassies, meetings with foreigners. … One 
of us was kidnapped, he was a representative of the Christians. They kidnapped him and 
took a ransom.
A co-worker of a Yazidi10 lawyer in the IMC was also kidnapped. Working with the IMC now 
meant accepting the coercive proposal that exercising his political freedom to organise came 
with  the  threat  of  kidnap.  The IMC agreed to  rent  a  house  from Hadi's  brother  to  hold 
meetings. Hadi also offered his gold store, closed for business since 2003, as a meeting place. 
This was part of a threat evasion strategy which was enhanced by the resources available at  
Hadi's disposal, such as having discrete private buildings to use for meetings. “We began 
switching places. Sometimes we would meet in that house, other times we would go to other 
places. We would choose different places so that we wouldn’t be monitored. Meetings and 
gatherings had become dangerous. They were scary.” This threat-evasion strategy seriously 
constrained his mobility. But Hadi was determined to continue his work and had a strong 
sense of moral obligation to his sect and the other Iraqi minorities. He placed a premium on 
using  his  political  freedoms,  as  limited  as  they  were,  to  ensure  representation  for  his 
8 The Shabak community are based in northern Iraq. Taneja (2011) says that around 70% are Shia Muslims and 
the remainder Sunni. They speak a language that is a mixture of Arabic, Turkish and Persian and some 
consider themselves to be Kurdish. The Yazidis are also present in northern Iraq and their faith is a syncretic 
mix of Abrahamic religions as well as Zoroastrianism and Manichean traditions. A section of their 
community also considers itself to be Kurdish. Members of both groups have been violently attacked since 
2003 (Taneja, 2011). For a study of Iraq's different faiths and sects, see Khayoun (2007). 
9 The constitution making process was exclusionary, much of which was done by an informal forum of  
Kurdish and Shia leaders. See ICG (2005). 
10 The Yazidis live primarily in the Ninewah province in northern Iraq. Their faith is syncretic and includes 
elements of Sufi Islam and Zoroastrianism. 
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community in a pluralistic Iraq. He was a central figure at the IMC and a valued spokesman 
and appeared on different television channels advocating for Iraq's minorities. The criticisms 
he directed at the new exclusionary political order brought him trouble, highlighting the limits 
of  political  freedoms in post  2003 Iraq.  The freedom to  organise did not  come with the 
freedom to dissent.
A steady flow of threats  came Hadi's  way. At first  they came by phone. Then they were 
delivered by word of mouth from his sons in law, both of whom were kidnapped in 2005, 
each a hostage for four days. In May, his son in law's parents paid a $70,000 ransom. Threats 
kept coming even after his release so he left for Dubai that same month. Hadi's second son in 
law was kidnapped in October, released at a cost to his parents of $60,000. The kidnappers 
had passed the message to Hadi to stop his work and to keep quiet, but he refused. These 
threats  formed a coercive proposal in  which remaining in  Baghdad whilst  making use of 
limited  political  freedoms  was  carrying  a  growing  risk  to  Hadi  and  his  family.  Hadi's 
baselines were the safety of his immediate family and being able to exercise the political  
freedom to represent his community. It was becoming increasingly difficult to assure both of 
these baselines – in a state of violence they were becoming mutually exclusive. His mobility 
in the city was severely constrained, and had to be done with extreme vigilance. 
One day in March 2006, Hadi and others were meeting in his store when a car parked outside 
and exploded. 
I used it as a meeting place for a few hours twice a week at certain times. They knew I 
would be there at certain times, the people I trusted, because the telephones weren't 
working, communications were messed up. 
I was in the shop when the bomb went off and suffered minor injuries. The store is deep, 
some shards of glass got through but not close enough. After that I stopped using the shop 
as a meeting place. To this day the glass is still broken, I haven't repaired it, I just locked 
up the store. I'm still paying fees to the person who owns the building. It's now empty but it 
is still mine.
The threats were still coming, they continued. But I didn't give them a chance. I didn't stay 
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in one place. I knew how to protect myself. I wouldn't go to certain places, public places, 
or places where it was known that certain people would meet. When I went out I wouldn't 
leave the house at particular times. Some times I wouldn't leave the house for two or three 
weeks at a time. 
Hadi was often a prisoner in his own home, too afraid to leave the house. His movements 
were heavily restricted. Mobility – even during journeys – came with a lethal threat. Their 
other regular meeting place was the house rented from his brother. It was only a short drive 
from Hadi's home, but even that short journey contained threats. The space around his home 
contained many threats. People died as mortar shells landed on their homes. The Mehdi Army 
militia took control of his neighbourhood. 
You could see that militias had taken control of all the public areas, especially when there 
were processions for Ashura and the like. The whole area would be filled with flags. The 
Mehdi Army would cut off traffic.
The American Army had laid concrete barriers where Hadi lived, as they had done so across 
Baghdad. He believed this was to restrict the mobility of the Mehdi Army. “They cut off the 
streets,  they put  concrete  blocks down and you couldn’t  access all  of  the  streets,  except 
through one entrance.” It reached a point where armed attacks were taking place on a daily 
basis. People would drive through their street to avoid the heavy traffic of the main road 
nearby, including government officials who would be easy targets in a gridlock. This meant 
that roadside bombs would often explode when official convoys drove past. 
There would be some sort of assassination incident almost every day on that road. We 
would hear gunshots every day and go out to find a man killed in his car. His engine would 
still be running and the car would have climbed the pavement but he was dead. Or we 
would wake up in the morning and find someone dead, killed in the street. What kind of 
life is that? Services were zero. You couldn’t do anything. When there was an Ashura 
procession, the streets would be full of them, convoys. One procession would be followed 
by another.11 There were drums, chains, lamentations, women and all those things. There 
11 Ashura is a significant day in the Shia calendar commemorating the martyrdom of the Imam Hussein. Public 
processions and lamentations were banned under Saddam's rule. Hadi is probably also referring to the many 
other days of mourning in the Shia calendar during which the Mehdi Army may have held processions. 
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was nothing wrong with it but it was over the top. Life became intolerable.
Each time he left the house he had to assess the risk, the coercive proposal evident in the 
circumstances:  remain  confined  to  the  house  and  unable  to  carry  out  important  political 
activities, or leave and risk being kidnapped or killed. 
Hadi's  neighbourhood was  confessionally  mixed.  Christians  were  harassed  by the  Mehdi 
Army who had infiltrated the police. As in Farah's neighbourhood, they were making excuses 
to enter homes. They would often rob them and, said Hadi's son, with the help of militia men 
who  had  infiltrated  the  police.12 Women  were  pressured  into  wearing  head  scarves. 
Kidnappings became regular occurrences. Hadi's wife, Karima, had a friend who suffered. 
The Christians – do you remember the woman who used to work in the bank, my friend? 
They kidnapped her sister. She was pushing her child in a pram in the street. They stopped 
her and told her that she wasn’t allowed to walk in the street any more because she was a 
Christian and she had to leave.
A neighbour asked Karima to wear a headscarf in public so that people wouldn't know she 
was Mandaean, she feared for Karima's safety. But she had problems with it: 
I would put a scarf on my head but it would keep slipping off, I would keep having to 
adjust it, straighten it, I didn't know how to wear one. They tie them in a particular way, I 
don't know how to do it. In the end I just took it off.
At the height of the violence and militia rule of the streets some women, particularly non 
Muslims, felt it  was too dangerous to drive alone. Karima stopped driving altogether, and 
would pay her neighbour's son to take her daughters to university, to the doctor's, anywhere 
else they needed to go. “It was because he was a Muslim. He would drive them around so at 
least if the moment came they would be under his protection.” Their family had the resources 
to pay a driver to allow her to travel in relative safety and temporarily evade threats to her life.  
But one day Mehdi Army members asked him what he was doing with “the Subbi girl”13, why 
12 Hadi's son explained that people in the area reported that police would knock on the door, demanding to be 
let in. Residents that complied were robbed by militia men accompanied by a man in a police uniform and 
those that did not had their doors broken down and were also robbed.
13 Subbi is short hand for a Sabean - saabi'i – and can be derogatory depending on the manner of its use. 
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he was taking her to college every day. They had been watching and he feared for himself and 
their daughter. His daughter's mobility was constrained even further.
Figure 16 (above): Concrete barriers block and disfigure a Baghdad street, 2012 (Sundus Al Bayati).
Figure 17 (below): Litter strewn street, Baghdad neighbourhood 2012 (Sundus Al Bayati).
There  were  fuel  shortages  and  the  Mehdi  Army  seized  control  of  supplies  in  their 
neighbourhood. Their eldest son would queue for hours, sometimes from 3am in the morning 
until noon. There was no guarantee of a result.  
That was for a canister of gas and sometimes they would only half fill it. The Mehdi Army 
had taken control of the places that produced gas canisters. They also took control of the 
petrol stations. When the [subsidized] fuel would come from the state, they would take it 
and sell it for themselves. They would buy it at the state price, for pennies, and then sell 
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each one for 25,000 Iraqi Dinars.14 
Daily  life  had  become  miserable.  Karima  said  that  “We  wanted  to  see  something  good 
happening, something that would give us hope that things were going to get better, but there 
was nothing.” To which Hadi added: 
There was no electricity, no water. The water that came, if it did, would be filthy. The air 
was polluted. There was rubbish in the streets, and the stench killed you. Diseases started 
to spread, we were afraid. … Each day would be worse than the last. They were wretched 
days. ... That was on top of all the threats that were coming our way
Social opportunities (Sen, 1999: 39) are a category of instrumental freedom which include a 
society's provision of healthcare and education, giving people the substantive freedom to live 
lives free of disease and with the educational skills that allow them to make use of other 
freedoms (ibid.). By 2006 in Baghdad most public services had ground to a halt along with the 
social opportunities contingent upon them. Every Iraqi I spoke to complained bitterly about 
the lack of electricity and clean water supplies. The collapse of the state compounded the 
damage to education and healthcare caused by the sanctions era. The security situation on the 
streets of Baghdad prevented basic services like refuse collection. Corpses were left to rot as 
people feared the snipers who often shot any person who came close to a dead body. In areas 
where the Mehdi Army militia was dominant, they also controlled fuel for generators, for  
cooking, and mobility. These pressures made daily life into a miserable grind,  even for a 
wealthy family like Hadi's. All around them they could see Christians being harassed, and 
Muslims too. Shortly after the 2006 bombing of the Al Askari shrine in Samarra, a Sunni 
mosque was attacked in the neighbourhood, the guard and the Imam were killed. It was then 
renamed and turned into a Husseiniya, a Shia mosque and community centre. Hadi's family 
were acutely aware of identity killings going on in Baghdad - the mutual slaughter of Sunnis 
and Shias. The coercive circumstances intensified.
When I, as a Sabean, see that a Muslim is doing that to another Muslim, what's going to 
happen to me? I'm a candidate for it. And truly I wasn't just a candidate for it, I was 
actually threatened with it. 
14 Hadi later explained that the state was selling them for the equivalent of a few dollars, the Mehdi Army 
would sell them for $20-30 each. 
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The threats had accumulated. The threats had been to their inclusion in the political process as 
Mandaeans in the new Iraq, threats to their freedom to practise their faith and to sustain the 
integrity of their community, threats to their economic freedoms and to the mobility of all the 
individuals in their household. The threats encompassed their health as public services had 
collapsed and they included direct threats to their lives. Their living environment had become 
a coercive landscape permeated with a multitude of threats in a multitude of social spaces. 
The coercive landscape in which they now lived was intimately connected to the descent of 
Iraq after 2003 into a state of violence. In a state of violence, the laws, policies, customs, and 
practices which guarantee security for members of society are no longer there. Instead they 
are  replaced  with  practices  that  do  the  opposite  and  threaten  members  of  society  in  a 
generalised way. When the threats are no longer evadable, when remaining means enduring 
circumstances below a baseline that is no longer assured - such as adequate public services 
and physical security – people with the means to leave become very likely to do so. Hadi's 
family had the material resources to evade the threats in Baghdad to a considerable extent. 
They did not want to leave and were prepared to attempt all manner of threat-evasion and 
endure many threats to their physical security. But there is a threshold point for everyone and 
the pressures eventually intensified beyond an acceptable threshold. 
That threshold was reached in April 2007 when their youngest son was kidnapped and held 
for 14 days. Luckily he was released alive after they paid a $50,000 ransom. Hadi related the 
ordeal, the phone call that left him in shock, the police captain who told him frankly that they 
wouldn't  be  able  to  help  him.  Hadi  knew they couldn't  help,  but  wanted  to  register  the 
abduction  in  case  of  the  worst  possible  outcome.  The  captain  gave  him  the  name  of  a 
shaqee15,  the  leader of an organised crime network who specialised in  finding kidnapped 
children. He found the  shaqee had his own office and “about a hundred armed men at the 
door”.  He agreed to  help,  took Hadi's  number and a  photograph of  his  son,  but found a 
different  kidnapped son who Hadi  returned to  his  parents.  It  was  only when Hadi  spoke 
directly with the kidnappers that he was able to exchange the cash for his son's life.16  
15 A shaqee is similar to the Lebanese qabadhay - a type of gangster. It literally means “tough man” from the 
word for toughness, shaqaawa [ةواقش – يقش]. Not all the shaqees are involved in benevolent activities.
16 As news travelled of what happened, Hadi was asked by other families to mediate in the release of twelve 
Mandaean hostages, all involving ransom payments of thousands of dollars. 
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I aged 20 years because of it, I swear, I jumped 20 years in my life. He would call me on 
the phone and say “Did you bring the money? Are you going to bring me the money or do I 
have to cut him into pieces and leave him at your front door in a sack?” He was young at 
the time, he was 12 years old. 
Soon after his release, Hadi took his family to Syria for some much needed relief from the 
daily ordeals of life in Baghdad. They registered with the UNHCR who told them they would 
have to wait six months for a resettlement interview. Hadi and his family returned to Baghdad 
after about 50 days in Syria but the threats kept coming and felt more serious than before. The 
kidnapping of his son had heightened the terror of the threats. But Hadi didn't want to leave 
Iraq,  he  did  not  want  to  surrender  his  political  freedoms  (Sen,  1999)  to  fight  for  his 
community. He decided to go to Arbil, the capital city of the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. 
There were Mandaeans there, and a Mandaean Association which sponsored their entry. The 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) enforced entry controls. Anyone who was not Kurdish 
and who did not have an ID card issued in an area under its control, needed to have a sponsor 
to enter the region.
 
Hadi expected to be able to continue his political and economic work in the stability and 
relative  economic  prosperity  of  the  Iraqi  Kurdish  region's  capital.  Instead,  he  spoke  of 
chauvinism  and  discrimination  in  Arbil,  and  of  political  conditions  similar  to  those  he 
experienced  in  Saddam's  time.  First  he  tried  to  make  use  of  the  economic  freedoms  he 
assumed the  relative security  of  the  KRG area  would allow him. He opened a  gold and 
jewellery store as he had not had an income since 2003. Hadi discovered that for non-Kurdish 
traders there were no  transparency guarantees (Sen, 1999: 39-40).  This is  the category of 
instrumental freedom which allows individuals to interact with each other “on some basic 
presumption  of  trust”  to  prevent  “corruption”  and “underhand dealings”  (ibid.).17 Shaykh 
Rami discovered earlier  that  he had no such transparency with the  police  and now Hadi 
discovered the same with respect  to Kurdish traders.  Kurdish traders borrowed and never 
repaid, they gave false addresses. The lack of transparency guarantees blocked his economic 
opportunities, highlighting the interdependent nature of these freedoms. Hadi closed his store 
in Arbil and continued to live without an income. The education system did not accommodate 
non-Kurdish speakers either, meaning that his children's social opportunities were restricted. 
17 See Chapter 1.
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When the Assayj, Kurdish Political Security (KPS), paid him a visit,  it  was clear that his 
political freedoms would also be curtailed in the KRG. 
They told me that they knew I was an activist who appeared on television. They told me I 
must not speak about minorities at all. I must not speak about the Christians, the Shabak, 
the Armenians, the Yazidis, even the Turkomans. They said if I wanted to speak I could 
speak about the Mandaeans. They told me I had to sign an agreement [to that effect]. If I 
didn't do it then I had to return to Baghdad. 
They told him that the other minorities were all Kurds and it was not his business to speak 
about them.18 After the deadly robbery of Shaykh Rami's family store took place, Hadi was 
contacted by Al Sharqiya satellite station for a telephone interview. He condemned police 
complicity, attacked the Iraqi government for failing to provide security, and denounced the 
Shia clergy in Najaf for their silence on the issue of the plight of Mandaeans.
The next day and after I started getting threatening phone calls from Baghdad. People were 
saying to me “How can you harass the police like that? How can you criticize the 
government? You're in Arbil, but don't think we can't get you there. We know where you 
are.”
A week later the Assayj came. They told me that I couldn't speak on television because I 
had signed an agreement. They said “you've embarrassed us in front of our allies”. They 
said that I now had to sign in with them on a weekly basis and that I must not leave the 
country without their permission. They were rough with me, the way the spoke. They were 
threatening me indirectly. 
The Assayj threatened to send him to Baghdad if he did not comply, despite his protestations 
that it would probably lead to his death. Hadi was afraid that something would soon happen to 
him and left Iraq for Syria. He had an ID card from the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce 
which allowed him to enter Syria without a visa. His wife went with him, as did his youngest 
son, permitted to because he was under 18 at the time. His older son Fadhel had to wait for a 
18 A worrying sign of the reproduction of oppressive behaviour. The Kurds in neighbouring Turkey were for 
long labelled “Mountain Turks” as a way of denying their Kurdish identity - the Kurdish language was 
banned from use in schools. 
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Syrian visa. The Assayj came looking for Hadi and found Fadhel instead. Angered that he had 
travelled without Assayj permission, they took Fadhel prisoner until Hadi returned to Arbil.  
Hadi had a friend who was an adviser to the KRG, he told him what happened and Hadi  
quickly returned to Iraq to free his son. Fadhel was released, but Hadi spent 59 days in a  
cramped prison until his friend in the KRG secured his released. Some days later, he secured 
an exit visa for Hadi. The Assayj allowed him to fly out of Iraq on February 14 th 2010, and he 
has not since returned.   
Hadi had clung to Iraq as tightly as he could, for as long as he could. The reasons he gave me 
were  a  mixture  of  moral  obligations,  emotional  attachment  to  Iraq,  and  a  resistance  to 
abandon his material and social connections. 
We are the original inhabitants of Iraq. … The problem with us Sabeans in particular is that 
we are nationalists, we're clinging to the land of Iraq. We love Iraq. I've left so much 
wealth in Iraq. I left my interests, and I have connections whose value cannot be measured 
in the billions of dollars. 
Mandaeans had an emotional attachment to Iraq and its rivers. It is where they had lived for 
centuries. Hadi's connections had helped him promote the interests of the sect and got him out 
of prison and other difficulties in the past.  In the 1980s he used his connections to avoid 
combat duties on the front line against Iran and was assigned administrative duties instead. In 
the 1990s he was able to speak to the Iraqi president about Mandaean issues and was also able 
to  arrange  a  private  meeting  with  the  governor  of  an  Iraqi  province  where  mid-level 
bureaucrats were obstructing the construction of a Mandaean temple. In 2010 his connection 
to  a  KRG advisor  probably  saved his  life,  preventing  his  imprisonment  in  Baghdad and 
perhaps his “disappearance”. 
Life in Baghdad, his wife Karima told me, “exhausted us to the point of despair, …. things 
just accumulated and accumulated.” Their son's kidnap was the final instalment of a sequence 
of events which pushed them to leave Baghdad, but it wasn't yet enough for Hadi to decide to 
leave Iraq. 
I insisted on staying because I had moral obligations to be there. I had work in the research 
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centres, and in civil society organisations like the Iraq Minorities Council, I had a lot of 
serious responsibilities. I went to Arbil in order not to leave Iraq. I thought maybe the 
situation would get better. I figured I could stay in Arbil and at least my name was still in 
Iraq. I did it in order to be free of the threats and preserve myself and my family. I wanted 
to breathe and for my family to breathe.
Hadi insisted that the decisions of others to leave did not affect him. Relatives abroad were 
astonished that he remained in Iraq, trying to persuade him over the phone to leave. Hadi 
believed his decision to remain for so long influenced other Mandaeans.   
Of course there were many people who were waiting with me in Iraq. They used to say that 
as long as Hadi is here in Iraq, there is hope that Iraq will become better. … As a known 
face, as a Mandaean activist, many of our friends, and many Mandaeans who saw me from 
a distance, knew that as long as I was in Iraq there was a hope in Iraq. That was a fact.
So there were those who left after you, because you left?
 It was a justification for them, a reason to persuade themselves that it was over, that it 
wasn't worth remaining so let's leave. So and so had left, he had left too. If there was any 
good left in Iraq then they wouldn't have left. They would justify it like that. They needed a 
reason for themselves, to justify it to themselves. He would have been ready to leave 
psychologically.
The pressures had earlier accumulated in Baghdad to push Hadi's family beyond a threshold: 
no longer assured of important baselines, they left Baghdad for Arbil hoping for security and 
for Hadi to be able to generate income and continue his political activities. But again in Arbil 
they  were  pushed  beyond  a  threshold  by  coercive  circumstances  and  a  very  direct  and 
personal threat to Hadi from Kurdish security services.  Again the threats had accumulated. 
The threats in Arbil were to their freedom to generate income and to their children's education 
and social  opportunities.  Public services were not wretched and there was no generalised 
violence  and  insecurity  in  Arbil.  But  now Hadi  faced  a  specific  threat  from the  Assayj: 
imprisonment and possibly transfer to Baghdad where he could face indefinite detention or 
death. These threats aggregated with their experience of living in a coercive landscape in 
Baghdad to force them out of Iraq altogether. The Kurdish areas were no longer a refuge from 
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the state of violence in Baghdad. Having received threats from powerful figures in Arab and 
Kurdish areas of Iraq, it is difficult to see a possibility for Hadi and his family to safely return 
to Iraq. But this is what the perpetrators of the threats intended to achieve. Hadi described a 
situation in which the presence of a prominent community member adds to the morale of 
those who remain in a situation of crisis. When that figure is forced to leave, key resources are 
removed from the community and solidarity is weakened as part of a purposeful strategy to 
rid an area of a  specific  population (Marfleet,  2006: 245).  But  Hadi suggested that those 
people  had  already  prepared  themselves  to  leave,  they  just  needed  a  final  justification. 
Perhaps it was because by the time Hadi left Iraq in 2010, things were already so dire for 
others that leaving Iraq was an easy decision to make. If they had experienced similar threats 
to Hadi,  similar constraints  of their  economic and political  freedoms, a depletion of their 
social opportunities, and of their freedoms to practice their faith, then it is likely that Hadi's 
assessment of their motivations is correct. Hadi resisted longer than others before deciding to 
leave. It was, he told me, so that he wouldn't regret leaving. “But later I realised that I had left 
it very late. I should have left earlier, regrettably.” 
Abu Waleed decides to leave
We heard from Hadi and Shaykh Rami about how living in a state of violence affected the 
Mandaeans.  This situation impacted strongly on the Palestinians too.  Earlier,  Abu Waleed 
spoke of the increasing hostility against the Palestinians of Iraq. They were stripped of their 
permanent  residency  by  the  state.  Their  tenancy  situations  became  precarious  as  private 
landlords began forcibly evicting them in order to increase their rental income, something the 
Palestinians were shielded from by the former regime. Abu Waleed moved apartment because 
his  rent  trebled  and  he  sensed  a  veiled  threat  in  a  conversation  with  the  landlord.  The 
American Army had raided the Palestinian Embassy. Later, a hostile media campaign began 
against the Palestinians and a group of them were falsely accused of a terrorist attack in a 
Baghdad market. Palestinians were being killed, as Abu Waleed recalls, on a weekly basis. 
Despite these changes, these threats and pressures, Abu Waleed had not wanted to leave Iraq. 
It was a prime topic of concern in the community. 
Did you used to meet together and discuss the situation, whether to stay or not?
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Of course of course, almost every day. In people's homes, in cafés, in the street, people 
would discuss it almost every day. During any meeting in any place, the conversations 
Palestinians were having in Baghdad from 2003 to 2006 included “are you going to leave? 
When are you going to leave?” That was the topic.
Abu Waleed persistently argued that they should remain in Iraq, that was until February 2006, 
when  the  Al  Askari  shrine  in  Samarra  was  bombed  and  identity  killings  -  people  being 
murdered based on their confessional affiliation – intensified in the city. 
The dividing line for me was not the occupation of Iraq, it was the event of Samarra. We 
lived four difficult days in the house. There was a curfew and there was no food outside. 
There was a curfew outside. All there was between you and the world was the television, 
when there was electricity. There were identity killings close by. The Baladiyat residential 
compound [where many Palestinians lived] was targeted. Five Palestinians were killed in a 
day or two days. Two brothers were amongst them. They killed them and they mutilated 
their bodies. They wouldn't give the bodies to their families. There was a raid on the 
Baladiyat compound. There were clashes between militia men and Palestinians in the 
compound.
Abu Waleed described how hours after the Samarra bombing sectarian militias roamed the 
streets of Baghdad and began identity killings, attacking and burning mosques in the process. 
Reprisals accelerated into a bloody and barbarous cycle. Harling (2011) identifies the Mehdi 
Army as the culprits and comments that “as the horror escalated, [it] destroyed any sense of 
shared humanity” (Harling, 2011:48). Abu Waleed was acutely aware of this as he monitored 
his surroundings. Already under attack for being Palestinian, they found themselves deeper in 
danger as now they were targets for another reason: most of them were Sunni Muslims. Abu 
Waleed reeled off the names and causes of death of Palestinians in Iraq - he was documenting 
them for a community website.19 But as a group they had a heightened awareness of the deaths 
in their community. Not only was it relatively small but three quarters of them hailed from the 
same three villages in Palestine. There was intermarriage between the families so news of 
19 The site www.paliraq.com contains details about the situation of Palestinians in Iraq, and those who have 
been able to resettle in third countries, like Sweden.  
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deaths and kidnappings would travel quickly. A close friend of Abu Waleed's was strangled, 
and he would hear news of what felt like a deliberate targeting of Palestinian men. One such 
story was of three Palestinian craftsmen who were ambushed at a petrol station. Armed men 
sprayed their car with bullets and fled, leading Abu Waleed to the conclusion that it was a 
deliberate attack. 
In the widespread violence, it was difficult to assess the motives behind all of the killings that 
took place. Was it a violent robbery? Was it an exemplary attack designed to frighten a group?  
Was it a sectarian killing? Certainly these motives were not mutually exclusive. These threats 
were experienced by all Baghdadis during 2006 and 2007, which Abu Waleed described as the 
“worst two years in Iraq's history”. 
It was in that environment that people were becoming increasingly convinced that they 
were under threat and that we shouldn't remain in Iraq. Most people were trying to get 
along with their lives, to evade the effects of the situation. 
But how can a person evade these things?
He wouldn't move so much. He would speak Iraqi Arabic well. He wouldn't leave the 
house a lot.  Most of the Palestinian victims were killed on their way to work, or on their 
way home from work, or at checkpoints. Everyone one of them has a story. They were 
targeted. The developments in Iraq passed through a very dangerous course. For two years 
and ten months I had accepted the idea that the occupation had happened and that what was 
happening to Iraqis was also going to happen to Palestinians living in Iraq, and that I 
would live through this period, cautiously. It wouldn't last for ever. I would live like the 
Iraqis. But events didn't take that course. … We didn't have much electricity and there was 
no movement or transport. I realised during that period - with the worry that was burdening 
us, our family, and most Palestinian families – with the events that were happening and 
spreading that I would be targeted, or someone in my family would be targeted, or maybe 
the whole family might be targeted. I had to think seriously about leaving Iraq. The country 
wasn't safe for us, the whole country wasn't safe generally but specifically for us as 
Palestinians, we were very very much in danger. In the end I had to leave.
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Abu Waleed no longer  felt  safe  being a  Palestinian or  a  Sunni  Muslim in Baghdad.  His  
mobility was severely restricted – there was a coercive proposal inherent in every journey 
within the city: remain confined to the house perhaps without necessary basic supplies, and 
certainly  without  electricity,  or  make  the  journey  and  risk  death.  He  pretended  to  be  a 
Christian from northern Iraq but Christians were not entirely safe as a group either. During the 
worst of the violence no groups were truly safe in the city. Sunnis and Shias could move to 
neighbourhoods  where  notionally  they  were  protected  by  armed  groups  with  the  same 
confessional affiliation and some Christians were able to move to Christian settlements in the 
north of Iraq (though that was not without problems). Palestinians had no such option, in a 
similar way to the Mandaeans. They did not have villages in the north and there was no militia  
controlled area that was safe for them.
To Abu Waleed, circumstances presented a clear coercive proposal. Stay in Iraq and face what 
he believed would result in certain death, for himself or a family member. Or leave and face 
the uncertainty of life in Syria. The baseline was about preserving the lives of his family. Iraq 
was his country of birth and where he was raised. It was, he told me, his home despite a strong 
attachment to Palestine. Leaving was, emotionally, an extremely difficult decision. Leaving 
and remaining were both unpalatable proposals but  remaining carried a heavier price.  He 
waited for his eldest daughter to graduate and took his family to Damascus, from where he 
assigned a Palestinian lawyer in Baghdad to collect his daughter's graduation certificate. The 
lawyer was later killed on his way home from his office: the $2000 cash that was in his car 
was stolen, making it unclear if it was a robbery or a targeted murder or both, and further 
vindicating Abu Waleed's decision to leave. The events of 2006 and the ensuing descent into a 
violent abyss, a transformation of the country into a state of violence, changed Abu Waleed's 
perception of his environment. He could sense an imminent threat, a general danger imposed 
on every resident of the city. He was now living in a coercive landscape and was doubly a 
target for being Palestinian and for being Sunni. The norms of protection had been weakened 
after 2003 but after 2006 they were completely destroyed in the perception of Abu Waleed. 
Conclusion 
Displacement is a process which can be better explained with a broader understanding of 
threat and by considering how threat perception varies between and within reference groups. 
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In this chapter the cases of Mandaean Iraqis and the Palestinians of Iraq. I again mobilised the  
notions of coercive proposals and hard choices (Wertheimer, 1987) to shed light on the forced 
nature of migration decisions and the specific types of coercion experienced by these minority  
communities.  I  have  shown the  importance  of  analysing  the  circumstances  which  coerce 
agents  into decisions.  Coercive proposals  and hard choices are  not  only imposed by one 
individual upon another, but also by changed environments which threaten valued baselines. 
These baselines not only relate to immediate survival, but also to different types of freedoms. 
I referred to the religious freedoms which were restricted for Mandaeans. I also discussed the 
instrumental freedoms, outlines in Chapter 1,20 which allow a person to live in a valued way 
and these included economic and political freedoms as well as transparency guarantees (Sen, 
1999: 39-40). The narratives in this chapter showed how these dynamics affected the lives of 
minority groups in Iraq. While some of their experiences overlapped with those of the wider 
Iraqi society, with the general sense of insecurity associated with living in a state of violence 
(Harling, 2011), their baselines were threatened in ways specific to these groups. 
I  have  also  shown how the  dynamics  of  cumulative  causation  played a  coercive  role  in 
migration decisions – both in decisions to leave and decisions to stay. As noted already, the 
departure of members of a community or group affects the context within which those who 
remain make decisions (Douglas Massey, 1990). In Chapters 4 and 5, and in this chapter, it 
was  evident  that  the  dynamics of  cumulative causation  coerced Iraqis  into leaving.  Such 
pressures were exerted on members of Iraq's minorities in this chapter. In Chapter 5 I also 
noted that feedback mechanisms immobilised those without the resources to cushion against 
the financial risks which leaving could entail. In this chapter the phenomenon was referred to 
again in relation to Mandaean families who did not have the economic buffer necessary to risk 
a protracted period of living in Syria without an income. Feedback from cumulative causation 
can force both movement and immobility.
The resources available to an agent directly affected migration decisions and displacement 
experiences. In Chapter 5 I discussed the effects of a lack of resources on decisions to leave 
and to stay. In this chapter the stories of Hadi and Shaykh Rami contrasted with previous 
stories of Farah and Yousif. Hadi in particular had substantial  economic assets and social 
connections to draw upon in his efforts to evade threats and to remain in Iraq for as long as he 
20 See Chapter 1, pp. 24-26.
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safely could.  He was also able  to  hire  a  driver  for  his  wife  and daughter  to  temporarily 
mitigate against constraints to mobility which they experienced as Mandaean women. This 
example also shows how gender, confessional identity and economic assets intersect in ways 
which  have  implications  for  displacement.  In  Chapter  5  Um  Ahmed  was  able  to  drive 
unaccompanied in different parts of Baghdad, as a Shia Arab woman who could also pass as a 
Sunni Arab. She drove her children to and from school and her mobility was not constrained 
in the same way as that of the women in Hadi's family. 
When  all  of  these  threats  and  constraints  combine  -  appearing  in  different  spaces  and 
threatening multiple baselines - agents are confronted with a coercive landscape. The essence 
of  the  coercive  landscape  remained  similar  for  most  Iraqis  –  a  social  and  physical 
environment laden with threats to baselines, to instrumental freedoms, to physical safety and 
one in which life is heavily constrained. However, the experience of the coercive landscape 
differed for minority groups, in the sense that their understanding of threat and experience of 
it  was specific, as I have outlined in the previous pages. Again,  the presence of coercive 
proposals in daily life and the accumulation of threats led the participants in this chapter into 
hard choice situations. Their options were limited to a set of unpalatable proposals. Migration,  
a coerced decision to leave their homes and eventually to leave Iraq, was the least unpalatable 
of these proposals. 
The stories of Hadi,  Shaykh Rami and Abu Waleed indicate the cumulative nature of the 
displacement process and the ways in which threats and constraints accumulate to force a 
migration  decision.  Their  stories  illustrate  how threats  and constraints  can  be  understood 
collectively by minority groups and how changes to the environment can result in changes to 
threat perception. In the climate of insecurity that plagued Iraq from 2003, people like Abu 
Waleed still believed they could remain in the country through threat evasion strategies and 
perseverance. After 2006 when the situation became one of a state of violence, the sense of 
threat changed. It was heightened and intensified in a way that permeated multiple spaces in 
daily life: many Iraqis were living in a coercive landscape. Threats became a feature of daily 
life, coercive proposals had to be taken into account with formerly routine tasks and journeys. 
In  the  concluding  discussion  I  propose  that  the  concept  of  a  coercive  landscape  can  be 
mobilised  in  forced  migration  studies  to  understand  the  displacement  experience  more 
holistically.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: Hard choices in coercive landscapes
As I suggested in Chapter 1, it is the element of duress in the decision making process which 
must be considered if we are to better understand forced migration. Forced migrations are 
indeed “hard choices” to borrow Wertheimer's words (1987), or “excruciating choices” to use 
Richmond's (1994: 53). Richmond is a rare example of a scholar addressing what it means to 
be forced  to  make a  decision to  leave.  Penz (2002:  10-11)  also made advances with  the 
concept of migration intended by agents to escape “harms” to livelihoods. Discussions about 
the meaning of force in these journeys are few in the field of refugee studies, yet the concept 
is widely used and taken for granted. The contributions of Penz and Richmond to the debate  
are valuable. However Richmond doubted the validity of the distinction between forced and 
free choices in migration because, he noted, all human actions are constrained (ibid.). What 
was important was his recognition of the extreme constraint and stress in forced migration 
decisions  (Richmond,  1994:55).  It  is  necessary  to  recognise  that  being confined to  those 
choices is against the will of the agent (Wertheimer, 1987:301-302) and that is the route to 
understanding the forced nature of the refugee experience. I have mobilised the notion of a 
hard choice situation throughout the thesis to highlight the forced nature of Iraqis' decisions to 
leave their  homes. To recap: a “hard choice” is an extreme form of coercive proposal. A 
coercive proposal confines an agent to options that will leave him/her worse off in relation to 
an accepted baseline – but not necessarily in a  parlous state (Wertheimer, 1997: 204). It could 
mean a reduced income or a longer journey to work. A “hard choice” situation is similar to a 
coercive proposal but intensely constrained. The options available are extremely unpalatable - 
they will leave the agent in dire straits whichever one of the proposals he or she chooses 
(Wertheimer, 1987: 233). The consequences of the hard choice may be of especial importance 
and their scope is characteristically limited by their unattractiveness (ibid.). They can leave an 
agent in acute economic insecurity or threaten physical safety. To be worse off is to recognise 
that there is a baseline below which an agent does not wish to fall and that the baseline is 
subjectively understood (Wertheimer, 1987). 
The framework  used by Wertheimer relates  to  interpersonal  coercive proposals  -  when a 
proposal and a threat combine to form a coercive proposal.  This happens when person A 
threatens  to  leave  person B worse  off  in  relation  to  a  baseline if  B does  not  accept  the 
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proposal, and only less worse off if the proposal is accepted I also looked at “throffers” – an 
offer that leaves a person better off if she accepts it or worse off if she does not. But none of 
the cases I studied contained real “throffers” - only coercive proposals. Earlier, I suggested 
expanding this to include social circumstances that present an agent with a coercive proposal 
to which the agent responds. I have drawn attention to the ways in which Iraqis in this study 
have understood these proposals and responded to them with strategies of evasion. When 
these  coercive  proposals  permeate  a  multiplicity  of  spaces  in  daily  life,  when  threat  is 
perceived in multiple spaces, the agent's environment becomes a coercive landscape. Iraqis 
assessed their options and attempted to  navigate  safely through the coercive landscape in 
response to the threats pervading it. Some of them believed that their survival was dependent 
on escaping the coercive landscape altogether and those with the means to leave eventually 
did. Forced migration choices are threat-induced and part of evasive strategies undertaken by 
agents who are highly attuned to the dangers around them. The understanding of threat is 
subjective in various ways: it is understood differently by individuals and reference groups 
and their understanding in turn changes as their surroundings evolve in ways that can heighten 
their sense of threat. These choices are made after a process of displacement which is often 
protracted and holistic in nature. For many Iraqis migration was a desperate option after a 
sequence of constraining and often violent episodes in a climate of generalised threat and 
insecurity.
Generalised  threat  was  caused  by  Iraq's  transformation  into  a  “state  of  violence”  which 
operates in distinction to a “state of law” (Harling, 2011). In a state of violence norms and 
practices that members of society rely upon in a state of law - for a degree of protection and 
security - do not function. In Iraq, they were replaced with violent activities as a range of 
different armed actors aspiring to control the nascent state vied for control of different social 
spaces in increasingly brutal ways. In a state of violence, of generalised insecurity, the spaces 
in people's lives become laced with threats and a person, family or reference group is likely to 
perceive threats in a myriad of spaces in their social world. Their environment becomes a 
coercive landscape. In this landscape threats can accumulate to the point at which individuals 
and  reference  groups  are  confronted  with  adjustments  to  their  social  circumstances  that 
constitute  a  threat  to  survival.  They  are  forced  to  take  radical  decisions  –  hard  choices 
characterised by their lack of scope - against their will in order to navigate through or escape 
from the coercive landscape altogether. Threat perception is heightened with the aggregation 
of  pressures  and constraints  that  come with  a  collapse of  security  and public  protection. 
People responded to these threats in different ways as the sense of danger gathered impetus. 
195
Actions which may have seemed relatively unthreatening – such as members of a political 
movement  asking about  a  person's  whereabouts or  graffiti  on the  front  gate  – took on a  
different meaning as the sense of threat pervaded broader circumstances. This was especially 
true when the agent belonged to a reference group that was being targeted or purged.   
Deliberations and consultations 
In Chapter 1 I considered Aristotle's reflections about making moral choices – those relating 
to practical matters which can be achieved through an agent's own instrumentality.1 Aristotle 
observed that agents examine the means available to them, and which of those means are most  
viable  and creditable.  They deliberate  with  co-adjustors  in  counsel  to  consider  important 
choices  (Aristotle,  NE iii  3:  61-63).  I  also considered the  role  of  household members in 
making  decisions  to  leave.  In  the  subsequent  data  chapters,  I  have  assessed  how Iraqis 
examined their options and which members of the household or family unit  had the most 
control over the decision. I looked at whether or not co-adjustors were sought in counsel and 
the extent to which they influenced decisions to leave. In cases examined in earlier chapters,  
the decision to leave was taken by the man heading the household. The women did figure in 
the calculations, the deliberations and the preparations. But even where the adult woman had 
a  strong  role  in  the  family  and  initiated  the  move,  the  man  still  held  veto  power.  The 
household featured strongly in decisions to leave. Men made decisions with the household 
and the security of its members in mind. There was little evidence of significant influence 
from non-kinship  networks.  As stated already,  the  household does  not  refer  solely to  the 
people  living  in  a  physical  structure  but  to  a  dynamic  and  fluid  unit  that  transcends 
geographical  place;  it  includes  individuals  who  live  in  a  variety  of  locations  (Cohen  & 
Sirkeci,  2011:  28).  The  information  and  resources  of  close  relatives  living  abroad  were 
considered during the decision making process and also after it to implement the decision. 
The  household  itself  evolves  in  ways  that  can  influence  migration  decisions.  Majeed's 
household in Iraq grew larger in a way that meant he could not afford to return from Syria, 
also showing how a lack of material resources can limit mobility. Household members living 
abroad  played  key  roles  in  other  decisions,  as  providers  of  information  and  financial 
assistance. 
The  efforts  of  non-family,  non-household  networks  were  less  influential.  Christian  and 
1
See Chapter 1, pp.32-33.
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Mandaean priests could only play advisory roles and were unable to persuade members of 
their faith groups to remain in Iraq. The Mandaean clergy stopped trying after the dangers of 
being a Mandaean in Iraq became so grave.  The Palestinians of Iraq had daily discussions 
about deciding to leave - in cafés, in the street and in each other's homes. But Abu Waleed's 
decision to leave was, he told me, entirely his own and with the safety of his family members 
in mind.  Once a decision to leave had been made, it  remained within the confines of the 
nuclear family. Safety fears factored in this: a family on the move was more vulnerable to 
attack by armed groups. 
State transformation and coercive circumstances 
State transformation resulted in coercive changes that threatened to take particular reference 
groups below an acceptable baseline. Those perceived to belong to the old Iraqi order as its 
employees, and others perceived to have been its beneficiaries such as the Palestinians of Iraq,  
were targeted systematically by the new order. So too were those who represented the old 
order symbolically in as much as they were evidence of a multi-confessional Iraq. That was 
how the Iraqi Mandaeans I interviewed made sense of their situation. They, along with former 
military officers and high level administrators, and the Palestinian refugees resident in Iraq, 
seem to have been perceived as the embodiment of the former Ba'athi regime. The state, as 
noted  by  Gardner  (2012:  28),  is  not  only  conceived  of  as  laws,  bureaucracies,  and 
apparatuses.  It  is  also  understood  as  “a  configuration  of  powers  inseparable2 from  the 
embodiment  in  individual  citizens.”  They  were  directly  targeted  after  the  former  state 
collapsed and a new order began to emerge from it. The Palestinians of Iraq were victims of 
statecraft – the craft of state building - actions intended to strengthen the state (Soguk, 1999). 
The nascent Iraqi state was weak and the Palestinians vulnerable: by targeting them it could 
masquerade its weakness as strength. The policies of the Iraqi state were understood by the 
Palestinians as a collective threat. Under foreign occupation and in a climate of generalised 
violence, attacks on Mandaeans and Palestinians took on a greater meaning: both believed 
they were being targeted as part of concerted efforts to remove them forcibly from Iraq. Their 
sense of threat was heightened as the number of attacks on their  members increased and 
communal violence escalated after 2006. The narratives of the Mandaeans and Palestinians, 
and also Christian and Sunni Iraqis, suggest that while Iraq's minorities shared many of the 
same experiences  of  threats  with  their  compatriots,  they  also  experienced threat  in  ways 
specific to belonging to a minority. Minority experiences of displacement related to state-
transformation deserves further attention from scholars. It would be useful to consider the 
2 Emphasis in original.
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experiences of Iraq's minorities comparatively in historical and geographic terms, with those 
of other minority groups.
Transformations of state manifested themselves in different ways and in different spaces in 
the lives of the Iraqis in this study. We saw in earlier chapters how spaces in people's lives 
were altered in coercive ways. Threats appeared in the school and neighbourhood causing 
them to take evasive actions until they were safe or until the threats could no longer be evaded  
and migration became necessary to avoid danger. We also saw evidence of the different forms 
that displacement can take, the restrictions upon people's instrumental freedoms (Sen, 1999) 
that it can impose. Political, religious and economic freedoms, as well as social opportunities 
and transparency guarantees, are the main groupings I outlined in Chapter 1 based on Sen's 
(1999) development framework.3 Being able to exercise these freedoms in spaces that do not 
contain threats to physical safety were baselines that some of my participants valued enough 
to  make  them leave  in  search  of  being  assured  of  them elsewhere.  Threat  must  also  be 
considered as circumstantial changes which put the exercise of these freedoms at risk.  The 
collapse of the state under occupation created a situation in which armed groups flourished 
and their activities produced threatening alterations to important spaces in daily life which 
prevented agents from utilising valued instrumental freedoms In addition to the American 
Army there were mercenaries  and armed Resistance fighters.  The Mehdi  Army,  the Badr 
Brigade, and groups related to Al Qaeda in Iraq also benefited from the absence of centralised 
state authority. This was in addition to the criminal gangs that terrorized the population and 
were often indistinguishable – if not a part of - the militia groups. Their actions directly and 
indirectly constrained the freedoms of many Iraqis in this study – threatening their freedoms 
in addition to their physical safety.  
The  coercive  transformations  of  space  I  presented  in  Chapter  5  were  not  in  themselves 
decisive  events  but  part  of  a  process  of  displacement  and  an  accumulation  of  perceived 
threats. Baan's school became a site of armed conflict but it was not enough in itself to make 
her parents decide to leave Iraq. Jasim's parents took him to Syria after an explosion in the 
school he was transferred to in order to evade  armed conflict near  his first school. In both 
cases  they  were  threats  to  physical  safety,  but  in  Jasim's  case  they had appeared  after  a 
sequence  of  other  violent  episodes  and  pressures  on  his  family  overall.  Baan's  family 
eventually  left  their  neighbourhood  but  again  after  a  sequence  of  violent  episodes  and 
3 See pp. 24-26 and Sen (1999).
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transformations which heightened her mother's perception of threat. Their experiences show 
the  cumulative  nature  of  displacement,  a  process  that  can  lead  to  a  forced  migration. 
Displacement and forced migration are connected but should not be conflated (Lubkemann, 
2008) as many people experience the constraints and pressures of the displacement process 
but do not relocate from their normal place of residence. They are displaced in place (ibid.) 
and those who wish to move but cannot do so are “involuntarily immobilised” (ibid.). This is 
in  the  sense  that  they  cannot  relocate  to  another  country  –  or  perhaps  even  to  another 
residence in the same country.  However,  as seen in the lives of my participants,  there is 
typically a lot of mobility involved in their threat evasion strategies regardless of whether 
relocation is possible or not.
Threats on the move and the gendered nature of displacement
In a state of violence, mobility is heavily affected - typically constrained. A key feature of the 
coercive landscape in Iraq was the lethal threat understood to be implicit in every journey 
made – especially in Baghdad - during 2006-2007. The routes to school and work, and to 
home, became places of danger. This was because of the presence and actions of US forces, 
Iraqi government forces, and other groups fighting them and each other. These armed groups 
often  directly  attacked civilians  and  Iraqis  found themselves  in  great  peril  as  they  made 
journeys to work, school, and to buy food. A network of concrete blast barriers and dividing 
walls obstructed and complicated movement in the city. Checkpoints, where people were shot 
if they were carrying the wrong type of ID card, pervaded the city. Many Iraqis tried to limit  
their journeys to those of necessity and to avoid routes disrupted by checkpoints. Constraints 
on one type of freedom can adversely affect a person's ability to exercise others. A threat to 
the freedom of mobility is a threat to the freedom to do a range of things. The story of Raz's  
father  illustrated  this  in  Chapter  5.  When Mehdi  Army gunmen came to  kill  him in  his 
workplace they missed him but in doing so changed his perception of threat. Leaving his 
neighbourhood – impervious to the Mehdi Army as it was protected by the Resistance – now 
contained  a  lethal  threat.  Remaining  in  Iraq  meant  living  without  an  income  and  being 
confined to the few streets protected by the Resistance. 
The gendered nature of displacement was salient in the case of mobility. Displacement as the 
appearance of threats in spaces of transit affected men and women differently. The threat of 
violence combined with gender relations to increase restrictions on women's mobility, and 
also to put men in greater physical danger. In this coercive landscape women were often not 
allowed to travel alone, especially the younger ones who were potential targets for rapists and 
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kidnappers (though the eldest son of a family was considered to fetch the highest ransom). 
Men were at risk of sexual assault too. Whilst working as a translator, I met an Iraqi man who 
was subjected to multiple sexual assaults at a police station in Baghdad. He explained that he 
was  detained  on  false  grounds  so  that  police  could  extort  money  from  his  relatives  in 
exchange for his release.
Unlike men, women were also not typically  expected to go out and generate income. Many 
Iraqi women have had to do so as a result of necessity, particularly widows.The shopkeeper 
whose  murder  was  witnessed  by Anwar  was  a  woman,  but  I  was  unable  to  feature  this 
demographic in my study. Anwar's parents were too old to work and so he had to. He told me 
that  it  would have  been considered  shameful  for  the  family  to  allow his  sisters  to  work 
because this would mean that the men were incapable of providing for them. Jobs were scarce 
so many men worked as makeshift taxi drivers in their private cars despite the risks. This had 
become  an  extremely  hazardous  way  to  make  a  living  in  Baghdad.  Hadi  told  me  of  a  
neighbour who was killed for straying into the wrong neighbourhood whilst working as a taxi 
driver. A man from outside a neighbourhood that was in the midst of intense armed conflict  
could be seen as a threat – sometimes a challenge. In some situations it was safer for a woman 
to be seen driving than a man. This is not to say that women were safe driving alone: Hadi's 
wife and daughter were afraid to because Mandaean women travelling alone were at risk of 
assault by extremists. He had the financial resources to pay a Muslim neighbour to drive his 
daughter  to  university  and  elsewhere.  But  that  ceased  after  Mehdi  Army  militia  men 
intimidated the driver. Hadi's wife stopped driving altogether. To leave the house she was 
advised to wear a headscarf by a worried Muslim neighbour.  The Mehdi Army had been 
threatening Christians where they lived and she wanted her to dress like a Muslim to avoid 
this risk. When militias roamed the streets, harassment by armed groups for not wearing a 
headscarf was a  problem for Iraqi women generally. Maher's wife Rania spoke of Mehdi 
Army members at the university of Baghdad pressuring women to cover their hair. What was 
also interesting was the intersection of gender, communal identity and material resources and 
their implications for displacement. Hadi's wife was able to mitigate these constraints – which 
related to  her  being a  Mandaean woman -  temporarily  because of  the  material  resources 
available  to  her  family.  Um Ahmed did not  have  the  same resources  at  her  disposal  but 
because of her identity as a Muslim woman who could pass as either a Sunni or a Shia, she 
was able to drive alone in areas she calculated were safe. 
While men were in greater physical danger during mobility, the women in this study appear to 
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have experienced the greater restriction overall on their mobility. Farah believed that adults 
were using the security situation as an excuse to exert more control over young women. Baan 
felt frustrated that she was not allowed to leave the house unsupervised yet the same rules did 
not apply to her older brother. She grew up in Baghdad but knew the streets of Damascus 
much  better,  even  though  she  had  only  lived  there  for  one  year.  This  was  because  in 
Damascus she was allowed to travel unsupervised as it was safe to do so at the time. The 
gendered nature of displacement  – and the interaction of gender with other identities and 
material resources - is worth investigating further.
Cumulative Causation 
Cumulative causation was clearly present in the displacement process. To recap on Chapter 1, 
migration is cumulatively effected “in the sense that each act of migration alters the social 
context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make 
additional  migration  more  likely”  (Massey  et  al.,  1998:  45-46).  Movement  of  kinship 
networks across borders, such as to Syria and Jordan, can also facilitate journeys of those who 
remain.  They  act  as  points  of  information  and  support  for  new  arrivals,  provide  the 
information needed in pre-migratory planning, and also help to find new arrivals somewhere 
to live in their destination.  But the flight of others, the movement of kin and other community 
networks, does not only work as a facilitator. It can work coercively, resulting in leaving 
agents  below the  baseline  of  family  and community  integrity.  As I  observed in  previous 
chapters,  separation  from kinship  and  other  networks  is  a  type  of  displacement.  It  is  a 
development  which  makes  additional  journeys  to  reunite  with  family  and  community 
networks more likely. This is a coercive pressure exerted on those who remained and who had  
not decided to leave but were soon compelled into doing so. There is a coercive proposal at 
work. Those who remain after other relatives have departed do so knowing that they must live 
without the support that kinship networks provide. Yousif's situation was a salient example in 
Chapter 5.  Aside from one unmarried uncle,  he had no extended family left  in  Iraq.  His 
relatives had all left for Australia and elsewhere. As well as the loss of proximate support 
networks there was the added pressure of his relatives attempting to persuade Yousif and his 
family to join them. But the economic risk was too great for his father to take: he feared being  
in  a  situation  of  financial  dependency  on  his  relatives  which  he  considered  worse  than 
remaining  in  Baghdad.  Yusif's  case  also  illustrates  the  contrasting  feedback  dynamic  of 
cumulative causation – one which compels agents not to migrate. As a result of information 
feeding back about the possibilities of impoverishment in Syria and Jordan, where Iraqis took 
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refuge but were not formally allowed to work, they developed a heightened association of 
migration with a risk to economic security.
Displacement also took the form of the depletion of the cultural community – as in the cases 
of the Mandaeans and Christians. Yousif observed dwindling numbers of the congregation at 
his church. As well as affecting his social life this also meant that maintaining the community 
became more difficult. He is a Chaldean Christian and expressed his preference to marry and 
procreate  with  a  co-religionist.  The  Mandaeans  too  have  dwindled  in  number  and  any 
Mandaean who marries outside the religious group is spurned by it. The departure of key 
figures in a community affects its integrity. As I noted in Chapter 6 with the Mandaeans, it can 
also affect its functioning and this is a deliberate strategy of armed groups aiming to forcibly 
depopulate certain areas (Marfleet, 2006). It was not only priests who were key figures but 
also visible activists such as Hadi. Other Mandaeans expressed their relief at knowing he had 
remained in Iraq - that they felt hope for the community as long as key figures remained. Key 
figures helped to maintain the morale of those who remained. Conversely, their departure 
curtailed it.  By considering the reality of an entire community's departure we can further see 
how  minorities  were  affected  more  intensely  by  displacement,  something  also  worth 
considering in future comparative studies.
Cumulative  causation  also  worked  coercively  outside  the  kinship  context.  Within  the 
neighbourhood there was the unsettling effect of finding that the street was emptied of its 
residents in the pre-invasion exodus from Baghdad. Anwar's mother and sister had initially 
decided to remain in Baghdad but changed their minds because they were unsettled by the 
flight of  their  neighbours.  Similarly,  in  2006, Um Ahmed watched as Shia families were 
threatened and left their homes on her street within a space of a few months. They were the 
last Shia family remaining on the street and this change created a sharp sense of insecurity,  
showing how the  flight  of  others coerces  those who remain.  Beyond the  neighbourhood, 
cumulative causation coerces people to leave when the departure of members of a reference 
group diminishes the assets and integrity of group members who do not leave. The coercive 
proposal is thus: stay behind and be part of a vanishing community under threat in Iraq, such 
as the Mandaeans, or leave and attempt to rejoin the group in a less threatening setting abroad,  
but one with a different set of insecurities to confront. As I noted earlier, the Mandaeans who 
did not leave Iraq were less able to practise their rituals. They were also less able to procreate 
as they were not permitted to marry outside their religious community.
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Scholars of migration have already demonstrated the benefits of exploring the dynamics of 
cumulative  causation.  I  have  argued  that  the  theory  is  worth  investigating  in  a  forced 
migration context. I suggest that population movements in a displacement crisis can be similar  
to those identified by Massey and others (1990, 1993, 2005) in migrations between Mexico 
and the United States. There is also evidence that the dynamics of cumulative causation not 
only facilitate migration but can also force it. In a situation of economic crisis and generalised 
violence, the departure of proximate support networks has a powerful effect on those who 
remain – they are faced with the possibility of enduring arduous circumstances alone. It is 
also clear that negative feedback from cumulative causation can curb mobility. In light of my 
findings in this study, I believe it would be productive for scholars to consider two issues in 
future  research.  One  is  that  the  dynamics  of  cumulative  causation  in  other  contexts  of 
displacement  should  be  assessed.  The  other  is  to  reconsider  the  “economic”  migration 
contexts, in which cumulative causation has already been identified, in light of its coercive 
dynamics.  By examining how “economic” migrants experienced the coercive pressures of 
cumulative causation, it is also worth asking if their migrations should be considered forced in 
nature.
The displacement process and coercive landscapes
I have attempted to show that a forced migration is a decision to move taken under duress, in 
accordance with the decision maker's  evolving perception of threat and after a process of 
displacement.  Cumulative causation plays a  role  in  this  process,  as  discussed above. The 
process can also include constraints related to transformations of state and to the coercive 
alterations of spaces in people's daily lives. Iraqis relayed  the different ways in which their 
displacement  was  cumulative.  They  adapted  their  daily  routines  to  the  evolving 
circumstances:  some  changed  their  routes  to  work  and  to  school,  some  restricted  their 
journeys to ones of absolute necessity and some did not leave their homes at all for extended 
periods in order to evade threats. Parents transferred their children to schools in areas where 
armed conflict was less intense. Other Iraqis relocated their businesses to more secure areas. 
Some made temporary migrations within the country, away from their areas of origin whilst 
others  made  temporary  journeys  abroad  as  part  of  threat  evasion  strategies.  They  were 
measures designed to elude dangers - the decision to leave Iraq altogether was typically a last 
resort. They had often exhausted all the options available to them to evade threats without 
leaving Iraq and made a hard choice to leave their country under duress. 
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The experiences of refugees - Iraqis who have left the state – have been the focus of this 
study. Yousif and the nuclear family members of Baan and also Farah are exceptions. They 
decided to remain in Iraq rather than risk the economic insecurity of long-term migration and 
endure  the  increasing  constraints  on  their  daily  lives  as  a  result  of  displacement.  The 
experiences of Iraqis who are displaced in place have not been addressed centrally here but 
this is an important area for further research. How does the displacement process affect others 
who remain in Iraq? The effects of this process on those who did not leave Iraq - or their areas 
of origin - deserve scholarly attention. 
I have found it useful to develop the idea of a coercive landscape in which an aggregation of  
threats  has the effect of severely constraining those who live within it.  Their  choices are 
severely diminished as threats permeate and constrain a multiplicity of spaces in their daily 
lives. It is within the coercive landscape that processes of displacement and coercive pressures  
can combine to induce mass displacement. The notion of the coercive landscape refers both to 
a social world in which threats diminish the choices available to agents and to the physical 
environment they traverse. Agents are subjected to a number of coercive pressures which 
relate to dynamics of cumulative causation, statecraft and economic collapse - a profusion of 
threats and constraints. It is also clear that in the shaping of the coercive landscape, gender 
relations are profoundly important. Certain spaces can be transformed in ways which make 
women the direct focus of threat initiatives or focal points for the generalisation of fear. Men 
may also face greater threats than women in some situations and this can be directly related to 
gender roles: in the Chaldean and Mandaean communities, men were the priests and therefore 
more likely to be targeted. These are important issues which warrant further research.
The idea of a coercive landscape emerges from a situation which is the outcome of specific 
developments – local, regional and global – relating to Iraq during the 1990s and the first 
decade of the 21st century. My work is also based on snapshots in time. As I wrote in Chapter 
2, my field-work was contingent on a moment in history and the stories I collected and co-
constructed were told in a  complex political  context – one which has changed drastically 
since.  I  cannot  claim  that  these  are  representative  of  Iraqis  involved  in  the  major 
displacements which occurred after 2003. But the testimonies presented here have been useful 
sources from which to make general inferences - these can be tested and developed by further 
research. It would now be helpful for scholars of forced migration if comparative work – 
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geographically and historically – could be undertaken so that we can examine whether the 
notion of a coercive landscape is useful in other situations of mass displacement.
Thinking of mass displacement in terms of decisions made in a coercive landscape requires a 
holistic approach to migrants' experiences - research into various aspects of the social world in 
order to construct an understanding of wider pressures that contribute to the decision to leave. 
The connection to processes of state formation, state collapse and to “statecraft”, should be 
examined  closely  to  identify  causative  elements.  Narratives  of  the  displaced  should  be 
collected systematically to make historical comparisons. Kushner (2006: 15) has remarked 
that refugees are “the forgotten of history, the abused of politics” and that they have been 
deliberately ignored in the historical record (Kushner,  2006: 17-18).  Iraqis displaced after 
2003 point to the failures of the Anglo-American military intervention and to the disingenuous  
claims made by its  architects  about  their  concerns for  the  welfare of  the  country and its 
people. They provide a salutary testimony for those who supported the occupation and hold 
the view that humanitarian imperialism is possible. They are even more awkward for the post-
2003 political order in Iraq – many of Iraq's political elite are directly connected to militias 
which  displaced  hundreds  of  thousands  of  people.  The  experience  of  refugees  and  the 
representations of them have had little in common (Kushner, 2006: 1). Here narrative research 
methods can be particularly useful to counter this. They offer researchers a method of eliciting 
detailed testimonies and encourage participants to reflect on and make sense of extraordinary 
events. It is in part through such a holistic and refugee-centred approach that we can begin, to 
borrow once more from Kushner (2006: 47), the task of “putting refugees back into history.”
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Biographical information about the participants in this study
Abu Bakr 
A retired officer in the Iraqi Republican Guard which was the professional and not conscript 
based army. He was an electronic systems engineer and not an armed officer but was still  
excluded from the new armed forces in Iraq after 2003 as he was considered to belong to the 
former regime.  He was in his mid 40s. Abu Bakr had a love for cars and enjoyed watching 
the TV show Top Gear with Arabic subtitles. He is Adnaan's brother and has family origins in 
Tikrit but lived in Baghdad until his departure for Syria. I met him and Adnaan when I was 
working as a translator for ILAS (Iraqi Legal Aid Society).1 I  interviewed Abu Bakr in a 
restaurant close to my home in Damascus. 
Abu S
He had attained a senior position in the administration of public health and other medical 
matters in  a province in southern Iraq.  I  met him in a  clinic in the Damascus suburb of 
Sayidda Zaineb. I had interviewed an Iraqi dentist2 who worked there – my Iraqi research 
assistant introduced me to him - and he introduced me to Abu S who was employed as a  
pharmacist in the same clinic. Abu S was living in Damascus, separated from all of his family 
members who were still living in Iraq. I interviewed him in the pharmacy while he worked. 
He was around 50 years old.
Abu Waleed
Abu Waleed was born in Baghdad but his family originated in Palestine. They were refugees 
living in Baghdad. I met him through my colleague Tahir Zaman and interviewed him in his 
home in the Yarmouk Camp suburb of Damascus which – as its name suggests – had evolved 
from a refugee camp for Palestinians. Abu Waleed was in his early 50s and spent a lot of time 
contributing to the community website of the Palestinians of Iraq www.paliraq.com.
Adnaan
The brother of Abu Bakr, in his forties, and also a former officer in the Iraqi Republican 
Guard. Unlike his brother he was an armed officer – a parachute instructor in the Special 
Forces of the Republican Guard. His family origins were in Tikrit but he had grown up in 
Baghdad. He was a pious Muslim. In his neighbourhood of Ghazaliya he had established a 
Sons of Iraq group to combat Al Qaida and militia activity there. The project was successful  
whilst overseen by American forces but he was forced out after Iraqi government forces took 
over – eventually having to leave the Iraq altogether. I interviewed him in a restaurant in 
Damascus.
Anwar
A man in his 30s who ran a grocery stall in Baghdad. He left for Syria because of militia 
activity where he lived and ran his stall. In Syria he worked as an interpreter for the Iraqi  
Legal  Assistance  Project  and  set-up  a  project  which  helped  Iraqi  and  American  school 
children interact on the internet. He developed an interest in film and photography and made a 
1
See Chapter 2.
2 The dentist's experience does not appear in this thesis but does so elsewhere. See Ali (2011). 
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short documentary about an Iraq family living in Syria. He is now in the United States – I  
interviewed him in my apartment a few days before he left. 
Baan
She is the daughter of Um Ahmed and in her early 20s. She lived in Ghazaliya in Baghdad. 
Her  parents  transferred  her  to  a  different  school  as  intense  fighting  took  place  near  her 
original school. She was a student at the Education for Iraqis Project (EIP) where I taught her 
academic English. I also gave her guitar lessons. She caused a stir at her school in Baghdad 
for being the first girl to start playing basketball and because she encouraged other girls to do 
the same. She is  now studying for her undergraduate degree at  an American university.  I 
interviewed her in my apartment in Damascus and also interviewed her mother. 
Bessaam
Also a student at EIP in his early 20s, he is now in America studying for an undergraduate 
degree. His family are originally from Hilla in southern Iraq but he grew up in a residential  
compound near the city of Fallujah. He studied dentistry briefly in Ukraine but corruption was 
so  endemic  there  that  he  abandoned  it  to  study  for  a  specialist  welding  engineering 
qualification in Malaysia. I taught him during drama classes at EIP. I interviewed him in my 
apartment.
Farah
She is another bright and successful student from the EIP and is now studying for her degree 
in the United States. I taught her academic English at EIP. She also worked in an NGO in  
Baghdad which focused on local civil society activities. She studied design in a Baghdad 
institute but had long dreamt to study abroad. She had a strong desire to learn. She has a 
mellow voice but strong character: when she was 13, she refused to let Mehdi Army militia 
men enter her home. I interviewed Farah in my apartment in Damascus. 
Hadi
A colourful  and  interesting  spokesman  for  his  community.  He  came  from  an  important 
Mandaean family - his father was a Shaykh but also the King of Iraq's goldsmith and also a 
favoured goldsmith of subsequent rulers of the country. Hadi had been advocating for the 
Mandaeans for years before I met him and is a skilled public speaker. He played a key role in 
the committee which oversaw the first translation into Arabic of the Mandaean holy book – 
the Ginza Rabba. He was also a successful businessman. Sadly his business and advocacy 
activities  were  restricted  and  eventually  put  to  an  end  by  the  occupation  and  dynamics 
released by it. Hadi is in his 50s and I interviewed him in his apartment in Jaramana. I met  
him when I was working as an interpreter for ILAS.
Haleem
Haleem is a Mandaean man in his 60s. He is also a writer and a retired teacher. He studied in 
the UK for an MA in English Literature. He is very talkative and enjoyed being interviewed. 
He told me that the thing he missed the most about Iraq was his date palm tree – he was 
sadder  about  leaving  his  tree  than  about  leaving  his  home.  I  was  introduced  to  Haleem 
through Hadi and interviewed Haleem in his apartment in Jaramana. 
Hassan 
Hassan worked as a barber in Damascus in the suburb of Sayidda Zaineb. He married a Syrian 
woman.  I  interviewed  him in  his  apartment  and  was  introduced  to  him  by  my research 
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assistant. He had studied Tourism and Hotel Management in Iraq but was unable to pursue a 
career related to his degree. 
Jasim
I met Jasim when I was teaching academic English at EIP. He is now studying for his degree 
at an American university. He was passionate about physics and loved reading science fiction 
as well as watching it on the screen. He enjoyed playing computer games, listening to an 
eclectic  range  of  music,  and  was  also  a  huge  fan  of  the  American  TV  series  Lost.  I 
interviewed him in my apartment in Damascus. 
Maher & Rania
They are artists in their mid-20s who now live in North America after being resettled there 
through the UNHCR process. I met them at parties in Damascus. Maher particularly enjoyed 
the  social  scene  in  the  city.  They  were  both  able  to  exhibit  some  of  their  paintings  at 
exhibitions of Iraqi art in Damascus. They were looking forward to leaving Syria for North 
America where they hoped they would be able to enjoy many of the things they missed out on  
growing up in Iraq. 
Majeed
I met Majeed, a Baghdadi with origins in a Christian village in the north, whilst conducting a 
research  study  for  the  UNHCR  in  Syria.  I  interviewed  him  for  that  project  about  his 
employment  situation  in  Syria  and  he  later  agreed  to  come  to  my  apartment  and  be 
interviewed for this thesis research. He was in his late 30s and had worked in a printing press 
in Baghdad for years. Majeed also managed to acquire work in a printing press in Damascus 
thanks to help from his priest.
Mohsin
Mohsin  is  now studying  in  the  United  States  thanks  to  EIP where  I  taught  him  briefly. 
Although in hid early 20s he has the appearance of a man in his early 30s, likely because of 
the challenging experiences he has had since 2003. He was however a very vibrant character 
and his enthusiasm for life was infectious. I interviewed him in my apartment in Damascus 
where he also stayed briefly before moving house. 
Najma
Anwar introduced me to Najma, a woman in her early 20s, but I got to know her very well  
through my work as an interpreter for ILAS. She had fled her abusive husband in Iraq and had 
moved home several times whilst in Damascus fearing that he may one day find her and their 
2-year-old daughter – as he had threatened to. Najma had spent time in a women's shelter in 
Damascus but the conditions there were prison like and this resulted in her having a nervous 
breakdown before she left. She was also verbally abused by a UNHCR Protection Officer – 
something I complained about on her behalf. Najma now lives in North America. 
Raz
I taught Raz, aged 20, at the EIP. He is a Baghdadi with origins in western Iraq. Raz was 
probably the most nationalist of all the EIP students I knew. He was an avid computer game 
player and also a gun enthusiast. He could identify different weapons by their sounds – but he 
told me that this was quite a normal thing amongst young men in Iraq today. Like other EIP 
students, he was an avid reader. Raz was also extremely self-confident and a very helpful 
individual. He is now studying at a university in the United States. I interviewed him in my 
215
apartment in Damascus.
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Sara
I met Sara when I was teaching at the EIP. She is from Baghdad and her father was an elite  
pilot in the Iraqi Airforce. She enjoyed the drama classes I co-taught at the EIP and seems to 
be a natural on the stage – she has taken up singing as an extra-curricular activity at  her 
university  in  the  United  States.  She  was  aged  19  when  I  interviewed  her  in  a  café in 
Damascus. 
Sayf
I  interviewed  Sayf  inside  the  UNHCR  compound  in  Kafar  Sousa,  Damascus,  for  the 
employment study. He was a friendly and gregarious individual and had been the director of a 
large state-owned energy company in southern Iraq. I did not interview him at length for my 
PhD but the information he gave during conversations at the UNHCR were very interesting. 
He was in his 50s and originated from a province in southern Iraq. 
Shaykh Rami
A goldsmith and a Mandaean priest in his 60s. Shaykh Rami was introduced to me by Hadi. I 
first met him when he was baptising Mandaeans during a wedding ceremony. He was also 
training younger assistant priests that day. In his house in a Damascus suburb, he kept a goat 
and some chickens. The Shaykh was a very friendly and approachable man. I interviewed him 
in his house in Damascus with the help of Hadi who made some key interventions to prompt 
the Shaykh's memory of past events.
Um Ahmed
The mother of Baan, a student I met and taught at the EIP. She was a teacher in Baghdad but 
had family origins in Mosul. She was brave and of very strong character and managed her  
family's move to a safer neighbourhood almost alone and at times taking risks – such as when 
she returned to pick up furniture from the neighbourhood from which she had been displaced 
- without her husband's knowledge. I interviewed her twice in a restaurant in Damascus, close 
to my apartment. The batteries in my recorder died during the first interview and she kindly 
agreed to be interviewed again. 
Yousif
Yousif is a bright and energetic young man, aged 20 at the time I interviewed him in may 
apartment  in  Damascus.  He  was  something  of  a  celebrity  in  the  Chaldean  Christian 
community as he had presented a TV show in a neo-Aramaic dialect on a recently established 
Iraqi satellite channel. Unfortunately he was unable to secure a place at a university in the  
United States with the EIP and returned to Iraq where he remains. 
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions
Below is the question set I had to hand during interviews. The main questions are lettered A to 
K and the sub-questions are numbered. 
A) Could you tell me about your life before you left Iraq?
1) Where did you live in Iraq? 
2) Who lived in your home with you before you left? 
3) What is your profession? 
4) How did you earn your living in Iraq? 
5) What level of education did you attain and where did you study?
6) Tell me about your daily life in Iraq before the invasion in 2003?
B) Could you tell me about what your life was like in your neighbourhood before the 
invasion in 2003?
7) How long had you lived there?
8) Did you own or rent the place where you lived?
9) Tell me about your neighbourhood before the invasion in 2003. 
10) What was it like in your neighbourhood before 2003?
11) What were your neighbours like?
12) Were there any neighbourhoods in your city that you felt were unsafe to visit before 
2003? 
C) After the invasion, how was your life affected? 
13) Did anything change immediately after 2003? 
14) Did your daily life change after the occupation?
15) Were there neighbourhoods that you felt were unsafe to visit after the invasion?
16) Were these neighbourhoods places you would have visited before 2003?
17) What was it about these neighbourhoods that made you think they were unsafe?
18) What information did you have about the danger?
19) How did you manage visiting neighbourhoods that you felt were unsafe?
20) Did anything change later?
D) What was your experience of healthcare in Iraq? 
21) What was it like before the occupation? Did this change afterwards and when?
E) What was your experience of education in Iraq?
22) What was it like before the occupation? What changed afterwards, and when? 
F) What was the situation like for people of your profession before the invasion?
23) Did this change after the invasion? When did these changes begin, and how did they 
develop? 
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G) Would you tell me about how you came to leave Iraq?
24) When did you leave Iraq?
25) Tell me about the day you left your home/Iraq.
26) Was there any particular event or events which triggered your decision to leave your 
home?
27) Had you thought of leaving before this event(s)? Were there any other times in the past 
when you wanted to leave Iraq? Why was that? Why didn't you leave then?
28) Did anyone make suggestions to you about your plans for leaving?
29) Did you hear anything on the radio/tv/ from anyone in the mosque / church / 
professional association that affected your decision?
30) How much time was there between making the decision to leave, and actually leaving?
31) What preparations did you make?
H) Were you the first person in your family, group of friends, or professional colleagues to 
leave?
32) If someone you knew left before you, did they help you to leave in anyway? Did you 
ask them for information or advice?
33) Have you helped anyone you know to leave their homes? Have you advised anyone 
about this?  
I) Why did you choose Syria? 
34) Did you already know people here? 
35) Did you consult with them before leaving your home?
36) Where do you live now? 
37)  Have you always lived in this part of Syria?
J) Is there anything you would like to tell me that I haven’t asked about?
K) If you and your family could live anywhere in the world, where would you go and why?3
3 I used this question as a way of closing the interview on a lighter note which I felt was important after 
prolonged discussions about difficult events in the past. 
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Appendix 3: Questions used by the IfPO-Oxford research project about 
decision making. 
 
 
1. Basic information:
1.a Where did you live in Iraq before moving where you are now?
1.b Please tell us exactly where? (not just the muhafazah, but the precise location)
1.c What is your profession and how did you earn your livelihood before leaving Iraq?
1.d What level of education did you attain and where did you study?
1.e Are you married and do you have children? Are they here with you, and if not where are 
they (spouse and children)? 
1.f Before you were displaced (or left), who was living in the same house with you (beyond 
the nuclear family: eg elderly relatives, or other relatives)?
2. Before 2003, was your life where you were living in Iraq generally secure? If not, how was 
it insecure? 
After 2003, what was the main reason for your departure? Was there a particular event which 
caused you to leave? Did you feel that you and/or your family were in immediate danger? 
If yes, go to section 2.a; if not, go to section 2.b
2.a What type/degree of danger? Were you/members of your family under direct threat?
If so from who or what? 
Before you left, did you feel it was necessary to protect yourself or your family in other ways 
(changing usual pattern of movements in relation to work, education, access to food and 
services, family and other visits, etc)? 
Did you know about other such threats to other people around you, or more generally in Iraq? 
How did learn about them (family in Iraq or abroad, neighbours, wider community in Iraq or 
abroad, religious/political networks and institutions, armed groups, media and which ones, 
and who was talking through the media)? 
Did this knowledge influence your decision? And how?
Did you conclude that you must leave over the course of days, months, weeks, years? 
Do you believe that your decision to leave influenced others? And how? 
2.b If you did not leave under a direct threat, how did you become aware it might be 
necessary to leave your usual place of residence? 
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Did problems relating to your job, access to services (education, health, etc), food/water 
supplies (food rations, shops, agricultural lands, etc), failure of public services (electricity, 
transportations, etc), possibility or security of movements etc influence your decision to 
leave? 
Did the decision to leave of people you knew personally influence your decision and in which 
way?
Did you know about direct threats on other people around you, or more generally in Iraq? 
How did learn about them (family in Iraq or abroad, neighbours, wider community in Iraq or 
abroad, religious/political networks and institutions, armed groups, media and which ones, 
and who was talking through the media)? 
Did this knowledge influence your decision? And how?
Before you left, did you feel it was necessary to protect yourself or your family in other ways 
(changing usual pattern of movements in relation to work, education, access to food and 
services, family and other visits, etc)? 
Can you describe how the circumstances became progressively more difficult to the point that 
you felt you had no choice but to leave? Did you feel there were any other options? 
Did you conclude that you must leave over the course of days, months, weeks, years? 
Do you believe that your decision to leave influenced others? And how? 
3. Was the decision to leave taken on your own (3.a), in consultation with others (3.b), or was 
the decision taken by others (3.c)? 
3.a Did you feel it was necessary to consult other people before you made the decision 
(spouse, others members of the family in Iraq and abroad, friends in Iraq and abroad, 
neighbours, religious/tribal community members/leaders, others)? 
Was the advice of some people more influential than others in helping you make the decision? 
How and why?
In your view who are the best people to make such decisions and why?
Do you know of conflicts in your family or community associated with the decision to leave?
3.b Who participated in making the decision (spouse, others members of the family in Iraq 
and abroad, friends in Iraq and abroad, neighbours/village, religious/tribal community 
members/leaders, others)? 
What was the size/type of social group/collective within which the decision was taken; to 
which the decision applied; and who abided by decision? Where there some people who 
decided not to leave and/or who were unable to leave?
Were some people more influential than others in shaping the collective decision? How and 
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why?
In your view who are the best people to make such decisions and why?
Do you know of conflicts in your family or community associated with the decision to leave?
3.c If you were not involved in making the decision, who made it for you?
What was the size/type of social group/collective within which the decision was taken; to 
which the decision applied; and who abided by decision? Where there some people who 
decided not to leave and/or who were unable to leave?
Did you or others try to resist the decision of influence it? 
Do you know of conflicts in your family or community associated with the decision to leave? 
In your view who are the best people to make such decisions and why?
4. Did all the members of your family leave together? How did you decide on this? What 
influenced choice to leave together or leave in stages or phases? 
4.a If departure was phased, who left first, who followed and when and who decided upon the 
pattern and timing of movement? Based on which elements? 
5. What preparation did you make for your journey? 
Sale or rent of properties (house, land, business, etc.), and moveable properties
Application for passports, visas
Collecting other documents (school certificates, etc.)
Transferring money to the place where you were going and how (hawalah, etc)
Finding residence in your intended destination (through relatives or others)
Organising with relatives or other people you knew to travel together
Seeking information about safety and conditions on your journey and at destination 
6. What did you/others know about the risks involved in your journey in/from Iraq?
Did you travel directly to where you are now? 
6.a If yes, what guided your decision to come here? 
2. Your own previous knowledge of the place; family members who were here or had been 
here (marriage, study, transit migration, stage migration, labour migrations etc); other people 
and if yes, how did they have knowledge/information about this place; other sources of 
information (media, religious institutions/leaders, etc)?
3. Do you feel that you were able to exert a choice as to your current destination or that there 
was no other possibility? 
6.b If not, can you retrace the trajectory, timing, decision making and information gathering at 
each stage that led you and your family members to this place? 
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At each stage, do you feel that your were able to exert a choice between staying or leaving, 
and between several possible destinations, or that there was no other possibility? 
7. Are all the members of your family currently with you in this place? 
7.a If not, where are they and why? Is their dispersal the result of choices made within the 
family or the result of constraints (keeping the property or the business, border closures, 
incapacity to move, etc)? 
How does this separation influence your aspirations to stay in or leave this place? 
8. Had you personally lived outside Iraq (or in other locations inside Iraq) before 2003? 
8.a If you had not lived outside Iraq, had you wished to leave Iraq already before 2003?
8.a.a If yes, had you made previous attempts? To go where? Why were these attempts 
unsuccessful? 
8.b If yes, when did you leave? To go where and for how long? How did you chose the place 
to which you migrated? Were there successive migrations to several places? When and why 
did you go back to Iraq?  
9. Had other members of your close family (parents, brothers and sisters, spouse, children) 
left Iraq (or your habitual place of residence in Iraq) before 2003? When, to where and how 
long? Where there successive migrations to several places?
Would you say that their migration was the result of a choice of forced by circumstances? 
How did they chose the place to which they migrated? 
10. In retrospect, was your decision to leave Iraq (or your previous place of residence in Iraq) 
when you did the right one? Do people related to you (family, relatives, friends, etc) face 
continuing problem today? Would you recommend that they leave? Where would you 
recommend them to go?
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